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In September 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon, someone placed letters containing Bacil-
lus anthracis spores into a mailbox in Trenton, New Jersey. Those letters 
were addressed to several media outlets, including ABC, NBC, CBS, the 
New York Post, and American Media, Inc. in Boca Raton, Florida. The 
recipients of one of the letters, Mr. Robert Stevens, was the first person 
to die in what has become known as the anthrax letters attack and des-
ignated as the “Amerithrax” investigation by the FBI. At first, diagnosis 
of Mr. Stevens’ illness was complicated by the absence of any suspicion 
that would make anthrax part of the differential diagnosis for a 63-year-
old man in Boca Raton. Once a diagnosis of anthrax was made, health 
care workers and epidemiologists began trying to understand how an 
office worker could come in contact with B. anthracis, the causative agent 
of the disease anthrax. One possible, though unlikely, scenario that was 
widely touted at the time was that he had come across an infected ani-
mal, perhaps a beaver, while on a recent hiking trip. The receipt of an 
array of letters filled with white powder soon confirmed that this was 
a bioterrorist attack and not a natural occurrence. In early October, the 
perpetrator mailed a second set of letters containing a more highly refined 
preparation of spores, this time addressed to Senators Tom Daschle and 
Patrick Leahy. Once it was clear that there was an ongoing threat, exten-
sive efforts were begun to identify the source and characteristics of the 
material used in the attack. What became immediately clear in the midst 
of heroic efforts to discern the cause and source of the anthrax mailings 
Preface
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was that we were unprepared to analyze the microbial forensic evidence 
associated with this attack.
At the time, most diagnostic and epidemiological characterizations 
of infectious diseases were based on illness, culture, serology, physical 
characteristics, and metabolic profiles of infectious organisms—processes 
that take time and require pure cultures of viable microorganisms. There 
was a nascent field of microbial forensics, which had begun in the United 
States in the preceding decade with the formation of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s Hazardous Materials Response Unit. The Unit was cre-
ated in part to support suspected or known bioterrorism investigations 
by providing investigative leads and supporting prosecutions or exon-
erations with scientific evidence. The Unit was a law enforcement opera-
tion designed to employ forensic science principles and practices to pro-
duce evidence that would be admissible in court according to U.S. legal 
requirements and standards. The Amerithrax investigation accelerated 
the development of the field of microbial forensics, resulting in remark-
able development and applications of new techniques and approaches 
for using laboratory tools to pinpoint the identity of a microbial agent. 
Microbial forensics became an essential part of the scientific investiga-
tion, which was combined with physicochemical analyses as well as other 
nonscientific types of evidence to narrow the search for the source of the 
B. anthracis used in the attacks.
Today we find ourselves with a complex infrastructure of govern-
ment agencies, Select Agent registries, regulated research, environmental 
monitoring in designated cities, federal and state regulations—all result-
ing from one more or less successful biological attack on the United States. 
The Amerithrax attack with highly refined material produced by a knowl-
edgeable expert (presumably in a U.S. bioweapons laboratory) resulted 
in 22 illnesses and 5 deaths. Approximately 4 g of material were used in 
the Amerithrax attack. At that time, the United States planned and pre-
pared as best it could for an attack involving 50 kg of weaponized anthrax 
spores released on a city with a population of 500,000, anticipating 125,000 
casualties. However, it is unlikely that a nonstate entity would be able to 
produce that quality or quantity of material undetected. Moreover, aside 
from B. anthracis, there are few (if any) biological agents that can be grown 
in quantity, viably maintained, stabilized, processed to the appropriate 
size, and delivered in an aerosolizable form except by a few special-
ized bioweapons facilities and certainly not by terrorists in a garage or 
cave. Most exotic microorganisms are just too difficult to grow and keep 
alive, even in the most sophisticated facility. In addition, the technology 
involved in weaponizing biological materials is complex, demanding, and 
requires substantial expertise. The more likely scenario is someone having 
access to a small amount of unrefined material that he/she uses to make 
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a few individuals ill (causing perhaps a few deaths), the consequence of 
which will be a nation paralyzed with fear, not illness.
In that context, microbial forensics becomes more important than 
ever. How does one differentiate a natural outbreak from an accidental 
release from a legitimate laboratory, or the use of biological material to 
commit a crime, bioterrorism, and all-out biological warfare? How can 
this be accomplished quickly enough to inform law enforcement, the 
intelligence community, policy makers, and the public in a timely fashion? 
The traditional clinical laboratory sciences of culture identification, serol-
ogy, etc. are inadequate for these purposes. It was with this background 
that the workshop in Zagreb, Croatia, was held in October 2013 with the 
intent to identify the scientific challenges that must be met to improve 
the capability of microbial forensics to investigate suspected outbreaks 
and to provide evidence of sufficient quality to support responses, legal 
proceedings, and the development of government policies. The workshop 
also was designed to increase awareness of microbial forensics among the 
members of the larger international scientific communities and to engage 
these communities in the development of a plan on how to address sci-
entific challenges.
One of the more important concepts discussed during the workshop 
was that the techniques of microbial forensics could aid not only law 
enforcement and policy makers, but also public health workers, in trying 
to identify the existence and source of natural outbreaks. Indeed, as we 
saw in the Amerithrax attack, the public health system will likely be the 
first to encounter and the first line of defense against a biological attack. 
Most infectious diseases develop gradually, with individual patients seek-
ing medical care through their local health care providers. People vary in 
their susceptibility to infectious diseases, and subtle clues may signal an 
attack, such as an increase in frequency of a naturally occurring infectious 
disease, unusual seasonality, unexpected resistance to antimicrobials, or 
unusual age distribution. These features are likely to be recognized first 
in the public health arena, and the more common the tools and techniques 
are between law enforcement and public health, the more likely that a true 
attack will be identified early, perhaps in time to administer prophylactic 
antibiotics or vaccines or prevent a second release. Moreover, the further 
we get from an actual attack, the less inclined policy makers are to pro-
vide financial support for continuing the research necessary to prepare for 
an attack. As noted in the 2013 President’s Report for the Global Partner-
ship Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction 
(U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013): 
Many of the capabilities required for detecting and responding to the 
whole spectrum of natural, intentional, and man-made events are es-
sentially the same. Systems and networks that might be created for rare 
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events will atrophy through lack of use, whereas systems created for 
addressing natural, man-made and accidental outbreaks of infectious 
disease are likely to be used frequently. Relying on tools and systems that 
are compatible with both rare and common occurrences means that in an 
instance of a rare event, detection and response will not be delayed by 
lack of familiarity with the tools or systems of reporting.
On behalf of the entire committee, I wish to extend our sincere grati-
tude to the excellent staff at the National Academies. It is because of 
the dedication and extraordinary efforts of Fran Sharples, Director of 
the Board on Life Sciences at the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 
that we were able to complete this ambitious task in so short a time. The 
committee also wishes to thank Jo Husbands from the NAS staff and our 
colleagues at the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Jelena Dukic, 
the Director of International Cooperation, and Ninja Ivanus from her staff, 
for their outstanding contributions to the design and organization of the 
workshop. Our colleagues from the U.K. Royal Society and the Interna-
tional Union of Microbiological Societies provided important support and 
ideas throughout the process. I also want to thank my fellow committee 
members for their commitment that made the workshop and writing of 
this report an enjoyable and rewarding opportunity.
John D. Clements, Chair
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Cultural Organization
UNICRI U.N. Interregional Crime and Justice Research 
Institute
UNIDIR U.N. Institute for Disarmament Research
U.S. United States of America
USAMRIID U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Diseases
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
VNTR variable number tandem repeat
WDCM World Data Center of Microorganisms
WFCC-MIRCEN World Federation for Culture Collections—
Microbial Resources Centers Network
WGS whole-genome sequencing
WHO World Health Organization
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
WMD weapons of mass destruction
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Summary
One of the fundamental components of any investigation of a sus-
pected accidental release of a dangerous pathogen or the alleged hostile 
use of biological agents, whether by states or nonstate actors, will be 
scientific analysis to support efforts for attribution. Science will not offer 
definitive solutions in such scenarios, but it often plays a special role in 
supporting other aspects of an investigation. The United States and a 
number of other governments and international and regional organiza-
tions are actively working to identify and support the research that is 
needed to build those capabilities, which are known generally as “micro-
bial forensics.” 
Microbial forensics deals with the genetic and other materials associ-
ated with microorganisms. Contrary to the images from popular media, 
this emerging discipline is still in the early stages of development and 
faces substantial scientific challenges to provide a robust suite of technolo-
gies for identifying the source of a biological threat agent and attributing a 
biothreat act to a particular person or group. The unlawful use of biologi-
cal threat agents poses substantial dangers to individuals, public health, 
the environment, the economies of nations, and global peace. It is likely 
that scientific, political, and media-based controversy will surround any 
investigation of the alleged use of a biological agent. For these reasons, 
building awareness of and capacity in microbial forensics can assist in our 
understanding of what may have occurred during a biothreat event and 
facilitate international collaborations that engage the broader scientific 
and policy-making communities that are likely to strengthen our micro-
1
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bial forensics capabilities. One goal is to create a shared technical under-
standing of the possibilities—and limitations—of the scientific bases for 
microbial forensics analyses. Another is to identify the range of scientific 
needs to continue the field’s development.
Microbial forensics has additional specialized needs because of the 
demand for “evidence” and “proof” in the context of law enforcement 
or international policy. Many of these relate as much to the quality of 
the process by which material is collected and analyzed as to the science 
and technology employed. The public health needs highlighted in this 
report reflect the global reality that in most countries the capabilities 
and activities relevant to microbial forensics occur only in the context 
of public health. Particularly the United States has a microbial forensics 
science community that is truly differentiated from public health, and a 
limited number of other countries have some basic microbial forensics 
infrastructure. For most of the rest of the world, microbial forensics is a 
side activity of public health officials. Since most disease outbreaks will 
first be recognized through the public health infrastructure, strengthening 
detection and diagnostic capacities there serves both public health and 
law enforcement.
With these needs and realities in mind, a group of national and inter-
national scientific organizations undertook a collaboration whose center-
piece was a workshop held in fall 2013 in Zagreb, Croatia. As mentioned 
above, the specific goals of the workshop (and the larger collaboration) 
were to
•	 Foster collaboration within the international scientific community 
to support technical understanding and enhanced research on 
microbial forensics, and
•	 Develop the beginnings of an international roadmap for how to 
do the necessary science, including priorities among potential 
topics.
The partner organizations were the U.S. National Academy of Sci-
ences (NAS), the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the International 
Union of Microbiological Societies, and the U.K.’s Royal Society. The Cro-
atian Academy hosted the workshop at its headquarters in Zagreb. Par-
ticipants included 59 experts from 21 countries and several international 
organizations, spanning a range of researchers and clinicians from numer-
ous scientific and technological disciplines related or applicable to micro-
bial forensics as well as technical experts and policy makers with a strong 
interest in the contributions of science and technology to security. The 
two-and-a-half-day meeting was the primary evidence-gathering mecha-
nism for an ad hoc committee with substantial international membership 
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appointed by the NAS’s National Research Council (NRC). The NRC 
committee supplemented the information obtained during the workshop 
with other evidence to prepare a final consensus report, which offers a 
series of conclusions for advancing the field. Funding for the project was 
provided by the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Department of State, and the NAS.
The committee used a generous definition of “science,” including 
research to improve fundamental scientific understanding of microbes; 
specialized research intended for particular applications in public health, 
law enforcement, or elsewhere; and an array of technologies and methods 
that are enabling dramatic advances in both basic and applied research. 
The committee also identified important procedural and policy needs, 
such as common understandings and protocols for taking and manag-
ing samples within and across nations. Meeting these additional needs 
is essential to ensure that the scientific and technical developments the 
committee calls for are to make microbial forensics a more effective tool 
for investigating suspicious disease outbreaks.
The committee prepared this final consensus report, which draws 
on the workshop presentations and discussions as well as on additional 
information obtained from other experts and the literature to reach con-
clusions for moving forward. The report is not meant to provide a detailed 
roadmap for the international development of microbial forensics, but 
rather elucidates the major issues highlighted at the workshop that the 
committee believes need to be addressed for the global development of 
the science of microbial forensics. For the purposes of this project, the 
committee chose breadth over depth.1 The committee also gave particu-
lar attention to those areas, such as increased scientific knowledge about 
microbial communities and common standards and protocols for analysis, 
which would benefit from international cooperation and collaboration. 
The number and variety of issues meant that not all issues could be exam-
ined in sufficient detail to develop a true roadmap.
The statement of task for this project calls for the committee to 
“develop the beginnings of an international roadmap for how to do the 
necessary science, including priorities among potential topics.” The list 
of needs identified in Box S-1 is long, but the successful development of 
microbial forensics will require addressing all of them. There are consid-
erable differences in how difficult it will be to achieve the priorities and 
in whether there are already existing national or international efforts, 
for example, in basic research or public health or by industry, which 
1  Basic information about microbial forensics is available in a number of textbooks (see, 
e.g., Budowle et al., 2011, and Primorac and Schanfield, 2014). Various national and inter-
national advisory bodies have also addressed many of the issues covered in the report (see, 
e.g., the reports of the U.S. National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee, 2009, 2011).
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BOX S-1 
Priority Categories for Microbial Forensics Needs
Challenging Tasks and/or Long Lead Times
•	 	An international collaboration engaging the worldwide scientific community in 
a systematic effort to identify, monitor, and characterize a far higher propor-
tion of global microbial species to increase knowledge about endemism and 
background. The effort should begin with known pathogens and then expand 
to their close relatives as well as emerging pathogens. (Conclusion 1, Basic 
Science)
•	 	Development of high-confidence methods to distinguish among natural, ac-
cidental, and deliberate outbreaks of infectious diseases. (Conclusion 2, Basic 
Science)
•	 	Increased emphasis on development and validation of processes (sample col-
lection, preservation, handling, storage, packaging, and transportation) and 
analytical methods for microbial forensics, including establishing standards for 
most components. (Conclusion 9, Validation and Standards)
•	 	Discussions under the auspices of an international body that has the respect 
of the international political and scientific communities about how to share 
microbial forensic data, and for developing and presenting cogent arguments 
that can be persuasive to political leaders and scientists worldwide. (Conclusion 
12, Bioinformatics and Data/Data Sharing)
•	 	An international effort to design and establish more systematic and comprehen-
sive reference collections and databases for pathogens and other microorgan-
isms. This effort could take advantage of existing models, such as the World 
Data Centre for Microorganisms and the American Type Culture Collection. 
A model system for a consortium of reference collections and data storage 
centers could be created and later scaled up to become more inclusive. (Con-
clusion 13, Bioinformatics and Data/Databases and Reference Collections)
Ongoing Efforts on Which to Build
•	 	Increased emphasis on research to determine mechanisms of pathogenicity, 
including virulence factors and host immune responses. (Conclusion 5, Needs 
Common to Medicine, Public Health, and Microbial Forensics)
can be drawn upon to help achieve them. Many scientific and techni-
cal communities will be able to make contributions. These communities 
should also be able to take advantage of other initiatives, for example, to 
advance disease surveillance and diagnostics for public health purposes, 
particularly if there is a conscious effort to foster communication across 
the many relevant disciplines and technical fields. There are a number of 
high-priority needs that are particularly challenging tasks with long lead 
times to achieving real progress so that efforts should begin or expand 
soon. The latter needs will require substantial and sustained support 
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•	 	Priority research to realize the promise of metagenomics and its application 
to microbial forensics and the development of the forensic value of the other 
“omics”: proteomics, metabolomics, transcriptomics, glycomics, immunoge-
nomics, etc. (Conclusion 3, Basic Science)
•	 	Greatly improved global disease monitoring and surveillance in humans, ani-
mals, and plants to facilitate rapid response and better disease control. (Conclu-
sion 6, Needs Common to Medicine, Public Health, and Microbial Forensics)
•	 	Improved worldwide access to molecular diagnostics (polymerase chain reac-
tion, whole-genome sequencing, etc.), including refinement and distribution of 
benchtop next generation gene sequencing instruments that are fast and af-
fordable and have simple workflow procedures. (Conclusion 4, Needs Common 
to Medicine, Public Health, and Microbial Forensics)
•	 	High priority placed on continued research and development to improve physi-
cal science applications to microbial forensics. (Conclusion 8, Methods and 
Technologies)
•	 	Refinement of bioinformatics and statistical methods for evaluating evidence in 
microbial forensics, including new algorithms that scale to very large or complex 
datasets. (Conclusion 11, Bioinformatics and Data)
Shorter Lead Times or Industry Incentives
•	 	Development of more advanced, faster, and cheaper assay and sequencing 
technologies that can be standardized and made more accessible to ben-
efit both microbial forensics and public health. (Conclusion 7, Methods and 
Technologies)
•	 	A compilation of all protocols in use (e.g., for sampling, DNA extraction and 
isolation, sequencing, etc.) and whether and how they have been validated. 
(Conclusion 10, Validation and Standards)
•	 	Expansion of technically based training to “professionalize” microbial forensics 
and increase the number of qualified practitioners worldwide by engaging in-
ternational professional organizations or other entities that have experience 
providing training in related fields. (Conclusion 14, Training and Education)
from governments as major funders of the research, development, and 
implementation that will be essential for achieving success.
Box S-1 presents the needs identified in this report organized accord-
ing to the key features discussed above:
•	 One set of needs represents tasks, for example, the need to iden-
tify and characterize a significantly increased number of micro-
bial species that are particularly challenging and/or require a 
long lead time to achieve the desired results. Such efforts will 
require the involvement of governments to provide the research 
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resources to carry them out over many years and should be given 
priority by participating institutions.
•	 The second set represents needs that could take advantage of 
ongoing efforts to advance the development of microbial foren-
sics, but will require deliberate communication efforts and, in 
some cases, funding to ensure that microbial forensics applica-
tions are actually included and implemented.
•	 The third set of needs has the advantage of either a relatively 
short lead time to make substantial progress or the existence 
of significant markets that will provide incentives for industry 
to produce what is required. For example, the production of 
faster and cheaper instruments for diagnostics for medicine and 
genomic analyses for microbial forensics will probably be con-
ducted by industry, which is always seeking to put improved 
devices on the market.
The committee recognizes that there is overlap among the categories 
and that some of the needs would fit within more than one of them. It 
nevertheless believes that exercises like this can be helpful in thinking 
about implementation issues and for the development of a more detailed 
roadmap to guide future efforts. 
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Introduction: What Is Microbial 
Forensics and Why Is It Important? 
Many people have some notion about forensics from their exposure 
to the many “police procedural” TV shows being broadcast in countries 
around the world. Popular entertainment has made many familiar with 
the concept of using human DNA to identify criminals, although the 
TV version of this practice gives what is probably a less than realistic 
impression of the complexity of analyses and degree of certainty sur-
rounding DNA evidence. Nevertheless, human DNA typing is a widely 
accepted means of identifying and convicting perpetrators, exonerating 
the innocent, and identifying missing persons from such tragedies as 
mass disasters.
“Microbial forensics” has been defined as “a scientific discipline dedi-
cated to analyzing evidence from a bioterrorism act, biocrime, or inadver-
tent microorganism/toxin release for attribution purposes” (Budowle et 
al., 2003). This emerging discipline is still in the early stages of develop-
ment and faces substantial scientific challenges to provide a robust suite 
of technologies for identifying the source of a biological threat agent and 
attributing a biothreat act to a particular person or group. The unlawful 
use of biological agents poses substantial dangers to individuals, public 
health, the environment, the economies of nations, and global peace. It 
also is likely that scientific, political, and media-based controversy will 
surround any investigation of the alleged use of a biological agent, and 
can be expected to affect significantly the role that scientific information 
or evidence can play. For these reasons, building awareness of and capac-
ity in microbial forensics can assist in our understanding of what may 
7
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have occurred during a biothreat event, and international collaborations 
that engage the broader scientific and policy-making communities are 
likely to strengthen our microbial forensics capabilities. One goal would 
be to create a shared technical understanding of the possibilities—and 
limitations—of the scientific bases for microbial forensics analysis. 
Toward this end, a group of national and international organizations 
held a workshop from October 14 to October 16, 2013, in Zagreb, Croatia. 
The workshop was organized by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS), the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the International 
Union of Microbiological Societies, and the U.K.’s Royal Society. The 
Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts hosted the workshop at their 
headquarters in Zagreb. A planning meeting between NAS and the Royal 
Society in June 2011 began the process of designing the project with the 
intent of the Zagreb workshop to (1) identify the scientific challenges 
that should be met to improve the capability of microbial forensics to 
differentiate among natural outbreaks, unintentional release, biocrimes, 
or bioterror attacks; and (2) provide evidence of sufficient quality to sup-
port legal proceedings and the development of government policies. The 
workshop also was designed to increase awareness of microbial forensics 
among the members of the larger international scientific communities 
and to engage these communities in the development of a plan on how 
to address scientific challenges. An international ad hoc committee was 
appointed by the NAS’s National Research Council to organize the meet-
ing; brief committee member biographies can be found in Appendix A. 
The committee’s statement of task is in Box 1-1.
Fifty-nine expert participants from 21 countries took part in the work-
shop. Participants included researchers and clinicians from numerous 
scientific and technological disciplines related or applicable to microbial 
BOX 1-1 
Statement of Task
An ad hoc committee with substantial international membership will plan an inter-
national symposium and prepare a consensus report of findings and conclusions to 
address the science needs underlying the development of microbial forensics. The 
results of the symposium, supported by additional information and data gathering 
by the committee, are intended to
•	 	Foster collaboration within the international scientific community to support 
technical understanding and enhanced research on microbial forensics, and
•	 	Develop the beginnings of an international roadmap for how to do the neces-
sary science, including priorities among potential topics.
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forensics as well as technical experts and policy makers with a strong 
interest in the contribution of science and technology (S&T) to security. 
The two-and-a-half-day meeting included plenary sessions featuring talks 
by scientific experts and policy makers who reviewed current and devel-
oping practices and technologies in, or applicable to, microbial forensics, 
with an emphasis on defining the challenges confronting the field. Smaller 
breakout groups enabled more targeted discussion of perceived gaps in 
microbial forensic capacity, as well as identification and prioritization of 
possible ways to develop and strengthen the field and its applications.
Information about the convening organizations may be found in 
Appendix B. Support for the workshop and report was provided by 
the U.S. Navy through the Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Depart-
ment of State, and the NAS itself. The workshop agenda may be found 
in Appendix C and a list of participants in Appendix D. A list of all the 
presentations and biographies for the speakers may be found in Appen-
dixes E and F, respectively. John Clements, the chair of the organizing 
committee, asked workshop participants to address what tools are needed 
to enable us to successfully confront a bioterrorism or biocrime event, an 
unintentional release of a harmful agent, or a public health crisis caused 
by microorganisms or toxins. In all cases, the goal is the same—to protect 
the health and well-being of the public. He posed the following questions: 
What will help move microbial forensics forward in supporting such pro-
tection and how should these needs be prioritized? 
The committee prepared this final consensus report, which draws 
on the workshop presentations and discussions as well as on additional 
information obtained from other experts and the literature to reach con-
clusions for moving forward. The report is not meant to, nor can it, 
provide a detailed roadmap for the international development of micro-
bial forensics, but rather elucidates the major issues highlighted at the 
workshop that the committee believes need to be addressed for the global 
development of the science of microbial forensics. For the purposes of this 
project, the committee chose breadth over depth.1 The committee also 
gave particular attention to those areas, such as increased scientific knowl-
edge about microbial communities and common standards and protocols 
for analysis, which would benefit from international cooperation and 
collaboration. The number and variety of issues meant that not all issues 
could be examined in sufficient detail to develop a true roadmap.
1  Basic information about microbial forensics is available in a number of textbooks (see, 
e.g., Budowle et al., 2011, and Primorac and Schanfield, 2014). Various national and inter-
national advisory bodies have also addressed many of the issues covered in the report (see, 
e.g., the reports of the U.S. National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee, 2009, 2011).
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WHAT IS BIOTERRORISM?
Seth Carus (2001) published a now classic compilation of cases from 
1900 to 2000 of the illicit use of biological agents by criminals and ter-
rorists. His definition of “bioterrorism” is that it is “assumed to involve 
the threat or use of biological agents by individuals or groups moti-
vated by political, religious, ecological, or other ideological objectives.” 
He clearly noted, however, that “most individuals and groups who have 
used biological agents had traditional criminal motives.” He believes that 
it is, therefore, essential to separate the clearly criminal perpetrators from 
those with political agendas, whether the motive is sectarian, religious, 
or ecological. The available evidence, in fact, suggests that the vast major-
ity of cases involve criminal motives. Such motives include extortion, 
revenge, a desire to terrorize particular victims to make them worry about 
their health, and murder.
Both biocrimes and bioterrorism exist on a continuum of risk associ-
ated with biological agents (Figure 1-1). The other end of the spectrum 
deals with natural outbreaks or accidental releases of infectious disease 
agents. In all cases on the spectrum, public health protection requires 
that the microorganism first be identified and its source located to stop 





Release Biocrime Bioterrorism Biowarfare
FIGURE 1-1 Spectrum of risks due to biological agents.
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enforcement initially have common aims and methods. Microbial foren-
sics, however, has requirements and needs that, in many ways, go beyond 
those of medicine and public health. Though often applicable to medicine 
and public health, the methods used in microbial forensics delve deeper 
into identification of organisms, require standardization and validation, 
and must meet legal standards for evidence. Hence these topics are the 
subjects of much of the detailed discussion in this report, while keeping 
in mind the commonalities with public health that provide opportunities 
to leverage methods and information across fields.
THE EMERGING FIELD OF MICROBIAL FORENSICS
Forensic science involves the application of science to the investiga-
tion of legal and policy matters. Science may not offer definitive answers 
in all cases, but often plays a special investigative role. “Science and tech-
nology are used to serve as independent ‘witnesses’ in criminal or civil 
matters, intelligence, and policy” (Murch presentation, 2013). The law 
enforcement goal is “attribution”—that is, determining who committed 
the offense. Based on the analysis of biological and other evidence, law 
enforcement builds a case for attribution to a specific source or sources. 
The evidence supporting attribution must be robust and suitable for use 
in legal proceedings and to inform decision making at the highest levels.
Microbial forensics seeks to produce reliable conclusions quickly to 
protect public health and with sufficient validity and quality to serve law 
enforcement and policy purposes. In microbial forensics, law enforce-
ment may partner with scientists from microbiology, genetics, public 
health, agriculture, and many other disciplines to identify and character-
ize pathogens, or their toxins, implicated in biological events.
 Dr. Randall Murch proffered five important questions to frame the 
background on microbial forensics:
1. Why is there an important need for microbial forensics?
2. What is the current state of the art?
3. How do the forensics used for criminal investigations differ from 
epidemiological investigations for public health?
4. What are the major research challenges for the field? 
5. How can basic science be used to solve the current challenges for 
microbial forensics and how might this help in other areas, such 
as public health?
Murch explained that microbial forensics in the United States began 
in the 1990s with the formation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
(FBI’s) Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU). The Unit was cre-
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ated to support suspected or known bioterrorism investigations by pro-
viding investigative leads and supporting prosecutions or exonerations 
with scientific evidence. The FBI unit initially drew upon legacy science 
being developed or performed by scientists at national laboratories and 
universities across the United States and employed forensic science prin-
ciples and practices to try to produce evidence that would be admissible 
in court according to U.S. legal requirements and standards. The FBI also 
recognized the importance of collaborating with the public health com-
munity. At the time of preparations for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games 
in Atlanta, a collaboration with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) was established that is still ongoing. The CDC pro-
vides, for example, training materials on forensic epidemiology.2
Although microbial forensics incorporates basic research to develop 
techniques or methodologies, the questions asked, processes engaged in, 
expectations for, and outcomes sought may be different or more demand-
ing than for basic research. The science in microbial forensics, like all sci-
ence, must (1) be properly validated and accepted by peers and stakehold-
ers (scientific, legal, policy making) before being used, but must also (2) 
demonstrate that the information generated can answer key investigative 
and legal questions. Microbial forensics borrows, transitions, and devel-
ops science from related disciplines for its own purposes. Meeting these 
challenges will increase the value of microbial forensics by providing 
“leaps” in value, confidence, and timeliness for critical decision making 
and will advance other related disciplines.
In the event of a suspected biological attack, leaders would have ques-
tions about the identity and source of the biological threat that intelligence, 
public health, law enforcement, and forensics must try to answer (see Box 
1-2A). Policy leaders want correct answers—and quickly—so they can act 
appropriately. Forensic science can help answer these questions, and it 
is essential that the answers be reliable. At the same time, policy leaders 
have to assess not just whether information is objectively credible and 
defensible, but also whether it will be accepted by key intended audi-
ences. This can be a major issue at the national level, but becomes a much 
larger consideration when dealing with international relations, security, 
and terrorism issues (see next section). Both “elites” and “publics” may 
reject information because of distrust of the source and other emotive fac-
tors. When using the results of science, policy makers (and international 
negotiators) must take these factors into consideration, too, not just the 
objective science. It is beyond the scope of this report to examine these 
political factors in any detail, but they have to be taken into account in 
developing and applying microbial forensic capabilities.
2  http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/forensicepidemiology/index.html.
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However, a somewhat varied set of questions could arise from the 
investigative/legal and intelligence/policy perspectives, as listed in 
Box 1-2B. These parties will share the same questions as national leaders, 
but they also can have many additional questions, particularly regarding 
the accuracy, reliability, validity, credibility, and defensibility of scientific 
evidence. They may also have information about the likelihood of evi-
dence being accepted and of ways in which different actors might attempt 
to manipulate information for political reasons. Forensics can contribute 
to answers, but the evidence is rarely of a clear-cut “smoking gun” type. 
While legal frameworks exist for evidence, policy frameworks are being 
developed.
In the United States, evidence in a criminal case must align with the 
standards of proof of the criminal justice system in order to be admis-
sible in legal proceedings, and standards must be met at every step of 
the investigation. Investigative leads, for example, must be based on 
validated, verifiable evidence, in order to enable authorities to gather fur-
BOX 1-2 
Questions Forensics Can Help Answer
A.  A Leader’s Perspective:  B.  Investigative, Legal,
  Key and Time-Sensitive Questions   Intelligence and Policy 
Perspective Questions
•	 What is or was it? •	 	Did a crime (event of interest) 
•	 Who did it?   occur?
•	 Did it come from a program or  •	 What happened?
 lab we know? •	 How, where, when, and why did
•	 Will there be more attacks?  it occur?
•	 What are we—and nations  •	 Who was involved and
 involved —doing about it?  responsible?
•	 What can we know, by when,  •	 What evidence exists? What
 and with what confidence?  does it tell us? How strong are
 	 	 	the links?
	 	 •	 How reliable and credible is the 
   evidence?
	 	 •	 What alternative explanations 
   are there for the evidence?
	 	 •	 Can we defend our conclusions 
   and actions?
       SOURCE: Adapted from Murch (2010).





Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
14 SCIENCE NEEDS FOR MICROBIAL FORENSICS
ther evidence and/or compel suspected parties to cooperate in a variety 
of ways. In the United States and many other countries, the “standard 
of proof in a criminal trial is ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ which means 
the overall evidence must be so strong that there is no reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime.”3 Reasonable doubt, of course, 
depends on the jurors’ (or the policy makers’) assessment of all the evi-
dence presented during a trial.
Murch defined “scientific attribution” as the assignment of a sample 
of questioned origin to a source, or sources, of known origin, to the high-
est possible degree of scientific certainty—while excluding origination 
from other sources (Murch, 2010). Ideal examples are fingerprint and 
DNA analyses, which can provide a high degree of scientific certainty that 
evidence came from one source to the exclusion of all others. However, 
according to Murch, microbial forensics cannot yet claim that degree of 
certainty and in many cases may never reach such specificity. In addition, 
the standard for attribution required in court may be different from the 
standard required to drive a policy decision.
The process of forensic investigation begins with gathering intel-
ligence and information to lay a foundation for and justify an investi-
gation. This initial information gathering is followed by a time-driven, 
multidisciplinary, multisource investigation to pursue a rule-in and rule-
out process. Crime scene investigation includes evidence identification, 
collection, preservation, and transport, as well as presumptive testing, 
which seeks to prove that either (a) the sample probably is a certain sub-
stance or (b) the sample is definitely not a certain substance. Laboratory 
analyses provide deeper characterization and comparison of questioned 
source and known source samples. Throughout the process, investigators 
must place the interpretations of analyses and the conclusions drawn into 
a context, transitioning them to meet the needs of both real-time and end 
users. Murch, a former FBI official, stated that investigators also should 
provide alternative interpretations of analyses. Throughout the investiga-
tion, forensics is assisting in building and shaping decisions and actions. 
The process is iterative, aids meeting the burden of proof, is part of the 
build toward prosecution, and supports exoneration. Finally, all the evi-
dence and information generated are channeled to communication and 
decision making. Unbiased results, conclusions, and explanations about 
an event, as well as alternative explanations, must be provided to the legal 
and policy decision systems and to other stakeholders.
Science plays a role in every phase of a forensic investigation, not only 
in the establishment of guilt or innocence. For example, science helps to 
3  See, for example, the United States Courts website, http://www.uscourts.gov/Federal 
Courts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/HowCourtsWork/CriminalCases.aspx.
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generate leads, and did so repeatedly during the investigation of the 2001 
anthrax letters case. Ultimately investigators will weigh the combined 
forensic evidence to exclude or attribute to a source (Figure 1-2) to sup-
port a finding of guilt or innocence.
Because the information generated by forensic methods is to be used 
by law enforcement in litigation, the goals of these methods differ from 
those of traditional research. In addition to the accuracy, reliability, and 
repeatability demanded in traditional research, forensic methodolo-
gies are subject to other rigorous requirements. There are admissibility 
requirements for “new science” in the U.S. legal process, and similar 
requirements are being developed for the policy process.
The ideal forensic science methodology would incorporate the goals 
listed in Box 1-3A. Achieving these goals would help to ensure that sam-
ples are collected and handled appropriately to preserve the target evi-
dence as well as possible; analyses and comparisons of known-source 
“The Forensic Continuum”





























Power of and Confidence in Analysis, Interpretation, Meaning
Integrate with Other Evidence & Intelligence
“Not 
Guilty” “Guilty”
Consistent With Having Originated From
FIGURE 1-2 The forensic continuum represents the evaluation and analysis of 
a microbial sample to determine its exclusion or attribution value. These results 
will be integrated with other evidence and information to determine innocence 
or guilt.
SOURCE: Budowle et al. (2013).
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(K) and questioned-source (Q) samples are performed with applicable 
discrimination and resolution; analyses are reliable and repeatable, with 
clearly defined error rates or defined limitations; and the process yields 
interpretable, probative results that can be communicated and sup-
ported. The ideal forensic science system would comprise the elements 
in Box 1-3B and enable the marshaling of appropriate scientific methods, 
tools, equipment, infrastructure, and personnel to meet the needs of the 
submitter and stakeholders. Such a system would help ensure that qual-
ity control and quality assurance can be maintained through the stages 
of field assessment and analysis, evidence collection and preservation, 
lab analysis to characterize an unknown or questioned sample and/or 
BOX 1-3 
Forensic Science Methods and System Elements
A. Forensic Methods B. Forensic Science System
•	 Robust collection and preservation  •	 Capabilities are matched to
 of evidence  submitter and stakeholder needs
•	 Relevant exploitation of samples  	and requests
•	 High discrimination •	 Appropriate deployable assets, 
•	 Enables comparison of “K” and  and facilities with sufficient
 “Q” samples  resources for operation and
•	 Utility across known, encountered   maintenance
 sample types •	 Field, transport, and laboratory
•	 Accuracy  evidence integrity and security
•	 Reliability •	 Properly credentialed, trained and
•	 Defined and acceptable error rate  certified personnel
•	 Speed and responsiveness •	 Full suite of equipment, fully
•	 Repeatability  validated methods, matched to
•	 Transferabilitya  samples received and questions
•	 Validity can be independently   asked
 established •	 Comprehensive quality assurance
•	 Probative results are interpretable,   and control program
 explainable, defensible •	 Appropriate repositories and
	 	 	 	  database 
	 	 	 	 •	 	Appropriate resources: research, 
development, test and evaluation, 
validation and technology transfer
a Transferability means that the method can be performed in other laboratories. It is similar to 
the concept of reproducibility and important for reanalysis or some form of verification.
SOURCE: Murch (2008, 2010).
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compare it with a sample from a known source, interpretation and conclu-
sions, and reporting and communication. 
The founders of the HMRU recognized that building a microbial 
forensics discipline would require aggregating a broad range of disci-
plines (e.g., epidemiology, genomics,4 metagenomics,5 and other “omics” 
disciplines, biostatistics and population genetics,6 analytical chemistry 
and biochemistry, microscopy, bacteriology, mycology, virology, clinical 
medicine for infectious diseases, veterinary medicine, plant pathology, 
food science, ecology, materials science, process engineering, physical sci-
ences, and bioinformatics and computational science). Murch emphasized 
that many of these disciplines also are fundamental to public health and 
medical science. As noted above, the need for a strong union and dynamic 
collaboration between law enforcement and public health to investigate 
possible bioattacks from event outset to post-event was recognized early 
in the development of microbial forensics. Public health, infectious dis-
ease medicine, and law enforcement investigations all need to establish 
whether an event is deliberate, accidental, or natural. Importantly, each 
can leverage the other’s resources to achieve the same initial objectives. 
The major difference between the two approaches is that the public health 
investigation’s goal is to manage the public health response and protect 
the public’s health and safety, whereas law enforcement’s is to provide 
safety and security by apprehending and convicting those who commit-
ted the attack.
Microbial forensics seeks to answer these questions:
1. What is the threat agent? Usually establishing this has not been 
difficult, although it may not occur in an optimal time frame. 
2. Is it probative or relevant? Establishing certainty here is more diffi-
cult. Scientists may be working with trace quantities, for example, 
or analysis may require an understanding of the sample back-
ground to understand the source.
3. Can it be linked to a source? Establishing this demands understand-
ing the power of methods used to discriminate and characterize 
with acceptable confidence limits.
4. What are the meaning and weight of the conclusion?
The goal of the microbial forensics process is to use microbial analy-
4  The science of studying DNA sequences and properties of entire genomes (Alberts et 
al., 2002).
5  Metagenomics is the study of a collection of genetic material (genomes) from a mixed 
community of organisms (http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/glossary=metagenomics).
6  The study of genetic composition in populations and how natural selection and other 
factors produce changes in genetic composition.
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ses and other evidence to fix a questioned source to a position on a 
continuum that ranges from “could not have originated from” to “consis-
tent7 with having originated from” to “absolutely did originate from” a 
known source. Again, identification is simpler than attribution. Exclusion, 
association, and attribution are dependent on several key factors, with 
more value and weight given to attribution derived when more possible 
sources can be eliminated. Uncertainty and confidence must be stated, 
either qualitatively or quantitatively. 
The magnitude of the microbial forensics workspace is vast. Unlike 
situations in which a human is a source of the biological evidence (one 
species, two genders), microbial forensics deals with myriad organisms, 
including viruses, bacteria, fungi, parasites, and the toxins some of these 
organisms produce. The vectors by which infectious diseases are spread 
and the reservoirs in which they reside might also be of importance. 
Biological agents are not limited to those appearing in the “threat lists” 
developed by various countries (e.g., the CDC’s “A, B, and C” catego-
ries of bioterrorism agents).8 Nor are humans the only possible target—
agricultural plants and animals could be as well. Moreover, threat agents 
can be bioengineered, and a number of infectious agents could be misused 
based on the motives, means, resources, and objectives of the perpetrator.
As Murch noted, in light of all this, we should be asking ourselves if 
the forensic techniques we need to confront this diverse range of potential 
biological threats are in place today and if they can meet the expectations 
of all levels of stakeholders? 
Much of the work of microbial forensics today is based on studying 
biodiversity, phylogenetics,9 phylogeography,10 genomics, and developing 
methods with greater sensitivity of detection and level of detail, extrac-
tion methodologies, and collection strategies. Science is moving toward 
faster throughput, cleverer bioinformatics,11 and other methods. The 
United States and some other countries have invested heavily in genome 
7  Note that although an explanation may be consistent with a set of circumstances, other 
explanations are not necessarily excluded.
8  Available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp.
9  “The study of evolutionary relatedness among various groups of organisms through 
molecular sequencing data and morphological data matrices” (Herndon, 2012)
10  “A field of study concerned with the principles and processes governing the geographic 
distributions of genealogical lineages, especially those within and among closely related 
species” (Avise, 2000).
11  “The use of information technology, such as computer programs, to analyze, store, and 
manage biological data. A common bioinformatics activity is predicting protein products 
from DNA sequences” (National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 2009).
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sequencing12—pursuing different methods and technologies, including 
the development of compact benchtop units—and bioinformatics.
Microbial forensics also investigates whether an agent has been genet-
ically manipulated or chemically treated to make it more virulent or dis-
persible or to mask its characteristics. The agent may have been handled 
crudely or with great sophistication. Analysis of processing elements, 
such as methods of growth, separation, washing, drying, grinding, and 
the use of additives can help further characterize the production process 
and source of a biological material and are usually determined through 
physical and chemical analyses that can employ instrumentation such as 
mass spectrometry.13 
Traditional forensic evidence (e.g., fingerprints, trace evidence, digi-
tal, materials) also is still an important part of attribution that should not 
be ignored. Microbial forensics requires that scientific investigators safely 
and properly address the probative classic evidence while also studying 
the biological agent as evidence.
There are many event scenarios for which we are ill prepared to 
respond effectively or investigate using microbial forensics. These include 
introducing a highly aggressive “new strain” of influenza virus during flu 
season, various scenarios introducing biological threats into agricultural 
animal populations or crops, and attacks employing pathogens that have 
been engineered to suggest they originate from a source other than the 
actual source. If a perpetrator uses nature to his/her advantage, some 
cases may never be resolved.
In some instances, forensic science and microbial forensics might 
make only limited contributions for a variety of reasons. The future of 
microbial forensics lies in bridging those gaps that diminish the capac-
ity. For example, Murch identified needs for better bioinformatics, faster 
12 “Determination of the order of nucleotides (base sequences) in a DNA or RNA molecule” 
(Larkin, 2001). A nucleotide is “a subunit of DNA or RNA consisting of a nitrogenous base 
(adenine, guanine, thymine, or cytosine in DNA; adenine, guanine, uracil, or cytosine in 
RNA), a phosphate, and a sugar (deoxyribose in DNA and ribose in RNA). Thousands of 
nucleotides are linked to form a DNA or RNA molecule” (http://www.laskerfoundation.
com/news/weis/g_dictionary.html). A base pair comprises “two nitrogenous bases (ad-
enine and thymine or guanine and cytosine) held together by weak bonds. Two strands 
of DNA are held together in the shape of a double helix by the bonds between base pairs” 
(http://www.laskerfoundation.com/news/weis/g_dictionary.html).
13  “Method involving specialized instruments for measuring the mass and abundance 
of molecules in a mixture and identifying mixture components by mass and charge” (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2012).
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throughput gene sequencing, and an increased focus on biosurveillance, 
endemism, metagenomics, proteomics,14 and the other “omics.” 
The next section addresses the additional challenges for microbial 
forensics in an international setting where more than one country is 
involved.
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS
The challenges for microbial forensics are difficult enough within the 
law enforcement context of a single country. Adding elements that span 
national boundaries poses substantial additional challenges. In his pre-
sentation to the workshop, Murch outlined several potential biological-
threat scenarios that he has developed to illustrate some of the issues 
likely to be encountered. Box 1-4 describes a hypothetical scenario of an 
outbreak of unknown cause in a country with no indigenous investigative 
microbial forensics capability, and little communication occurs between 
law enforcement and public health. Although other countries may be 
able to help, they have limited microbial forensics capabilities to perform 
the necessary analyses. Meanwhile, the terrorist group that has claimed 
responsibility leverages confusion by threatening more attacks. 
Box 1-5 outlines another hypothetical scenario in which a cruise ship 
has an outbreak of what initially may be considered to be norovirus, and 
there is a 25 percent case fatality among affected passengers. Nearby 
countries have limited expertise and capability in microbial forensics. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) tentatively identifies the virus. 
There is evidence the outbreak may be nefarious, but there is uncertainty 
about conclusions that may be drawn from the analyses (e.g., is it geneti-
cally engineered or not?). Media and concerned governments are clamor-
ing. Countries whose citizens are among the affected passengers, includ-
ing two countries with a strained political relationship, are conducting 
independent investigations, but no physical evidence other than patient 
samples has been collected.
For both scenarios, either sharing technologies, protocols, and meth-
odologies a priori or developing Memoranda of Understanding with 
other countries that possess the required analytical capabilities would 
allow the affected countries to be better prepared. Sharing of results and 
a more coordinated approach would provide great benefits and leverage 
resources.
14  Large-scale analysis of the “proteome” (collection of proteins expressed by a cell at a 
particular time and under specific conditions) to identify which proteins are expressed by 
an organism under certain conditions. Proteomics provides insights into protein function, 
modification, regulation, and interaction (U.S. Department of Energy, 2012).
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The third hypothetical scenario, described in Box 1-6, is the kind of 
event that continually preoccupies the very highest levels of the U.S. and 
other governments. Outbreaks of a zoonotic infectious disease occur in the 
United States and an allied country; a third country has threatened both 
nations. Microbial forensics attribution efforts appear to rule out other 
countries with which the United States has tense relationships and to rule 
in the threatening country, but this attribution cannot be confirmed. The 
United States accuses the suspect country, and seeks U.N. Security Coun-
cil support for military action, making clear that the U.S. government is 
prepared to act unilaterally if necessary to protect its national security 
and that of its ally. The accused country demands that the United States 
provide “evidence” to support its charges and provides its own experts 
to rebut the accusations. Other countries are weighing in on both sides. 
This scenario raises the question: If attacked with a bioweapon by another 
country, what quantity and quality of evidence (scientific and other) are 
BOX 1-4 
Murch’s Scenario 1—Unknown Outbreak, 
No Indigenous Capability
•	 	A country reports a suspicious outbreak of an infectious disease in villages 
populated by an ethnic minority; hundreds are affected.
•	 	Disease with these symptoms has not been reported previously in this country; 
the public health agency has no experience with it.
•	 	Assistance is requested of the World Health Organization. The causative agent 
is tentatively identified after 2 weeks.
•	 	A known regional terrorist group claims responsibility for the attacks, but the 
claim is unverified.
•	 	The country’s national police have (1) no expertise or experience with bioterror-
ism; (2) a limited relationship with the public health agency; and (3) no capability 
to collect, transport safely, or analyze hazardous evidence.
•	 	No mutual-assistance agreements exist with neighboring countries or countries 
with necessary capabilities.
•	 	The investigation is at a standstill; it cannot be determined if the outbreak is 
natural or deliberate.
•	 	Meanwhile, seeing an advantage, the terrorist group claims it is preparing for 
more attacks.
•	 	Nations experienced in dealing with bioterrorism (including forensic investiga-
tion) offer assistance but are not confident they have methods in place to do 
appropriate analysis for attribution.
SOURCE: Murch presentation, 2013.
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needed in order to gain international support for action, how likely is 
that evidence to be accepted, and how will it affect an ultimate political 
decision to take action against the perpetrator if that support is not forth-
coming? It is essential that such a decision be based on solid evidence 
whenever possible.
BOX 1-5 
Murch’s Scenario 2 —Viral Outbreak: Bioattack? 
Genetic Engineering? Multiple Countries Involved
•	 	A popular cruise line reports that a ship that has visited several ports and is now 
at sea in the eastern Mediterranean is experiencing an aggressive outbreak, 
perhaps of a foodborne illness. The ship is ordered to anchor off the closest 
port and await instructions.
•	 	4 days on, >300 passengers from >15 countries have been affected, with a 
case fatality of 25 percent. The ship medical staff is overwhelmed but has 
provided what medical assistance they can.
•	 Three crewmembers are missing.
•	 	Passengers have been calling relatives and friends to report an attack on the 
ship with a biological weapon. These people in turn have called the media and 
their governments, demanding an investigation.
•	 	The cruise line does not have medical resources to move onto the ship; it does 
not know how to handle the crisis.
•	 	Several national police agencies in the region have no expertise or support 
for microbial forensics; some have minimal capabilities. None have trained or 
exercised together, though several public health agencies routinely have col-
laborated. Two key governments involved have strained political relationships.
•	 	Two weeks on, after a third party gives assistance with capabilities in microbial 
forensic investigation and public health crisis management, the infectious agent 
is identified as a probable new strain of norovirus. It appears it may have been 
engineered; this has not been corroborated.
•	 Sixty more passengers and crew have died.
•	 	Individual countries with affected citizens are conducting separate investiga-
tions; coordination at all levels is inconsistent and uneven. Other than patient 
samples, no physical evidence has been collected. Gaps in the science are 
noted. No significant leads or persons of interest have been identified.
•	 	Several countries involved have reached out to the United States and European 
countries to explore whether additional assistance can be rendered.
SOURCE: Murch presentation, 2013.
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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
AND INVESTIGATIVE CAPACITIES
If any of these three scenarios were to occur, global leaders would 
seek answers from intelligence, public health, law enforcement, and 
forensics. The answers would then be sought within a particular set 
of international frameworks and capabilities. The primary international 
legal frameworks concerned with the use of biological agents as weapons 
are the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of biological and 
chemical weapons, and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), 
which is the first international disarmament treaty to ban an entire class 
of weapons.15 Since these agreements primarily address state-level pro-
15  The full name of the Geneva Protocol is the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War 
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare; the 
BWC’s full name is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The 
BOX 1-6 
Murch’s Scenario 3—Alleged Strategic Attack
•	 	Tensions are higher than normal in a region owing to a series of bellicose 
threats and actions by one country against the countries in the region, some 
of whom are U.S. allies. The U.S. has been threatened also.
•	 	Unusual zoonotic infectious disease outbreaks occur in one of the countries 
allied with the U.S., as well as in the U.S. itself. Disease spreads rapidly, with 
high case fatality in infected persons and domesticated animals.
•	 	Public health and agriculture systems are overwhelmed. The public in both 
countries begins to panic, and politicians voice grave concern.
•	 	Unusual properties of the viral causative agent isolated raise the suspicion of 
a bioattack.
•	 	Forensic (including microbial) evidence seems to “rule out” as sources other 
countries with which the U.S. has tense relationships, and to “rule in” the coun-
try at issue—although attribution cannot be achieved. U.S. intelligence and 
other sources “indicate credible links” to the country of concern.
•	 	U.S. leadership publicly accuses the country of concern, and seeks U.N. Se-
curity Council support for military action, making clear that is prepared to act 
unilaterally if necessary to protect its national security and that of its ally.
•	 	The accused country demands the U.S. provide “evidence” to support its charg-
es and provides its own experts to rebut the accusations. Other countries are 
weighing in on both sides.
SOURCE: Adapted from Murch presentation, 2013.
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grams and actions, in 2004 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 
1540, which puts binding obligations on all UN members to address the 
risks posed by nonstate actors.16 None of these agreements has its own 
investigative or enforcement capacities.
Under the BWC, an allegation of use of biological weapons would be 
handled through the UN Security Council. The treaty also calls on States 
Parties to provide assistance to states that have been determined by the 
Security Council to have suffered an attack (see Box 1-7 for the relevant 
articles). In the event of an allegation, the U.N. Secretary General has the 
authority to launch an investigation; the formal title for the process is 
the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons. This is the process that was used to 
investigate allegations that chemical weapons had been used in the con-
flict in Syria in 2013 with support from the Organization for the Prohibi-
tion of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO). Once Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention in October 
2013, the subsequent elimination of its chemical weapons program has 
been verified by the OPCW, which implements the treaty.
Depending on the scenario, efforts to investigate a case of alleged 
use would face substantial practical challenges. There could be issues of 
access to sites, availability and conditions of samples, analytical capac-
ity on the ground, concealment of evidence or deliberate efforts to mis-
lead investigators, and concerns for their safety (Casagrande presenta-
tion, 2013). Depending on the mandate for an investigation, there would 
almost certainly be questions related to the sensitivity of information and 
the willingness and capacity of various actors to share, and at present 
no international agreement or standard governs what will or will not 
be shared in a given set of circumstances. The successful use of micro-
bial forensics in such cases involves difficult policy as well as technical 
issues. Although the BWC does not have a formal investigative capacity, 
Dr. Piers Millet from the BWC Implementation Support Unit argued that 
the treaty is a key international platform for addressing challenges in 
microbial forensics, on both the technical and policy levels. His presenta-
tion focused on drivers for enabling and directing advances in microbial 
forensic capabilities.
Chemical Weapons Convention (Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Produc-
tion, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction) also covers toxins.
16  U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 addresses all weapons of mass destruction and 
obliges U.N. member states “to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors 
from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using 
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems” (UN 1540 Committee 
website, http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/#&panel1-16; accessed December 14, 2013).
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With 170 participating states, the consensus achieved in the BWC is 
meaningful. Since 2002 the BWC has held a series of annual intersessional 
meetings between the treaty review conferences held every 5 years. The 
two annual meetings of experts and states parties provide both an expert 
and a diplomatic component, with different issues addressed each year 
along with some standing topics. The BWC 2004 annual meetings, for 
example, examined mechanisms in place in the event a biological/toxic 
weapon was used or an allegation of use was made. In the final report 
of the meetings, states parties agreed on the value of (1) continuing to 
develop national capacities to respond to, investigate, and mitigate poten-
tial use of bioweapons; and (2) of doing so in cooperation with relevant 
regional and international organizations (Biological Weapons Conven-
BOX 1-7 
Relevant Articles of the Biological Weapons Convention
Article V
The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to 
cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective 
of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and 
Cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate 
international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in ac-
cordance with its Charter.
Article VI
(1) Any State Party to this convention which finds that any other State Party is 
acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may 
lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint 
should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for 
its consideration by the Security Council. 
(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out 
any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint re-
ceived by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the 
Convention of the results of the investigation. 
Article VII
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which 
so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to 
danger as a result of violation of the Convention. 
SOURCE: Text of the Biological Weapons Convention, signed April 10, 1972.
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tion, 2004). Although not explicitly defined, relevant organizations could 
include regional and international scientific bodies. Moreover, the BWC 
agreed to encourage and assist other states to pursue these activities. 
Consensus exists that bioweapon defense should be a global enterprise.
The BWC revisited this topic in 2010. Additions to previous agree-
ments were made that stressed the importance of
1. Effective efforts, regardless of whether the outbreak is natural 
or deliberate. Diseases and toxins that harm humans, animals, 
plants, and the environment fall within the purview.
2. Recognition that capabilities to quickly and effectively detect, 
respond to, and recover from an alleged use of a biological/toxic 
weapon must be in place before they are used (United Nations, 
2011).
3. Investigating and mitigating the potential impact of an alleged 
use of biological/toxic weapons in accordance with national laws 
and regulations (e.g., for data handling).
4. Coordinating a state-government approach to emergency man-
agement since multiple arms of a government would be involved.
5. Addressing the full range of possible implications of meeting 
these expectations (Biological Weapons Convention, 2010).
Reviewing advances in S&T was a main focus of the 7th BWC review 
conference in 2011. The work program for 2012 to 2015 that resulted from 
the meeting comprises three pillars that are addressed each year—one of 
which is the examination of relevant advances in S&T (Biological Weap-
ons Convention, 2011). Included within its purview are the potential for 
misuse of S&T (e.g., to make biological weapons) and beneficial applica-
tions (e.g., investigating and mitigating bioweapon attacks), as well as 
interaction between the security and scientific communities. 
International interest in ensuring that the S&T reviews focus heavily 
on potential benefits—including advances in microbial forensics—con-
tinues, and the BWC now has an international platform to address such 
issues. Moreover, mechanisms to respond to the use of bioweapons will 
be a topic at the next two biannual meetings.17 
Dr. Dana Perkins from the U.N. 1540 Committee added that microbial 
forensics is an essential element of a national and international biosecurity 
infrastructure, both as a deterrent and as a support tool. Similar to nuclear 
forensics, microbial forensics may be used to detect, prevent, and deter 
17  The language in the report is “How to strengthen implementation of Article VII, includ-
ing consideration of detailed procedures and mechanisms for the provision of assistance and 
cooperation by States Parties” (Biological Weapons Convention, 2011:21).
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acts of bioterrorism and illicit trafficking or use of biological materials. 
The potential applications of microbial forensics thus may contribute 
to strengthening biosecurity in the context of Resolution 1540 and to 
achieving cooperation and synergy among various international security 
frameworks.
Perkins stated that, in addition to its role in supporting investigations 
of alleged use, developing and improving microbial forensics methods to 
detect illicit trafficking and biological materials outside regulatory con-
trol, and to prevent and respond to biosecurity events, will strengthen the 
implementation and enforcement of Resolution 1540. She pointed out for 
nuclear forensics, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a 
leading role in facilitating the exchange of information and international 
collaboration and providing assistance to support law enforcement and 
assessment of nuclear security vulnerabilities. In contrast, microbial foren-
sics lacks that level of international leadership. She suggested, however, 
that there is potential for much more widespread and effective coop-
eration, not only among countries but also among organizations such 
as WHO, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, the Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention/Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons, and the BWC/BWC Implementation Support Unit. (The contri-
butions of WHO, OIE, and FAO are discussed further in the “Biosurveil-
lance” section of Chapter 2.) Another interesting point can be made about 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has a major role in the 
development and oversight of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, 
as well as nuclear weapons security. This suggests that policy mechanisms 
for mitigating rare events, such as bioterrorism, should be coupled when 
possible to more routine-use drivers so that the applicable technologies 
are tried, tested, and familiar.
A sustained effort will be required to (1) build communities of micro-
bial forensics specialists, (2) formulate projects to develop microbial foren-
sics S&T foundations, and (3) raise awareness of possible synergies among 
its different applications. Perkins believes that these plans should not be 
confined to investigating the use and alleged use of weapons but should 
also focus on contributing to prevention and deterrence of weapon pro-
liferation and terrorist threats. Identifying major technical and policy 
challenges that these plans could support is the subject of the next section 
and the remainder of this report.
AN OVERVIEW OF KEY QUESTIONS AND UNMET 
NEEDS FOR MICROBIAL FORENSICS
Significant scientific challenges or needs have long been recognized in 
microbial forensics, and have persisted with little or no progress toward 
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resolution. Murch pointed out that raising the bar in science improves our 
capabilities of innovation and use and also raises the bar against adver-
saries. In addition, many challenges in microbial forensics are shared 
by other disciplines,18 and so, bridging these gaps could provide leaps 
in “operationally useful” capabilities and knowledge for more than just 
microbial forensics. One way to meet the needs would be to enable inte-
gration of fundamental science, advancing technologies, and forensic 
applications with those of related fields for multivariate benefits. The ben-
efit would be to push the value of and expectations for microbial forensic 
investigation/attribution capabilities to the limits of science, technology, 
and knowledge. This will require recognizing pragmatic priorities—for 
example, iterative evolutions of technologies, platforms, and methods—
that must be designed and implemented to resolve chokepoints and bar-
riers that impede progress and success. In addition, we should identify 
what the “big leaps” are and invest in them. Advancing national and 
global biosecurity also requires fostering international, cross-disciplinary 
collaboration in ways not yet recognized. The benefits would apply to 
both microbial forensics and other basic and applied science fields. 
The needs of microbial forensics share many aspects with medicine 
and public health, which are discussed elsewhere in this report. Many 
of the capabilities required for detecting and responding to the whole 
spectrum of natural, intentional, and man-made events are essentially 
the same. The advantages of the microbial forensics and public health 
communities working together are that systems created for rare events—
for example, bioterrorism—may suffer because of lack of use, but those 
created for addressing natural and accidental outbreaks of infectious 
disease are likely to be used frequently. Availability of tools and systems 
compatible with both rare and common occurrences suggest that when a 
rare event does occur, these tools and systems will be ready and detection 
and response will not be delayed by lack of familiarity with them.
Drs. Randall Murch, Bruce Budowle, and Paul Keim, three of the 
pioneers of the emerging field of microbial forensics, collaborated on a 
list of key unmet needs—and questions—in microbial forensics, address-
ing methodologies, technologies, applications, and practices. This list 
was presented in the opening plenary session of the Zagreb workshop to 
encourage the other participants to define their own ideas about needs 
and questions throughout the workshop. As Murch, Keim, and Budowle 
see it, the challenges include
18  This is exemplified by a colloquium convened by the American Academy of Micro-
biology in Washington, DC, on September 27–28, 2006, to discuss problems in microbial 
taxonomy.
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•	 Being able to discriminate with a high level of confidence among 
similarly presenting natural, accidental, and deliberate out-
breaks, within a matter of hours, anywhere in the world. This 
capability would aid decision-tree design and inform actions of 
decision makers at all levels to manage response, recovery, and 
resolution. 
•	 Establishing the limits of current and near-term microbial foren-
sic characterization methods for identification of priority threat 
agents at levels more specific than the strain/isolate level. What 
is the probative value for different methods (e.g., method-specific, 
agent-specific, single approach, and combined approaches)?
•	 Being able to rapidly develop and validate19 new and agile foren-
sic analytical methods as a response to a “surprise” event. Inves-
tigators need on-the-shelf capabilities that can be adapted for a 
wide variety of circumstances. 
•	 Sampling and forensic characterization of any relevant microbial 
background to provide key context for microbial forensic analy-
ses, interpretation, communication, and resulting decision mak-
ing. There is insufficient understanding of microbial diversity and 
endemism to inform assessment of where an attack effort may 
have been developed or perpetrated, or how perpetrators may 
have exploited the microbial background. And as technologies 
become more sensitive, it is more likely that organisms that may 
not have been known to be endemic may be discovered to reside 
in a particular region. False positives may increase and methods 
for assessing the significance of false positives and false negatives 
are necessary. With higher throughput systems, it is conceivable 
that background sampling could be performed when an event 
occurs to attempt to define what may be endemic. Of course 
such an approach requires access to the geographic location of an 
event, which may not always be feasible. 
•	 Determining the probative value of a “small signal” (microbe of 
interest) in a “big noise” (highly cluttered with other material or 
microorganisms, or “dirty”) sample, with defined confidence. 
Environmental samples are very dirty samples. What if we find 
one cell of interest, but do not understand the background—what 
does that cell really mean? What can the clutter tell us? How 
19  “Validation” describes a number of activities in forensics. Scientific validity depends 
on two major factors: reliability, which is the ability of a technique to produce consistent 
and objective results with known precision and accuracy; and relevance, which is necessary 
to make evidence admissible in court. Both data quality and the interpretation of the data 
must be validated (Velsko, 2011b). See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of all the 
elements of validation.
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should scientific and legal significance be determined and sup-
ported when the agent of interest is a minority constituent in a 
“probative sample”? How much of the threat agent of interest 
must be contained in a sample to be considered significant?
•	 Exploiting the “clutter” (microbiota20 other than the threat agent 
of interest) in metagenomic samples for forensic value, including 
potential use in the comparison of samples from known and ques-
tioned sources. In metagenomic samples (including highly com-
plex samples), can the “clutter” provide more power to micro-
bial forensic analyses? Can it meet “forensic standards”? What is 
required to demonstrate viability of this approach, including the 
limits on analysis conclusions?
•	 Determining other-than-genomic approaches that can be devel-
oped, validated, and integrated for deeper forensic characteriza-
tion, including other omics (e.g., proteomics), and approaches 
such as multitarget analysis of culture media.
•	 Determining the maximal characterization for forensic value that 
can be achieved for biological toxins. In addition to identification, 
can analyses be developed to aid rule-in/rule-out determinations? 
•	 Maximally reducing the “discovery-to-decision” timeline, across 
all threat agents, with maximal probative value and confidence. 
The answer could be integrated with the decision process.
•	 Establishing how to best validate low-level analytics (very small 
quantities of a target analyte) in an operational setting. Precise 
identification of an analyte (e.g., DNA) might be made to the level 
of a distinct strain (e.g., canonical single-nucleotide polymor-
phism [canSNP])21 or other molecule (e.g., isotope signature)22 at 
the few- or even single-molecule(s) level.
20  The microorganisms of a particular site, region, or habitat.
21  “A single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) is a DNA sequence variation that occurs 
when a single nucleotide (A, T, C, or G) in a gene sequence is altered (Orho-Melander, 2006). 
SNPs are useful for both diagnostic identification and phylogenetic population analysis. 
There is a model for identifying nucleic acid “signatures” (a set of DNA-related molecular 
markers) that is based on evolutionary rules and comparative genomic analysis. This model 
is the foundation for identifying key diagnostic features called “canonical characters,” one 
of which is a canonical SNP (canSNP). A canonical diagnostic character marks a pivotal 
evolutionary point in the development of an organism and, therefore, represents multiple 
evolutionary differences. These “signatures” can be used to discriminate between target and 
nontarget species. A single canSNP can identify a particular species, subpopulation, and/or 
isolate (Engelthaler and Balajee, 2011; Keim et al., 2004).
22  “An isotopic signature (or isotopic fingerprint) is a ratio of stable or unstable isotopes 
of particular elements found in an investigated material. The atomic mass of different iso-
topes affects their chemical kinetic behavior, leading to natural isotopic separation process.” 
(http://www.springerreference.com/docs/html/chapterdbid/330809.html).
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•	 International data-sharing forums and quality and nomencla-
ture standards. These are essential. Governmental restrictions on 
sharing material have limited development of global databases 
needed to provide confidence in microbial forensic analysis. The 
political obstacles are likely greater than the S&T obstacles.
•	 Deep sequencing23 offers methodological advantages over the 
Sanger method24 (throughput, speed, cost) but generates a lot of 
data. Should databases be established in advance or be generated 
as events occur?
•	 Determining how to measure with certainty and report whole-
genome–sequencing25 comparisons performed during forensic 
analysis (e.g., comparing an evidence sample “profile” with a 
reference sample that may be considered a direct link or have a 
common ancestor). Sequencing errors and other factors will likely 
inflate dissimilarity between samples, creating a degree of uncer-
tainty. Defining and quantifying the error rates associated with 
each platform and chemistry are critical. How do we accomplish 
this in a communal way?
•	 Ensuring that the quality of sequence data and the results of 
bioinformatics analyses is as high as possible. Factors to consider 
that affect data interpretation and quality include reliability of 
standards for genomic data representation; uncertainty about 
databases (e.g., inferences based on available data, including 
metadata26); sequence errors and uncertainties; criteria for com-
parisons (match, similar, different, inconclusive); and the rigor of 
expert reasoning, which should include formulating well-defined 
hypotheses, and testing methods for assessing the weight of 
microbial forensics evidence.
•	 Replicating all the essential details of any particular bioinfor-
matics analysis pipeline by different labs is as much art as it is 
mathematics and science. Investigators must understand it to 
use it. It is not easy to transfer; there are analytical complexi-
ties. There are also multiple technologies, and different versions 
23  “Techniques of nucleotide sequence analysis that increase the range, complexity, sen-
sitivity, and accuracy of results by greatly increasing the scale of operations and thus the 
number of nucleotides, and the number of copies of each nucleotide sequenced” (http://
www.urmc.rochester.edu/profiles/display/123618).
24  A widely used method of determining the order of bases. A base is one of the molecules 
(adenine, thymine, guanine, or cytosine in DNA; adenine, guanine, uracil, or cytosine in 
RNA) that forms part of a DNA and RNA nucleotide. 
25  Determining the complete nucleotide sequence of an organism’s DNA. 
26  Data about other data.
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of programs and data assessments, and software and hardware 
change rapidly.
•	 No bioinformatics software comes as a stand-alone. How much 
documentation is needed? What baseline truths are needed to 
ensure that assessments and comparisons of technologies can be 
made effectively?
•	 Integrating disparate data to provide a single value (e.g., can 
genomics analysis be added to physical/chemical analysis to 
yield a single value or answer; can traditional forensics, intelli-
gence, prior odds, networks, be incorporated?) Is simplicity desir-
able for conveying information “up the chain” to decision mak-
ers? Should disparate data be maintained as separate entities?
•	 Avoiding the filtering of data on the basis of individual prefer-
ences and bias. 
•	 Instituting processes to inform decision makers in a way that 
ensures that the science is properly understood. Many nonscien-
tists who make decisions based on forensic science make those 
decisions based in large part on media, such as television.
The overall goal for microbial forensics is to move as far to the left as 
possible on the time-risk continuum portrayed in Figure 1-3. Microbial 
forensics results that are very informative, have high confidence, and are 
rapidly obtained—and perhaps better leveraged with other capabilities—
could enable investigators to manage risks so that energy is dedicated to 
anticipating and preparing for an event rather than reacting to a surprise, 
scrambling to mitigate consequences, and seeking attribution.
Currently, microbial forensics directs much of its science to operations 
on the wrong end of this time-risk timeline (Murch presentation, 2013). 
Dynamic cross-disciplinary international collaboration, however, could 
serve to improve and develop better microbial forensics capacities, shift-
ing the focus of microbial forensics to the left on the continuum, and at 
the same time contribute to the strength of other sciences.
ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the report prepared by 
the committee draws upon the material presented in the symposium as 
well as other evidence. This chapter has provided an introduction to the 
field and to major technical and policy issues. Among its key messages:
•	 The law enforcement goal of microbial forensics is “attribution”—
that is, determining who committed the offense. Based on the 
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analysis of biological and other evidence, law enforcement builds 
a case for attribution to a specific source or sources. The evidence 
supporting attribution must be robust and suitable for use in legal 
proceedings and to inform decision making at the highest levels.
•	 Public health, infectious disease medicine, and law enforcement 
investigations all need to establish whether an event is deliber-
ate, accidental, or natural. Importantly, each can leverage the 
other’s resources to achieve the same initial objectives. The major 
difference between the two approaches is that the public health 
investigation’s goal is to manage the public health response and 
protect the public’s health and safety, whereas law enforcement’s 
is to provide safety and security by apprehending and convicting 
those who committed the attack.
•	 The needs of microbial forensics share many aspects with med-
icine and public health. Many of the capabilities required for 
detecting and responding to the whole spectrum of natural, 
intentional, and man-made events are essentially the same. The 
advantages of the microbial forensics and public health commu-
Time-Risk Continuum
Overall Goal is to Move to the Left as Far As Possible 
(Very Informative, High Confidence and Rapid Microbial Forensics Better 
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FIGURE 1-3 Time-risk continuum. The goal is to collapse time—to reduce risk 
by planning and preparing for an event rather than targeting efforts to reacting 
to an event. 
SOURCE: Murch presentation, 2013.
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nities working together are that systems created for rare events 
(e.g., bioterrorism) may suffer through lack of use, whereas those 
created for addressing natural and accidental outbreaks of infec-
tious disease are likely to be used frequently. Developing tools 
and systems compatible with both rare and common occurrences 
means that when a rare event does occur, these tools and systems 
will be ready and detection and response will not be delayed by 
lack of familiarity with them.
These messages are illustrated and developed in the remainder of the 
report, with a focus on the major scientific, technological, and policy and 
process issues that need to be addressed to develop the field of microbial 
forensics. Chapters 2 through 7 follow the general order of the sympo-
sium, while Chapter 8 presents the committee’s findings and conclusions, 
which follow from these chapters and respond to the major messages as 
well as to the “Key Questions and Unmet Needs” presented in the sec-
tion above.
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Microbial Science:  
Ecology, Diversity, and Characterizing 
the Microbial World
One might think that the age of great discoveries in biology is past––that 
humans have been everywhere and seen everything on Earth. But in fact, 
biology still boasts some formidable unknowns, and many are now be-
ing explored in the once invisible world of microbes. In the last 20 years, 
technological advances have made it possible to explore a microbial 
world that has proven vastly more extensive, important, and diverse 
than previously imagined. Analyses of microbial communities in the 
soil, in the ocean, and even in the human body have shown that previ-
ous methods detected only a tiny percentage of the different microbes in 
these environments. It seems that each technological advance and every 
new environment sampled reveal even greater diversity in the microbial 
world. Is there a limit? How can the nature and extent of microbial di-
versity be satisfactorily characterized?
Source: AAM, 2011a.
Although the world of living things is dominated by microbes, very 
little is known about the vast majority of them. According to the American 
Academy of Microbiology, “There are ten-million-fold more bacterial and 
archaeal cells on our small planet than there are stars in the visible uni-
verse, and they may contain as much carbon as all plant and animal life 
put together” (AAM, 2011b). Much of what is known is based on the very 
few microorganisms that are culturable in laboratories. Prior to the advent 
of nucleic acid sequencing, only the phenotypes of culturable microor-
ganisms could be readily studied using tools that had been available 
for the previous 150 years—growth on selective and differential media, 
35
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Gram stains, serotyping with reference antisera, and clinical microbiology 
techniques—and these are inadequate for the purpose of identifying and 
attributing the source of the material used in a biological attack because 
they cannot produce sufficiently fine-grained detail on the nature of the 
organism (Clements, remarks at Zagreb workshop, 2013).
As noted in Chapter 1, much of the work of microbial forensics today 
is based on studying biodiversity, phylogenetics,1 phylogeography,2 and 
genomics. The ability to sequence the genomes of microbes has provided 
an enormous amount of new knowledge about some selected bacteria 
and viruses. However, even the most basic information remains unknown 
for most microorganisms and “knowledge of the evolution and ecology 
of microbial communities lags far behind cellular microbiology” (NRC, 
2007:33). Until recently there have been few systematic efforts to collect 
and describe the microbes living in soil, seawater, freshwater lakes and 
streams, plants, and even in the guts and on the bodies of humans and 
other animals. The new techniques of “metagenomics” circumvent the 
unculturability of the majority of microbes by enabling the study of micro-
bial genes and sequences from entire communities directly from envi-
ronmental samples. The use of metagenomic techniques, however, is still 
an area of active development (Darling presentation, 2013). Meanwhile, 
knowledge of the natural microbial communities residing throughout 
most of the world is scarce and vastly incomplete. Although the biology 
of the small fraction of bacteria and viruses that are pathogenic to human 
beings, livestock and companion animals, and crop or forestry plants is 
somewhat better known and understood, there is still much to be learned 
about their evolution, how many strains of pathogen species exist in 
nature, what their distribution is throughout the world, and how this 
distribution affects, and is affected by, ecological conditions.
BIOSURVEILLANCE
Biosurveillance is “the process of active data-gathering with appropri-
ate analysis and interpretation of biosphere data that might relate to dis-
ease activity and threats to human or animal health—whether infectious, 
toxic, metabolic, or otherwise, and regardless of intentional or natural 
origin—in order to achieve early warning of health threats, early detection 
of health events, and overall situational awareness of disease activity” 
1  The study of evolutionary relatedness among various groups of organisms through 
molecular sequencing data and morphological data matrices.
2  A field of study concerned with the principles and processes governing the geographic 
distributions of genealogical lineages, especially those within and among closely related 
species.
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(Homeland Security Presidential Directive, HSPD-21, 2007).3 In addition 
to the scientific benefits that will derive from an improved understand-
ing of the microbial world, the application of that knowledge through 
improved international biosurveillance capabilities for earlier detection 
and reporting of new and reemerging infectious diseases underscores the 
fundamental connections between microbial forensics and public health. 
As the experience with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 
2002 and 2003 demonstrated, the global reach of trade and travel, espe-
cially by air, means that diseases with pandemic potential can now reach 
around the world within hours or days rather than the weeks or months 
of prior years.4 Subsequent outbreaks related to various strains of avian 
influenza (H1N1, H5N1, and H7N9) as well as the Middle East Respira-
tory Syndrome (MERS) that emerged in 2012 underscored the importance 
of improving national and international disease surveillance. Many of 
these diseases originated with animals, emphasizing the need for greater 
understanding of zoonoses as threats to health:
The WHO is engaging in an ever-increasing number of cross-sectoral 
activities to address health threats at the human-animal-ecosystem in-
terface. These threats include existing and emerging zoonoses as well 
as antimicrobial resistance, food-borne zoonoses, and other threats to 
food safety.5 
A major breakthrough came in 2005 when the World Health Assem-
bly of the World Health Organization (WHO) adopted revisions to the 
International Health Regulations (IHR), changing the basis for reporting 
disease outbreaks from a list of specific diseases to a set of characteristics 
that constitute a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern.” 
The IHRs reflect more than a decade of international effort to achieve 
global consensus on the need to improve disease surveillance capacities 
and to accept international requirements to do so in a timely manner. 
Much remains to be done, however; as of the initial July 2012 deadline 
for reporting progress, fewer than 20 percent of WHO member coun-
tries reported that they had been able to meet the IHRs, and a majority 
requested a 2-year extension.6 The international assistance being provided 
to enable countries to achieve the core surveillance and response compe-
3  http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-21.htm.
4  Between November 2002 and July 2003, the World Health Organization recorded 8,096 
probable cases of SARS in 29 countries, with 774 deaths (http://www.who.int/csr/sars/
country/table2004_04_21/en/; accessed April 6, 2014). One estimate put the economic 
impact of the outbreak at $30 billion (http://www.globalhealth.gov/global-health-topics/
global-health-security/index.html; accessed April 6, 2014).
5  http://www.who.int/zoonoses/en/; accessed April 6, 2014.
6  See http://www.who.int/ihr/about/en/ for more information about the IHR.
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tencies needed to meet their IHR requirements also serves the develop-
ment of capacities for microbial forensics.
In addition, national and nongovernmental efforts have already dem-
onstrated the value of increased reporting capabilities. For example, the 
Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN), which was origi-
nally developed by Public Health Canada in collaboration with WHO, 
continuously searches media sources for information about infectious dis-
ease outbreaks. Pro-Med mail, which in addition to monitoring the media 
and other sources, relies on reports from its network of 60,000 subscribers 
in 185 countries, is now a project of the International Society of Infectious 
Diseases that was begun in the mid-1990s by two U.S. nongovernmental 
organizations.7 According to WHO, “more than 60% of the initial outbreak 
reports come from unofficial informal sources, including sources other 
than the electronic media, which require verification.”8
WHO’s own primary surveillance mechanism is the Global Alert 
and Response Network (GOARN), “a technical collaboration of existing 
institutions and networks who pool human and technical resources for 
the rapid identification, confirmation and response to outbreaks of inter-
national importance.”9 Also relevant to microbial forensics is the Emerg-
ing and Dangerous Pathogens Laboratory Networks, another WHO 
effort to support the development of increased readiness and capacity in 
high-security public health and veterinary laboratories for detection and 
response related to both human and animal disease. This network is sup-
ported by a number of international working groups, some of which focus 
on developing common procedures and protocols that could be relevant 
for microbial forensics as well.10
As mentioned above and described in the cases in this chapter and 
elsewhere in the report, animal, plant, and foodborne diseases can also 
pose threats to public health and challenges for microbial forensics. This 
has led to increasing cooperation among WHO, the World Organisation 
for Animal Health (OIE), and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO). For example, in 2006 the three organizations launched the Global 
Early Warning System for Major Animal Diseases, Including Zoonoses 
(GLEWS), which seeks to gain the added value of
7  More information about GPHIN can be found at http://www.who.int/csr/alertre-
sponse/epidemicintelligence/en/ and http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/pubs/_intactiv/
gphin-rmisp/index-eng.php. Information about Pro-Med mail can be found at http://www.
promedmail.org/aboutus/.
8  http://www.who.int/csr/alertresponse/epidemicintelligence/en/; accessed April 4, 
2014.
9  http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/; accessed April 4, 2014.
10  Further information can be found at http://www.who.int/csr/bioriskreduction/
laboratorynetwork/en/; accessed April 4, 2014.
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combining and coordinating the alert and disease intelligence mecha-
nisms of OIE, FAO and WHO for the international community and 
stakeholders to assist in prediction, prevention and control of animal 
disease threats, including zoonoses, through sharing of information, 
epidemiological analysis and joint risk assessment.11 
In the United States, the White House issued the National Strategy 
for Public Health and Medical Preparedness in response to Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-21 (HSPD-21) in 2007. HSPD-21 called for 
the United States to 
establish a biosurveillance capability, with connections to international 
disease surveillance systems, that can provide “early warning” of a bio-
attack or naturally occurring outbreak, and can provide ongoing “near 
real-time” information about an outbreak as it unfolds. This system 
should be designed to provide a national “common operating picture” 
and better situational awareness for state, local, and federal officials, as 
well as for public and private sector healthcare providers.
In 2008, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was 
tasked to lead the establishment of the National Biosurveillance Advisory 
Subcommittee (NBAS). NBAS provides advice to the Advisory Commit-
tee to the Director as well as “leadership and guidance” for implement-
ing the National Biosurveillance Strategy. It issued its first report in 2009 
(National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee, 2009), calling for stra-
tegic goals and investments in biosurveillance activities and technologies, 
hiring and retaining trained personnel, and electronic health records and 
databases. In a second report in 2011, NBAS made further recommenda-
tions on governance, information exchange, workforce, and research and 
development (National Biosurveillance Advisory Subcommittee, 2011). 
In 2012, the White House issued its National Strategy for Biosurveillance.
More recently, the Global Health Security Agenda, announced in Feb-
ruary 2014, is a new partnership created by the United States among 
WHO, OIE, and FAO along with more than 25 countries to
“. . . accelerate progress toward a world safe and secure from infec-
tious disease threats and to promote global health security as an interna-
tional security priority, to
•	 Prevent and reduce the likelihood of outbreaks—natural, acciden-
tal, or intentional;
•	 Detect threats early to save lives;
11  http://www.glews.net/; accessed April 6, 2014.
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•	 Respond rapidly and effectively using multisectorial, interna-
tional coordination and communication.”12
Again, success in achieving a number of the Agenda’s goals would also 
mean improved international capabilities for microbial forensics.
The U.S. microbial forensics community has already intensified its 
efforts to partner with the public health sector, particularly to improve 
and increase the use of biosurveillance information. Such information 
would help microbial forensics investigators to better understand the con-
text of an active outbreak and better interpret microbial forensics findings.
The rest of this chapter explores several actual microbial forensics 
cases to illustrate the techniques that have been developed over the last 
10-12 years, some of the relationships between public health and micro-
bial forensics, and the unmet needs that remain in the area of understand-
ing microbial ecology, diversity, and characterization of strains and other 
genetic variants. Other aspects of public health and microbial forensics, 
including unmet needs related to technologies and processes, are taken 
up in subsequent chapters.
THE AMERITHRAX CASE
Although several attempts to use pathogens as weapons occurred 
prior to 2001, the most comprehensive major case involving the use of 
a pathogen as a biological weapon occurred with the anthrax letters (or 
“Amerithrax”) case. In fall 2001, less than a month after the September 
11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the U.S. Pentagon, let-
ters containing spores of the anthrax disease-causing bacterium (Bacil-
lus anthracis, or B. anthracis) were sent through the U.S. mail. Between 
October 4 and November 20, 2001, 22 people were sickened by anthrax, 
with 5 tragic fatalities (Jernigan et al., 2002). In addition, there was exten-
sive environmental contamination caused by the anthrax mailings in 
U.S. Postal Service buildings, Senate office buildings, and in many other 
places that processed or received the contaminated letters. The FBI led the 
effort to characterize the material contained in the letters and identify the 
individual or individuals responsible for the mailings. This investigation 
involved extensive scientific study spanning almost 9 years (NRC, 2011). 
Over the 9 years, the FBI devoted 600,000 investigator hours to the case, 
which involved 17 Special Agents as well as 10 U.S. Postal Inspectors. 
During the investigation, 10,000 witnesses were interviewed, 80 searches 
conducted, 4 million megabytes of computer memory were analyzed, 
12  Additional information about the Agenda may be found at http://www.globalhealth.
gov/global-health-topics/global-health-security/ghsagenda.html; accessed April 6, 2014.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
MICROBIAL SCIENCE 41
and 5,750 grand jury subpoenas were served. Twenty-nine government, 
university, and commercial labs assisted with the scientific analyses that 
were a central aspect of the investigation (U.S. Department of Justice, 
2010). Note that, at the time of the anthrax letters mailings, the tools and 
technologies that were readily available were not adequate and the sci-
ence of microbial forensics was in its infancy and limited to a few pioneer-
ing laboratories (Clements remarks, 2013). The Amerithrax investigation 
accelerated the development of microbial forensics, resulting in remark-
able development and applications of new techniques and approaches for 
using laboratory tools to pinpoint the genetic identity of a microbial agent 
(Tucker and Koblentz, 2009). Microbial forensics became an essential part 
of the scientific investigation, which was combined with physicochemical 
analyses and other evidence to narrow the search for the source of the B. 
anthracis used in the attacks.
An important point to be made here is that B. anthracis is extremely 
stable genetically. One reason for this stability is that the organism’s life 
cycle includes long periods of dormancy in the form of spores, rendering 
the genome highly homogeneous (Pilo and Frey, 2011). Paradoxically, 
reconstruction of the evolutionary history of B. anthracis has been chal-
lenging because of the same stability that allowed investigators to track its 
use as a biological weapon (Van Ert et al., 2007). Very early in the investi-
gation the anthrax spores in the letters and the environmental and clinical 
isolates were identified as the “Ames strain” by Dr. Paul Keim and mem-
bers of his team at Northern Arizona University (NAU). At the Zagreb 
workshop, Keim summarized what enabled them to accomplish this iden-
tification in the era before whole-genome sequencing (WGS) became com-
monplace. Research in the mid-1990s to differentiate B. anthracis strains 
had been limited to working with small sections of genomic DNA. The 
genomes of very few bacteria had, at that point, been fully sequenced. 
Keim and his colleagues had focused on hypervariable regions in the 
genetic material of B. anthracis called variable number tandem repeat 
(VNTR) regions. His team was able to identify eight loci in B. anthracis that 
had multiple alleles (i.e., different versions of the same genetic marker). 
They developed a typing system called multiple-locus VNTR Analysis, 
or MLVA. In fact, B. anthracis was one of the first bacteria upon which 
this subtyping was performed. In 2001, NAU had a database of about 
400 different B. anthracis strains and could differentiate these isolates into 
approximately 90 different genotypes. Both Keim’s lab at NAU and the 
CDC lab independently produced the same result: the MLVA8 genotype 
was found to be consistent only with the Ames strain genotype that Keim 
and colleagues had identified earlier (Keim et al., 2000).
The Ames strain was a known laboratory strain used by the U.S. 
military and other vaccine development teams. The strain was origi-
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nally isolated from a dead cow in Texas in 1981 and was shipped by 
Texas A&M University to the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of 
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland 
(NRC, 2011). Over time, it was shared with other labs in the United 
States and in Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Thus, although 
the identification of the Ames strain narrowed the possibilities, making 
the source likely to be a laboratory that had access to the strain, MLVA 
was insufficient to identify its source unequivocally. The evidence, there-
fore, needed to be more painstakingly examined for additional unique 
and distinguishing genetic and other features that could be compared to 
samples obtained from laboratories holding the Ames strain to narrow 
the search for the source and perpetrator(s). Scientists from the Depart-
ment of Defense had identified several colony morphology variants in 
the samples from the letters (Figure 2-1). With funding from the National 
Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and other govern-
ment agencies, FBI scientists worked with The Institute for Genomic 
Research (TIGR) in Rockville, Maryland, to identify the genetic basis of 
the altered appearance of the bacterial colonies (Read et al., 2002). Some 
of these were determined to be insertions or deletions, while others were 
associated with single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) (NRC, 2011). 
FBI investigators then contracted with four laboratories to develop highly 
specific molecular genetic assays to try to detect some of these variants 
in the anthrax powder evidence. These assays were used in the examina-
tion of the samples the FBI had collected to form its repository of known 
Ames strain samples. 
Unfortunately, the rigor used in collecting and processing samples 
did not match the rigor of the powerful and validated assays. Validating 
an evidence-handling stream is very difficult. Achieving high confidence 
 
FIGURE 2-1 Variants of representative colonies of each of the morphotypes of B. 
anthracis Ames. 
SOURCE: Rasko et al. (2011).
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
MICROBIAL SCIENCE 43
would entail processing a large number of blank samples,13 which is very 
expensive. In the anthrax letters case, this could not be performed in 
real time and was not done. A “false positive” result that was uncovered 
during early evidence handling led to the unnecessary and expensive 
draining of a Maryland pond. This evidence proved not to be consistent 
with the Ames strain (NRC, 2011). Trace evidence errors can lead to costly 
mistakes. Nevertheless, the analysis of the repository samples using the 
then newly created assays eventually led the FBI to focus attention on a 
particular flask at USAMRIID containing a spore preparation known as 
RMR-1029.
In addition, physical science analytical approaches, such as scanning 
transmission electron microscopy, energy-dispersive X-ray analysis, car-
bon dating by accelerator mass spectrometry, and inductively coupled 
plasma-optical emission and mass spectrometry, were used to try to deter-
mine the chemical and elemental profiles of the spore powders (NRC, 
2011). These kinds of testing were designed to answer such questions as 
how the material was grown and processed, when the anthrax prepara-
tion might have been made, whether there were contaminants or trace 
elements that would provide a clue to the production location or materials 
used, and whether there was evidence of an effort to deliberately include 
additives to improve dispersal of the anthrax spores.
Early in the investigation, elemental analysis of the letter spores 
detected silicon, leading some to conclude that this material had been 
deliberately added to aid aerosol dispersal of the anthrax spores. The 
conclusion that silicon was present was correct, but the interpretation 
that it had been added to weaponize the spores was not supported. A 
sensitive and sophisticated analysis performed at the Sandia National 
Laboratories showed that the silicon signal was inside, not outside the 
spore coat, which meant the spores had not been coated to decrease 
clumping (Michael and Kotula, 2009). However, because the erroneous 
conclusion was leaked to the media, it was never possible to completely 
mitigate this false conclusion. In fact, controversy concerning the source 
of the silicon content in the attack material remains active in the literature 
(Bhattacharjee, 2010; Hugh-Jones et al., 2011).
Two other analytical paths proved to be ineffective. One was stable 
isotope analysis. Because rainfall can have different oxygen isotope ratios, 
this analysis was performed to try to identify the region of origin of the 
13  “Blanks are analytical quality control samples analyzed in the same manner as site 
samples. They are used in the measurement of contamination that has been introduced into 
a sample either (1) in the field while the samples were being collected or transported to the 
laboratory or (2) in the laboratory during sample preparation or analysis” (U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 2004; http://www.epa.gov/oswer/riskassessment/ragsa/pdf/
ch5.pdf).
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water used to produce the spores. However, rainfall composition was not 
sufficiently predictive; in addition, autoclaving versus filtering water for 
sterilization can change isotope ratios. The second path was predicated on 
the fact that early nuclear weapons testing had caused a change in atmo-
spheric carbon-14 ratios. This phenomenon suggested a potential way to 
date the production of the spores and showed that the spores in the letter 
sent to Senator Leahy were produced between 1998 and 2001. However, 
this date range did not prove to be useful information. 
Keim emphasized, during his presentation at the Zagreb workshop, 
that one of the most powerful tools in forensics is one that has the ability 
to differentiate between inclusion and exclusion. The term “inclusion” 
means that an association or match might exist; that is, it is a failure to 
exclude some putative relationship. There might be an exact match—as 
might occur in some cases in human DNA testing—or the sample might 
be identified as a co-member of the same phylogenetic group. (The term 
“member” is preferred to “match” because in phylogenetic analysis a 
“member” may not be identical but would still be part of the same strain.) 
Conclusions as to whether two things are the same—inclusion—tend 
to be weak for use for attribution in court, because the clonal nature of 
microorganisms and unknown history or other factors can be used to 
discount or reduce the significance of such evidence. In contrast, exclu-
sion can serve as very powerful evidence (Budowle et al., 2008). When 
it is concluded that something is not the same—not the Ames strain—
based on the evolutionary models and assays, these conclusions are very 
strong. Exclusionary conclusions do not get newspaper headlines, but 
they are very important as they reduce the potential list of candidates and 
allow investigators to further focus efforts. The hypothesis testing used 
in molecular forensics and epidemiology can be summarized as follows:
•	 “Inclusion” (failure to exclude). Might be an exact match or 
at least co-members of the same phylogenetic group that are 
descended from a most recent common ancestor. Conclusions 
may be weakly supported.
•	 “Exclusion” (failure to include). Different from the comparator 
and very unlikely to be the same or from the same source. Conclu-
sions may be very strong.
Three examples of the power of exclusion are based on the analyses 
of the B. anthracis strains obtained from (1) the biological-weapons lab 
accident in Sverdlovsk in the former Soviet Union in 1979 (Meselson et al., 
1994), (2) the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist attack in Tokyo in 1993 (Danzig and 
Hosford, 2012; Keim et al., 2001), and (3) a biological-weapons produc-
tion facility in Al Hakam, Iraq (analyzed soon after the 2001 U.S. anthrax 
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letters attack). None of these were consistent with the Ames strain in the 
anthrax letters. Links to the Japanese terrorist group and the Russian and 
Iraqi biological weapons programs were therefore ruled out.
Keim named the following as the key challenges associated with the 
anthrax letters investigation: 
1. Initial genetic conclusions about what the anthrax letters strain 
was and where it originated were based upon limited databases, 
which investigators recognized. Despite this, the information was 
shared with policy makers, who proceeded as though these initial 
conclusions were strong conclusions. 
2. Throughout the investigation, genomic technology was undergo-
ing rapid developments from relying on an 8 locus MLVA system 
to 15- and 60-locus MLVA systems, to SNP analysis, and finally to 
WGS—which made trying to validate a system in real time very 
difficult.
3. Trace evidence was analyzed using partially validated systems, 
leading to costly investigative errors. 
4. Scientific and peer-reviewed publication was limited during the 
entire process. To this day, critical data generated by the investi-
gation remain unpublished.
5. A “kitchen sink” approach to forensics was used. There was 
strong pressure to “try my method,” including pressure exerted 
from very high political levels.
6. The public media added to confusion and disruption. There was 
too much coverage, for example, of the incorrect interpretation of 
the presence of silicon, yet too little when the false interpretation 
was corrected. 
7. It was a politically charged environment. Certain individuals 
sought the limelight, and their decision making affected the pro-
cess of the science.
8. Subject-area experts were also criminal suspects. Those perform-
ing analyses were simultaneously being investigated.
Obviously some of these circumstances are unavoidable in today’s 
environment. However, Keim provided two strong suggestions for 
improving the forensic approach to microbial attribution. The first is that 
investigators should define a specific hypothesis or hypotheses. Hypoth-
esis building before obtaining results can reduce bias by averting any 
tendency to try to fit the results to a desired interpretation. If investiga-
tors focus their questions around hypotheses to be tested, it is possible to 
develop yes/no or inclusion/exclusion criteria in an investigation. The 
second recommendation is that investigators define a relevant reference 
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population for genetic analyses. Early in the anthrax investigation, there 
was inadequate information about both North American and worldwide 
B. anthracis strains. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF PHYLOGENETIC INFORMATION
The Amerithrax case abundantly illustrated the importance of having 
adequate phylogenetic information about B. anthracis Ames, the agent 
involved in the case. Fortunately, Paul Keim and others had developed 
a rather extensive, although still incomplete, picture of the evolution of 
B. anthracis and the distribution of major strains throughout the world 
(Figure 2-2). This knowledge of strains of B. anthracis helped to pinpoint 
quickly the identity of the attack agent as the Ames strain because its 
genetic characteristics could be compared with other strains in the ref-
erence database. It should be noted, however, that the Ames strain is 
unusual in having a short history and a limited distribution. If the attack 
strain had been something other than Ames, its identity might not have 
been as simple to pinpoint.
In a more recent case dealing with anthrax, Dr. Richard Vipond, 
Operations Manager for the Rare and Imported Pathogens Laboratory 
at Porton Down in the United Kingdom, reviewed the forensic work 
employed during a 2009-2010 anthrax outbreak involving contaminated 
heroin (Price et al., 2012; Vipond presentation, 2013). In the United King-
dom and Scotland, most rare diseases are imported. Porton Down, part of 
the U.K. public health system, has substantial expertise in this area and is 
a WHO collaborative center for arbovirus, viral hemorrhagic fevers, and 
special pathogens, including B. anthracis. Historically, anthrax disease in 
the United Kingdom has been linked to importation and to contamination 
by animal products of “brownfield” (contaminated land previously used 
for industrial purposes) sites. Outbreaks in cattle occur in contaminated 
burial pit sites and imported materials; people renovating buildings may 
be infected via handling materials such as contaminated horsehair plaster. 
Because of their experience with the drumthrax cases, the Porton 
Down investigators had the tools Keim’s team had developed for the 
Amerithrax case in place and thus were able to use 13 canonical SNPs 
(Van Ert et al., 2007) and 8 MLVA loci (Keim et al., 2000) to establish 
quickly that the heroin-associated strains were all the same, including the 
one in Germany. The strains matched the Trans-Eurasian group of strains, 
which is widely distributed, most likely through trade routes (Figure 2-2). 
The strain had not previously been seen in the United Kingdom, nor is 
it shown there on the map in Figure 2-2. With real-time PCR methods, 
resolution down to the single copy is possible, and so detection is not a 
major issue. There were 53 confirmed cases, and Vipond suspects there 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
MICROBIAL SCIENCE 47
may have been 117 cases in total. Grunow et al. (2013) also reported that 
in 2012, additional cases occurred in Germany, France, Denmark, and the 
United Kingdom. 
Vipond does not believe that the heroin-related anthrax outbreak 
represented a biocrime or bioterrorist attack. One argument against the 
outbreak being due to bioterrorism is that drug users are not an ideal 
target population for capturing the public’s interest. In addition, when 
the police stepped up their operations in Glasgow in hopes of confirm-
FIGURE 2-2 Worldwide distribution of B. anthracis clonal lineages: phylogenetic 
and geographic relationships among 1,033 B. anthracis isolates. (Panel A) Popula-
tion structure based upon analysis of data from 12 canonical SNPs. The number of 
isolates (N) and associated MLVA genotypes (G) within each sublineage are indi-
cated as well as the average Hamming distance (D) as estimated from VNTR data. 
The major lineages (A, B, C) are labeled, as are the derived sublineages (1-12), 
which are also color-coded. (Panel B) Frequency and geographic distribution of 
the B. anthracis sublineages. The colors represented in the pie charts correspond 
to the sublineage color designation in panel A. 
SOURCE: Van Ert et al., 2007.
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ing the source, they may have contributed to the spread of the disease 
by driving distributors to sell the heroin farther afield, resulting in cases 
emerging elsewhere in Scotland and down into England. The German 
case is thought to have emerged as a result of the normal trafficking route.
Vipond also pointed out that assays are becoming progressively more 
sensitive and are picking up natural background. A key need is to know 
what is there already, so one can spot the difference between a deliberate 
release and a new natural outbreak. One can live with natural background 
levels of B. anthracis in the soil and not become infected. So as detection 
gets better, one will be able to identify what has been there since time 
immemorial. The key is being able to distinguish between an anomaly 
and a deliberate release so no one hits the panic button every time some-
thing unusual is seen. 
Dr. Ruifu Yang of the Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiol-
ogy in China is a recognized expert in, among other things, the phylog-
eny and evolution of Yersinia pestis, the organism that causes plague. At 
the Zagreb workshop, he reviewed his work with genome sequences of 
Y. pestis, samples of which have been collected from around the world, to 
show how phylogenetics can aid microbial forensics. He also discussed 
the effect of environment on a pathogen’s ecology and evolution. A patho-
gen’s ecology can strongly determine its genomic diversity. For some 
microorganisms, ecological diversity is high because the organisms may 
inhabit ecological niches in soil, the ocean, and even in the human body, 
in which there are 10 times the number of microbial cells as human cells 
(Koeppel et al., 2008). 
Yang classified bacterial pathogens into three groups based on the 
rate of a pathogen’s genomic recombination, the acquisition of alleles. 
A genomically monomorphic pathogen, such as Y. pestis or B. anthracis, 
rarely exhibits recombination, and thus may be relatively easy to source 
(see Figure 2-3). A genomically intermediate diversified pathogen (GIDP), 
such as Escherichia coli or Klebsiella pneumoniae, undergoes frequent recom-
bination, but this does not necessarily affect the identification of phyloge-
netic relationships across samples. But a genomically highly diversified 
pathogen (GHDP), such as Helicobacter pylori or Vibrio parahaemolyticus, 
has a high frequency of recombination, and the phylogenetic relationship, 
especially in the deep branches, is distorted, which makes tracing a source 
more difficult, although it is still possible to distinguish among popula-
tions (e.g., Asian vs. U.S. strains). 
An understanding of a pathogen’s ecology and genomic diversity 
will aid in developing microbial forensics strategies to trace a pathogen’s 
source. For example, it would be appropriate to use SNPs to trace all three 
of the above categories of pathogens; to use VNTRs to trace GIDP and 
GHDP pathogens; and to use loss or gain of genomic fragments, as well 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
MICROBIAL SCIENCE 49
Fully parsimonious phylogenec tree 6SOLWQHWZRUNV
Free Recombination
FIGURE 2-3 Three classifica-
tions of bacterial pathogens. (A) 
Y. pestis: Rare recombination, with 
parsimonious phylogenetic tree. 
(B) Intermediate level of recom-
bination. (C) A neighbor-joining 
tree of 157 Vibrio parahaemolyticus 
genomes. V. parahaemolyticus is 
a highly diversified pathogen in 
which high-frequency homolo-
gous recombination leads to a ra-
diated phylogenetic relationship. 
SOURCES: A, Cui et al. (2013); B 
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as combined markers, to trace GIDP and GHDP pathogens. Databases can 
be built to accommodate these different target markers. 
Y. pestis is widely distributed in China. As of 2010, there were 296 
counties with 1.437 million km2 of natural plague foci. In different land-
scapes, climates, and ecologies, the hosts (e.g., various species of marmot, 
squirrel, rat) and bacterial strains vary. Dr. Yang and his colleagues are 
trying to understand the complex interactions between the pathogens, 
hosts, insect vectors, and environment. They have performed WGS on sin-
gle strains and employed comparative genomics to understand pathogen 
diversity, using SNP analysis to understand the transmission of Y. pestis 
through history and the phylogenetic differences in strains. Collaboration 
with other investigators has enabled them to track the historical transmis-
sions of Y. pestis plagues, which have repeatedly emerged from China, to 
trade routes such as the Silk Road (see Figure 2-4; Morelli et al., 2010). 
These analyses enabled them to track the evolution of different strains. 
The Black Plague strain of Y. pestis was different from strains before and 
FIGURE 2-4 Distribution of Y. pestis. 
SOURCE: Morelli et al. (2010).
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after it, and the ecological context in which the strains developed helped 
shape these differences.
Unfortunately, having information at the level of detail that is avail-
able for anthrax and plague is unusual for most microorganisms (AAM, 
2009a). As noted in the opening of this chapter, the microbial world has 
proven vastly more extensive and diverse than previously imagined. 
Metagenomic techniques now offer the possibility of determining the 
presence of new microorganismal genes directly from environmental 
samples or from the bodies of humans, other animals, and plants. To 
take advantage of this technique, the U.S. National Institutes of Health 
established a major project on the Human Microbiome and there are 
comparable European programs in existence. These efforts have produced 
vast quantities of new information on the bacteria, viruses, and microbial 
eukaryotes living in or on the human body (e.g., see Human Microbi-
ome Jumpstart Reference Strains Consortium, 2010). One researcher, Rob 
Knight, has even investigated the possibility that human skin bacteria, 
which appear to be unique to individuals, can be used as a forensic iden-
tification tool. Knight and his team found that residual skin bacteria left 
on objects could be matched to the skin bacteria of the individual who 
touched the object. Furthermore, these bacteria can be recovered from 
objects, such as a computer mouse, for up to 2 weeks (Fierer et al., 2010). 
The human microbiome is, however, influenced by a wide diversity of 
factors—for example, health, environment, diet, hygiene—which present 
many challenges.
Other groups are seeking to characterize new microorganisms, such 
as viruses associated with particular animals. Anthony et al. (2013) 
recently reported on a rigorous and systematic 5-year effort to discover 
the viruses associated with a single bat, the Indian Flying Fox, which car-
ries Nipah and Hendra viruses, among others. Fifty-five putative viruses 
(50 of which were new to science) from nine virus families were identified 
by repeated sampling from this one species. Extrapolating from the num-
bers derived from the Indian bat to the rest of the roughly 5,500 known 
mammalian species, the group estimated that there are a minimum of 
320,000 undiscovered mammalian viruses waiting to be described, assum-
ing that all mammalian species harbor a similar number of viruses. The 
importance of this work was characterized as enabling the establishment 
of preliminary bounds on the potential size of the pool of zoonotic viruses 
in mammalian wildlife. Other “virus hunters” are working to develop an 
early warning system to monitor the transmission of infectious diseases 
from animals to humans. Nathan Wolfe’s work in Africa and Southeast 
Asia, for example, is designed to develop forecasting capabilities that 
would identify and mitigate potential new zoonotic disease outbreaks 
before they become serious pandemics (Wolfe et al., 2007). 
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Such efforts are, however, barely scratching the surface of the micro-
bial world. Even phylogenetic studies of organisms that are relatively well 
understood, such as B. anthracis, are still incomplete, and there is as yet 
no worldwide repository of information on pathogen species and strains 
or any coordinated effort to develop information exchange mechanisms. 
John Clements pointed out that if public health agencies are not routinely 
collecting surveillance data (e.g., on influenza cases), data will not exist 
for law enforcement to use for microbial forensics purposes. Such data 
could be useful to both sectors.
Dr. Aaron Darling further reviewed microbial ecology and diversity 
in the context of forensics, focusing on metagenomics, which he defines as 
the study of DNA from uncultured organisms. He believes metagenomics 
has enormous potential to help in microbial forensics but that challenges 
remain for optimization of the technology. A major advantage of using 
metagenomics is that one can avoid culture bias (some organisms repro-
duce more quickly than others). There are also, however, disadvantages 
to metagenomics. One is DNA extraction bias. An organism cannot be 
sequenced if its DNA cannot be extracted. For example, if the DNA is 
trapped in spores with hard, uncrackable walls, extraction may not be 
successful. Therefore, the nucleic acids of an organism that are easily 
extractable in a sample may suggest that that organism is in greater abun-
dance whereas another organism—perhaps of forensic interest—seems to 
be of low abundance. A second limitation is that a small number of spe-
cies greatly dominate most ecosystems. It is difficult to study rare taxa, 
which comprise the majority of species, and the organism of interest may 
be naturally present at very low abundance. This situation would require 
a great amount of sequencing for characterization, higher throughput, or 
better targeting of informative genetic markers.
Darling stated that most of what is known about the ecology and 
evolution of pathogens comes from the study of isolates. Like Dr. Yang, 
he and his colleagues have categorized organisms by their recombination 
propensity, dividing them into organisms that tend to be monomorphic, 
those that are intermediately clonal, and those that recombine heavily. 
Even highly recombinant organisms, however, can reflect obvious phy-
logenetic structure.
Virologists have led the way in culture-independent forensic analy-
ses, and there have been a number of biocrime cases where phylogenetic 
evidence was used to support prosecution of individuals for deliber-
ately infecting others. In one such case, an HIV-infected individual was 
accused of intentionally infecting victims. Analyses of samples of DNA 
sequences of human immunodeficiency virus 1 (HIV-1) taken from the 
victims and the alleged suspect were performed in order to reconstruct 
the phylogenies of the HIV retrovirus polymerase (pol) and envelope (env) 
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genes (Scaduto et al., 2010).14 However, Darling noted with concern that 
the analysis of the pol gene shows a cluster of the victims’ pol sequences 
that does not include any of the suspect’s sequences, whereas analysis of 
the env gene shows the suspect’s sequences are ancestral to most of the 
victims’ sequences (see Figure 2-5). The env gene was used as evidence 
to support association, but seemingly discordant results from two genes 
with different evolutionary rates should be understood and appreciated. 
Darling noted the previously mentioned methods focused on SNPs as 
the basis for inferring phylogenies and performing forensic analyses. He 
pointed out that WGS, however, has revolutionized the understanding of 
bacterial evolution. In one study, after sequencing three E. coli genomes, 
researchers compiled a list of all genes in the genomes; only about 40 per-
cent of genes were common to all three strains (Perna et al., 2001; Welch et 
al., 2002). Although it has been known for some time that bacteria exhibit 
heterogeneity among strains (e.g., Bergthorsson and Ochman, 1995), it 
had long been assumed that members of the same species generally have 
highly homogeneous genomes and are largely identical because they are 
14  The paper by Scaduto et al. presents the molecular evidence used in two U.S. criminal 
cases: State of Washington v Anthony Eugene Whitfield, case number 04-1-0617-5 (Superior 
Court of the State of Washington, Thurston County, 2004) and State of Texas v Philippe Padieu, 
case numbers 219-82276-07, 219-82277-07, 219-82278-07, 219-82279-07, 219-82280-07, and 219-
82705-07 (219th Judicial District Court, Collin County, TX, 2009). The discrepancy noted by 




































FIGURE 2-5 Red lineages represent HIV sequences from the suspected perpetra-
tor. These lineages are ancestral in the env genes but not the pol genes in victims’ 
samples.
SOURCE: Scaduto et al. (2010).
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
54 SCIENCE NEEDS FOR MICROBIAL FORENSICS
the same species. This belief proved untrue, sparking a controversy over 
the nature of the definition of a species in bacteria. But it also suggested 
that one might be able to use gene content, instead of just nucleotide 
sequences, for forensic characterization because the gene content appears 
to be evolving almost as fast, if not faster, than the nucleotides.
Darling related information about a joint pilot project by the Uni-
versity of California, Davis and the JGI, that sought to characterize the 
genetic diversity of microbial organisms worldwide.15 As noted earlier, 
if one wishes to build a database of background information about dif-
ferent microbial ecosystems around the globe, an understanding of what 
exists is needed. The researchers gathered cultures of approximately 100 
organisms they deemed the most diverse from culture collections around 
the world and sequenced their genomes (Wu et al., 2009). They then 
measured the rate at which they discovered new genes, which was very 
high. Moreover, novelty in gene content correlates highly with novelty in 
the 16S rRNA16 sequence (Wu et al., 2009). Even within a single species, 
with each additional genome sequenced, discovery of new genes occurs.
As the discovery of additional 16S rRNA diversity continues, it 
becomes ever clearer that an immense, and probably unachievable, 
amount of sequencing would be required to characterize all the microbial 
DNA and RNA on the planet. The amount of 16S rRNA diversity that has 
been described in cultured samples is dwarfed by the amount of diver-
sity that has been described in uncultured or cloned cultures. Uncultured 
bacterial diversity greatly exceeds known isolate diversity. How do we 
gain access to all this uncultured diversity if one cannot grow it? There 
is a need to be able to build up databases on background microbial com-
munities and use them in forensics. 
Although metagenomics has been posed as a solution for this task, 
Darling indicated that metagenomics in its current form is far from 
adequate. There are two problematic technical issues. First, samples are 
complex mixtures. When extracted, the fragmented DNA from the chro-
mosomes from the various microbes in a sample are comingled and they 
cannot readily be pieced back together. Second, as part of the sample 
preparation for sequencing, the already fragmented DNA is broken down 
further to much smaller sizes so the sequencing chemistries can read 
them. In breaking up the longer molecules, information is lost. While 
assembly of short read lengths has been possible with homogeneous 
samples, the assemblies are problematic with complex samples and some 
genes or anonymous sequences may not be detected. Furthermore, it is 
15  For more information see http://www.jgi.doe.gov/programs/GEBA/index.html. Ac-
cessed November 13, 2013.
16  The 16S rRNA gene is a section of prokaryotic DNA found in all bacteria and archaea.
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difficult to place separate genes, if detected, on the same microbial chro-
mosome even if they originally were syntenic. It becomes unclear which 
chromosomes are which, which chromosomes were in which cells, and 
which genes were in which chromosomes. This is a tremendously difficult 
dataset to analyze, and currently most analyses do not do a good job of 
reconstructing the cellular origins of the genomic material. To solve this 
problem, Darling suggests (1) physically “dissecting” microbial communi-
ties to preserve information, (2) developing better inference methods with 
the help of bioinformaticians, and (3) developing alternative sequencing 
technologies. 
Darling has been investigating amplification and sequencing of DNA 
from single cells obtained directly from environmental samples (i.e., 
single-cell genomics). He and his colleagues sequenced 201 uncultivated 
archaeal17 and bacterial cells from nine different habitats. These organisms 
belonged to 29 major, but mostly unfamiliar, phylogenetic branches (Rinke 
et al., 2013). The additional genomic information enabled the researchers 
to resolve many intra- and interphylum-level relationships and to propose 
two new superphyla. However, the microbial diversity they were able to 
capture by this method was only a tiny fraction of organisms in existing 
genome databases. Therefore this method currently does not scale up for 
application to microbial forensics. 
Darling believes that the most important metagenomic analyses in 
microbial forensics are phylogenetic analyses. He explained that while 
the classic, isolate-based genome alignment provides one full-length DNA 
sequence per isolate, metagenomic alignments provide many DNA frag-
ments, with no information on which fragments originated from the same 
cell. Current methods for phylogenetic inference assume that complete 
linkage information is available. In particular, they assume that a full-
length DNA sequence for the gene under study is available from each 
organism being analyzed. However, metagenomic data do not satisfy 
these requirements because the data frequently contain small nonover-
lapping fragments of each organism’s gene sequence. Two inferential 
approaches that can be used to create phylogenetic trees from metage-
nomic data include phylogenetic placement, in which the read fragments 
are “mapped” into a reference phylogeny tree; and co-estimating the 
read clusters. This process is predicated on the assumption that there is 
a limited amount of diversity in a metagenomic sample: even if one has 
20 million reads, they must combine into a finite number of species. Two 
ways to implement this approach include Bayesian evolutionary analysis 
17  Archaea constitute a domain of single-celled microorganisms. Both the bacteria and 
archaea domains comprise prokaryotic organisms, but the two domains have different 
evolutionary histories.
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by sampling trees (BEAST), which is a software architecture for analyzing 
molecular sequences related by an evolutionary tree, and PhyloSift.
Phylogenetics, which provides information on evolutionary relation-
ships based on genetic data, can be used to determine what may be 
present in a sample. The greater the amount of genetic data, the deeper 
the resolution of the information on the microbe(s) present. With limited 
information, such as a single marker, phylum level may be the best that 
can be determined, which is likely to be of little use for attribution and 
determining the presence of, for example, a Select Agent. With a whole 
genome or a number of genes, deeper classification may be feasible. 
Bayesian hypothesis testing can be applied to any gene or genetic marker 
phylogeny, including toxin genes of interest. Metagenomic-derived phy-
logenetic data also can be used to answer the question, “What is the 
closest match between a sample of interest and a database of related sam-
ples?” This can be accomplished using phylogenetic placement data and 
the “phylogenetic Kantorvich–Rubinstein distance” (Evans and Matsen, 
2012).
However, these methods can be applied only to a single gene at a time 
or to a set of phylogenetically coherent genes. The capability to analyze 
all genes simultaneously is needed. Given current technology, the infor-
mation that is contained in whole genomes is not going to be entirely 
available and some information will not be captured. The analytical chal-
lenge of accomplishing this corresponds to reconstructing the histories of 
coevolution of all genes in a phylogenetic pattern. Evolution is complex 
and reticulate. Within a species tree, there are phylogenies of individual 
genes, which include gene duplication, gene conversion, lateral gene 
transfer, and gene death. The target areas that define a species or strain 
and distinguish it from near neighbors must be well defined. One or more 
sites may be required depending on phylogenetic resolution. Efforts are 
under way using informatics and phylogenetic reconstruction to meet 
the challenges (Bérard et al., 2012; Boussau et al., 2013). But scaling these 
methods presents technical, cost, and training challenges and is likely to 
remain difficult.
THE ISSUE OF DATA SHARING
Even if there is a major effort to characterize microbial diversity 
comprehensively through nucleic acid sequencing, unless the data that 
are collected are shared in such a way that scientists around the world 
have access to them, they will not provide optimal benefit for either 
public health or microbial forensics. During the discussion following the 
workshop session on microbial ecology and diversity, various workshop 
participants pointed out a variety of problems involved with data sharing.
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Paul Keim pointed out that language (e.g., English vs. Chinese) and 
export-control laws can pose problems for sharing data, particularly for 
organisms that are considered potential bioweapons. He noted that export 
control laws can sometimes be circumvented by publication of the data, 
but Dr. Yang stated that the decision to share is not always left up to the 
scientists, who are not always permitted to publish everything. Yang said 
that the worldwide scientific community could press governments to 
address the need for data sharing, given the bioweapons context, citing 
the needs of public health and microbial forensics. Yang’s database of Y. 
pestis, for example, could aid a traceback in the event of a Y. pestis outbreak 
anywhere in the world. A major theme among the workshop participants 
was that solutions to data sharing are severely needed. Ideally, countries 
would have their own microorganism collections and genomic databases 
and share them. But standards for the technology used would be needed 
so that all collections would have the same level of testing, accuracy, and 
quality. In addition, large developed countries have an advantage over 
small developing countries when it comes to data-generating capacity. It 
was suggested that an international framework is needed both to encour-
age and to reward data sharing. 
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3
Microbial Forensics and Clinical 
and Public Health Considerations: 
Commonalities and Differences
This chapter explores the commonalities and differences between the 
needs for microbial forensics on the one hand and for clinical diagnostics 
and public health protection on the other in terms of purposes, proce-
dures, technologies, and best practices. The answers to these questions 
touch on key goals and objectives, sample type, level of characterization 
required, interpretation and reporting of differences, and differences in 
governance and associated requirements.
Dr. Stephen Morse of the U.S. CDC outlined what public health needs 
to know in the event of an infectious disease outbreak due to either natu-









in place, and 
•	 Whether	 other	 factors	 (e.g.,	 safety	 of	 food	 and	water	 supplies)	
need to be addressed.
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Professor Alemka Markotić, University Hospital for Infectious Dis-
eases, Zagreb, an associate member of the Croatian Academy of Sci-
ences and Arts, also emphasized that the distinction between natural and 
deliberate infectious disease outbreaks is very important. The Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) does not apply to natural outbreaks of dis-
ease. Therefore, it is essential to determine as quickly as possible if the 
origins of an outbreak are natural or deliberate. Any State Party to the 
BWC may request assistance when a suspicious outbreak of disease has 
occurred (see Chapter 1). Various evaluation criteria have been developed 
to assist in assessing whether an outbreak is suspicious (see, e.g., Box 3-1). 
An interesting paper by Grunow and Finke (2002) applied a model using 
many of these criteria to an epidemic of tularemia in Kosovo in 1999 and 
2000. Grunow and Finke determined that the outbreak was the result of 
natural causes. But the procedure used was retrospective and would not 
have been in time for an intervention to prevent further spread of the 
disease if the cause had been due to a deliberate act. 
Dr. Dana Kadavy of Signature Science, LLC, noted some general dif-
ferences between the procedures used for clinical diagnostics and public 
health versus microbial forensics: 
•	 Clinical diagnostic analyses are designed to identify rapidly 
the species and possibly the strain of an infectious organism to 
inform effective treatment strategies. Microbial forensics laborato-
ries generate more fine-grained analyses of evidentiary samples, 
looking not only at species and strains but also perhaps at isolates 
of strains that possess unique genetic markers. Such in-depth 
analyses are likely to take much more time and effort (Figure 3-1).
•	 For microbial forensics, data must hold up to the scrutiny of 
judges and juries in a court of law as well as political figures, the 
media, and the public. Standards are defined for human DNA 
analysis, and diagnostic data are generated in conformity with 
Certified Authorization Professional (CAP), Clinical Laboratory 
Improvement Amendments (CLIA), or other certification stan-
dards. However, such guidance is less well defined for microbial 
forensics.
•	 In the clinical and public health sectors in the United States, gov-
ernance lies with the American Medical Association and the Food 
and Drug Administration. For microbial forensics, governance 
lies in law enforcement, the judicial system, and perhaps the U.S. 
Department of Defense.
Microbial forensics may encompass evidence from environmental 
background, epidemiological data, and other forensic findings. Collec-
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BOX 3-1 
Epidemiological Clues That May Signal a 
Biological or Chemical Terrorist Attack
 1.  Single case of disease caused by an uncommon agent (e.g., glanders, small-
pox, viral hemorrhagic fever, inhalation, or cutaneous anthrax) without ad-
equate epidemiological explanation; 
 2.  Unusual, atypical, genetically engineered, or antiquated strain of agent (or 
antibiotic resistance pattern);
 3.  Higher morbidity and mortality in association with a common disease or syn-
drome or failure of such patients to respond to usual therapy;
 4. Unusual disease presentation (e.g., inhalation anthrax or pneumonic plague);
 5.  Disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution (e.g., plague in 
a nonendemic area, influenza in the summer);
 6.  Stable endemic disease with an unexplained increase in incidence (e.g., tula-
remia, plague);
 7.  Atypical disease transmission through aerosols, food, or water in a mode sug-
gesting sabotage (i.e., no other possible physical explanation);
 8.  No illness in persons who are not exposed to common ventilation systems 
(have separate closed ventilation systems) when illness is seen in persons in 
close proximity who have a common ventilation system;
 9.  Several unusual or unexplained diseases coexisting in the same patient with-
out any other explanation;
10.  Unusual illness that affects a large, disparate population (e.g., respiratory 
disease in a large heterogeneous population may suggest exposure to an 
inhaled pathogen or chemical agent);
11.  Illness that is unusual (or atypical) for a given population or age group (e.g., 
outbreak of measles-like rash in adults);
12.  Unusual pattern of death or illness among animals (which may be unexplained 
or attributed to an agent of bioterrorism) that precedes or accompanies illness 
or death in humans;
13.  Unusual pattern of death or illness in humans that precedes or accompanies 
illness or death in animals (which may be unexplained or attributed to an agent 
of bioterrorism);
14.  Significant number of ill persons who seek treatment at about the same time 
(point source with compressed epidemic curve);
15.  Similar genetic type among agents isolated from temporally or spatially distinct 
sources;
16.  Simultaneous clusters of similar illness in noncontiguous areas, domestic or 
foreign;
17.  Large numbers of cases or unexplained diseases or deaths;
SOURCE: Reprinted from Khan and Pesik (2011). Copyright 2011, with permission from 
Elsevier.
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tively these aspects serve to help frame the forensics work required, 
and provide understanding of, and goals for, the types of laboratory 
analyses to be performed. The range of potential sample types that may 
be encountered in microbial forensics is vast. Clinical samples also can 
be highly complex, but the sample types generally are known and their 
matrices are well characterized. In microbial forensics, samples may come 
not only from clinical sources, but also environmental, food, and other 
matrices or be a completely unexpected target, as in a hoax. Sample types 
range from the simple to the complex, and across a clinical, clinical/
forensic, and forensic continuum. They may comprise pure isolates, a 
prominent isolate in a minor mixture, a trace isolate in a mix of hundreds 
of organisms, and every other permutation. Samples also may contain 
copious amounts of a target organism or just a trace of the sought-for 
(or unknown) organism, which represents an analytical target against a 
background of sample “noise.” These challenges necessitate alternative 
sample-processing strategies.
Laboratory analyses for microbial forensics are intended to (1) serve 
as rapid screening mechanisms, (2) provide information for investigative 
leads, and (3) narrow the potential sources for a particular microorganism 
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FIGURE 3-1 The microbial forensic process. 
SOURCE: Budowle et al., 2013.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
CLINICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS 63
in order to link it to a particular origin or activity for attribution. Microbial 
forensic methods need the capability to drill deeply and with very fine 
variances to fully assign attribution. Analysis extends to strain, subtype, 
and/or isolate; type and abundance of organism present in simple to 
complex samples; presence of antibiotic resistance or virulence genes; 
evidence of genetic engineering and/or isolate evolution (is it endemic, 
wild type, or a cultured strain repeatedly passed around labs?); and in-
depth, sample-to-sample comparison that may be informed by SNPs and 
other genetic markers. Some of these are also major concerns for public 
health, for example, the presence of antibiotic resistance or virulence 
genes, which may dictate differences in treatment options. Reporting 
requirements for characterization also are specific for the microbial foren-
sics space, and some of these are shared with clinical diagnostic practices 
and food analysis systems. In such cases, the sectors should leverage one 
another. The data generated may inform investigative leads and requests 
for additional samples, and will be used in reporting and for expert testi-
mony. Documentation and reporting must be in place at each step.
The following case studies will illustrate in practical terms how some 
analytical approaches are shared between clinical medicine or public 
health and the use of microbial forensics to deal with biocrime.
THE RAJNEESHEE CULT IN OREGON, E. COLI O104, AND 
KLEBSIELLA PNEUMONIAE: THREE CASE STUDIES OF 
RESPONSES TO INFECTIOUS DISEASE OUTBREAKS
In 1984, the Rajneeshee cult deliberately contaminated restaurant 
salad bars in The Dalles, Oregon, with Salmonella enterica. The motiva-
tion for this biocrime was to influence the outcome of a local election 
by incapacitating the local populace to ensure that the cult’s candidates 
would win the county elections. More than 750 people were sickened, but 
fortunately there were no fatalities. But the deliberate nature of the attack 
was not confirmed until nearly a year later. 
In this instance, the agent and context of the attack mimicked a naturally 
occurring event that plays out several times a year across the United 
States, with large, multifocal outbreaks such as the one that plagued the 
tomato and pepper supplies in 2008-2009, causing disease in more than 
1400 people. (Skowronski and Lipkin, 2011:174)
This example of a biocrime (a more frequent category of intentional 
use of biological agents than bioterrorism; see Carus, 2001) highlights 
several important points. First, it can be a major challenge to differenti-
ate among natural, accidental, or deliberately caused disease outbreaks. 
Second, such an outbreak requires similar responses to protect public 
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health regardless of the cause. Finally, modern technology makes it pos-
sible to determine the identity and characteristics of the organism being 
dealt with much more rapidly, as the next two cases dealing with natural 
outbreaks illustrate. The first case is one that also originated in the con-
sumption of food from a salad bar, this time in Germany in 2011.
Escherichia coli, or E. coli, is usually a harmless bacterium that grows 
naturally in the intestinal tracts of humans and other animals. However, 
there are many different strains of E. coli, just as there are different strains 
of B. anthracis and Y. pestis. Some of these strains are highly pathogenic, 
such as the infamous O157:H7 and O104:H4 strains. The letter O in the 
name refers to a marker on the bacterium’s surface, which presents in 
hundreds of different immunogenic forms, in the latter instance, form 
number 104. The H describes another immunologic marker found on the 
bacterium’s flagellum. Both of these markers are easily detected by spe-
cific antibodies and can be used to identify strains. Pathogenic E. coli must 
be able to attach to or invade the cells of the intestinal lining, where they 
disrupt the normal function of the intestine by producing toxins, such as 
the Shiga-like toxin produced by the O157:H7 strain (AAM, 2011b). This 
toxin is very similar to the toxin produced by Shigella dysenteriae and is 
able to kill host cells. Both S. dysenteriae and E. coli that produce Shiga-
like toxin are able to cause hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) in infected 
individuals. Some pathogenic E. coli may have extra genes not found in 
the normal intestinal strains that confer these abilities.
Dr. Dag Harmsen of University Hospital, Munster, Germany, 
described the recent E. coli O104:H4 outbreak in Germany and a Klebsiella 
pneumoniae outbreak in the Netherlands to illustrate the usefulness of 
next-generation gene sequencing (NGS) in public health responses. NGS 
is becoming both an essential component of microbial forensic analy-
ses and the new preferred standard in epidemiology. For example, the 
E. coli O104:H4 outbreak has become a textbook case on technology devel-
opment and microbial surveillance (Lipkin, 2013). It ushered in a new 
kind of epidemiological investigation and was directly instrumental in 
the development and evaluation of several new bioinformatics tools. It 
also provided proof of principle for the capability of smaller sequencing 
machines, which are reasonably affordable and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, allow rapid turnaround times. 
As can be seen in Figure 3-2, which provides the timeline of the case, 
the O104 E. coli outbreak began in early May 2011 in the Hamburg area of 
Germany. In contrast with previous outbreaks, the incubation period was 
long, approximately 10 days. The outbreak was not declared in Germany 
until May 20th. Two days later, the European Centre for Disease Preven-
tion and Control issued a warning for Europe. Labs were instructed to 
send isolates to the University of Münster, and the first samples arrived 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
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on May 22. After growing a pure culture, the organism was characterized 
and a screening test was created. This screening test, based on Sanger 
sequencing, was published on the Internet on May 30, and 15 days later in 
Lancet Infectious Disease. Eventually several other groups sequenced the E. 
coli so that its genome was eventually produced on all available NGS plat-
forms. Several peer-reviewed papers published the sequence very quickly. 
Phylogenetic analysis based on Sanger multilocus sequence typing 
(MLST) showed that the closest related genome was enteroaggregative E. 
coli, which had previously been sequenced by a French group (Mellmann 
et al., 2011). Harmsen pointed out that routine surveillance is very impor-
tant. The HUSECO41 E. coli strain was identified in a 2008 publication 
(see Mellmann et al., 2008), yet little notice was taken, perhaps because 
this organism rarely causes infections. Using the sequence data, the MLST 
technique showed convincingly that this previous isolate is indeed most 
closely related to E. coli O104:H4. Although Harmsen’s group and others 
have proposed differing hypotheses about E. coli O104:H4’s evolutionary 
descent, there is as yet no resolution of this question. 
Although there had already been an outbreak in Japan related to bean 
sprouts, it was not until June 5 that sprouts were suspected as the source. 
Unfortunately, most people remember eating a salad but will not remem-
ber all of its ingredients. This deficiency provides a very strong argu-
ment for changing the way epidemiological investigations are conducted, 
because the goal is to elucidate and contain the outbreak. It takes consid-
erable time to identify a single contaminated component of a mixed salad 
and there are many false leads because microorganisms and/or toxins 
can be transferred from one component to another. There are numerous 
examples where one component of a salad was alleged to be the culprit 
only to find out later that something else was responsible. In the current 
case, two clusters of affected people had eaten at the same restaurants, 
which proved to be the epidemiological breakthrough. Based on this 
information, a very detailed food supply chain analysis was performed, 
and that is how the sprouts were finally implicated. Although no isolate 
had been recovered from sprouts in the German case as of October 2013, 
the epidemiological investigation confirmed convincingly that sprouts 
were involved. There was also a smaller outbreak in Marseilles, France, 
linked to sprouts. In the German case, once the sprouts were identified, 
the outbreak was essentially over. 
Hospitals need fast, sensitive, and specific screening tests. In hospital 
surveillance terms, the ability to exclude pathogens is very important 
owing to response and cost. If a hospital can exclude the presence of an 
outbreak, it can avoid closing wards and putting patients into isolation, 
which are very costly measures.
According to Harmsen, while the laboratories and treatment provid-
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ers were well prepared to confront the outbreak, communication with 
the public was not handled as well. For example, an accusation made 
early in the outbreak implicating Spanish cucumbers came from a local 
food agency in Hamburg. This agency used screening tests that were not 
specific for the O104 strain and the Spanish cucumbers were wrongly 
implicated as the source. Spain sustained substantial economic losses 
and sought compensation. Communication among the national, state, 
and local authorities was not always consistent, nor was there agree-
ment between public health and food communications groups. Intense 
media attention is common in such situations and is not always helpful. 
Harmsen noted that he himself was misquoted during interviews. He 
suggests that there should be centralization of information for these kinds 
of communication.
The E. coli case demonstrated that rapid NGS can be used almost in 
real time during outbreaks, and Harmsen described a second example 
that proved the usefulness of NGS for diagnostics during an outbreak. 
Only a month after the German E. coli case in June 2011, there was an 
outbreak of K. pneumoniae at Dutch Maasstad Hospital in Rotterdam. The 
strain was multidrug-resistant K. pneumoniae OXA-48. The outbreak did 
not receive the global attention that the German outbreak had, but it was 
an enormous public health issue in the Netherlands.
The Dutch National Institute for Public Health and the Environ-
ment (RIVM) sent K. pneumoniae strains to the University of Münster to 
sequence. A draft genome of the K. pneumoniae OXA-48 outbreak strain 
was developed and compared with other publicly available Klebsiella 
genomes. Scientists identified 36 candidate regions to use in developing a 
strain-specific multiplex PCR test. They enlisted the help of the Wellcome 
Trust Sanger Institute in Cambridge in the United Kingdom, which was 
conducting a global surveillance of Klebsiella. By comparing the candidate 
signature sequences against Sanger’s additional 200 Klebsiella genomes, 
they identified two candidate regions that were specific for the Dutch 
outbreak (Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and the Envi-
ronment, 2013). This information was given to RIVM, and a multiplex 
molecular diagnostic test assay that targeted one of the two signatures as 
well as antibiotic resistance genes was developed. This test assay was sup-
plied to every Dutch hospital and is still used today for screening patients, 
mainly for exclusion purposes. The case is an excellent example of the 
important role of genomics in diagnostics as well as microbial forensics.
As detailed in Box 3-2, clinical microbiologists see many potential 
applications for NGS that can be broadly organized under these cat-
egories: (1) ad hoc epidemiology; (2) diagnostics; (3) therapeutics; and 
(4) global surveillance, early warning, and outbreak detection. Benchtop 
NGS is a democratizing force, enabling small- and medium-sized labora-
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tories to acquire these powerful new diagnostics, and some believe this 
technology can “leapfrog” into developing countries. NGS can be used 
for diagnostic and screening tests, and in therapeutics it has been used 
for susceptibility profiling. Some of the very early genome sequencing 
was performed for reverse vaccinology for the design of new vaccines, 
and NGS is now being used for drug development. It seems likely that 
many of the problems with sequencing will eventually be overcome, 
and its use could become fairly routine in clinical diagnostics. If this is 
the case, stored clinical data can also be analyzed for microbial forensics 
purposes if mechanisms for forensic analysts to access the clinical data 
can be devised. 
Clinical microbiologists are particularly interested in global surveil-
lance for use in detecting early outbreaks. To maximize surveillance data, 
a kind of molecular “Rosetta stone” is needed—a nomenclature that will 
enable global comparisons of data. 
Harmsen also suggested that another ultimate goal should be to 
develop plain-language reporting that is understandable to physicians 
and epidemiologists. Translating “there is a SNP at position 4,000,000” to 
BOX 3-2 
Rapid NGS Diagnostic Applications and 
Public Health Microbiology
SOURCE: Harmsen presentation, 2013.
§ Speciation / identification & pathogenicity profiling
§ Molecular diagnostic screening tests
§ Ultra-deep sequencing for pathogen discovery from human 
tissues (e.g., hemorrhagic viruses)
§ Introduction of benchtop Next Generation Sequencing 
(NGS) machines, enables small- and medium-sized 
laboratories (‘democratizing of NGS’) to perform ‘ad hoc’ 
genomic prospective epidemiology
Applic ations Details




§ Reverse vaccinology (rationale vaccine design)
§ Non-targeted new drug detection
T herapeutics
§ Standardized Whole Genome Shotgun [WGS] NGS for 
detection of transmission between individuals
§ Outbreak detection, i.e., establishing the spread of 
particular strains locally or regionally
§ Longer-term and evolutionary studies to identify the 
emergence of particularly pathogenic or virulent variants
G lobal s urveillanc e, early 
warning &  outbreak 
detec tion
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“this confers resistance to tetracycline” greatly improves usefulness. For 
certain bacteria, plain-language reporting could be easily achieved, and 
several groups are already working to accomplish this.
Figure 3-3 summarizes Harmsen’s thoughts on four approaches for 
using whole-genome nomenclature. Genome-wide SNPs work especially 
well for monomorphic organisms, but Harmsen does not think it is the 
best choice. He agrees with Maiden et al. (2013) in advocating genome-
wide, gene-by-gene allele typing. Although MLST is not popular for use 
with monomorphic organisms owing to its limited discriminatory power, 
it is still useful for other organisms and is influential from an intellectual 
point of view. Harmsen suggests using core-genome1 MLST, or using 
MLST+, which enables analysis of the seven “housekeeping” genes2 as 
1  The core genome is the set of genes that are present in all members of a species, suggest-
ing that they are required for essential cellular functions.
2  Housekeeping genes are constitutive genes that are required for the maintenance of basic 
cellular function.
FIGURE 3-3 Four approaches to using whole-genome sequencing. Pros (green), 
cons (red). 
SOURCE: Adapted from Harmsen presentation, 2013.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
70 SCIENCE NEEDS FOR MICROBIAL FORENSICS
well as hundreds or thousands of other genes, which will provide the 
discriminatory power needed for outbreak investigation for most organ-
isms (Jolley et al., 2012). There are also the benefits of it being additive, 
expandable, and nomenclature friendly. 
NGS is a technology for analyzing all bacteria, whether perform-
ing evolutionary or phylogenetic analysis. It could enable standardized 
hierarchical microbial typing, surveillance and outbreak investigation, 
evolutionary analysis, and resistome/toxome3 analysis. Harmsen ranked 
the discriminatory power of microbial typing approaches in Figure 3-4. 
He believes that MLST will endure for backwards compatibility; it has 
a legacy of 15 years of publication and data generation and it can be 
extracted easily from NGS data. Canonical SNPs offer the same range, if 
not better, of discriminatory powers. Martin Maiden recently proposed a 
system called ribosomal MLST (rMLST) (Jolley et al., 2012) to implement 
a combined taxonomic and typing approach for the whole domain of bac-
teria. Harmsen believes that MLST+ ranks high for discriminatory power 
and that it can be standardized. Using SNPs and alleles would offer even 
more discriminatory power (Köser et al., 2012), but standardizing the 
method will be challenging. 
Harmsen also sees a need for quality assurance and quality control 
guidelines for microbiology and microbial forensics. Published guidelines 
are primarily for use in human genetics. There is an initiative called Global 
Microbial Identifiers4 that is trying to address this and harmonize, but it 
is not well funded. He believes that a One Health approach,5 which links 
the communities concerned with food safety, veterinary medicine, clinical 
medicine, and microbial forensics, should be implemented, both within 
and among countries. Many nations may assume such collaborations are 
already in place, but during an actual event, difficulties will arise. 
From Harmsen’s perspective, the future of NGS looks bright. Pheno-
typing based on genotyping should become a reality. Organisms such as 
tuberculosis and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) would 
be particularly appropriate for this analysis. These capabilities should be 
coupled with early-warning and geographic information systems.
3  The “resistome” is the collection of antibiotic resistance genes and their precursors in 
bacteria (Wright, 2007). The “toxome” is the collection of toxicity pathways, most of which 
are only partly known (Hartung, 2011).
4  For more information, see http://www.globalmicrobialidentifier.org/; accessed October 
24, 2013.
5  The One Health Initiative is a movement to forge all inclusive collaborations between 
physicians, veterinarians, nurses, and other scientific-health and environmentally related 
disciplines. More information is available at http://www.onehealthinitiative.com/.
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HEPATITIS C IN SPAIN: A PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM 
THAT BECAME A LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUE
Dr. Fernando González-Candelas, University of Valencia, Spain, 
described how molecular technology and phylogenetics were used suc-
cessfully in court to convict an anesthetist of a biocrime involving the 
infection of multiple patients with hepatitis C virus (HCV). González-
Candelas described how phylogenetic inference and coalescent theory 
rML S T
ML S T +
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FIGURE 3-4 A ranking of the discriminatory power of microbial typing approach-
es, from bottom to top, with increasing discriminatory power. MLST, multilocus 
sequence typing; MLST+, core-genome MLST; rMLST, ribosomal MLST. 
SOURCE: Harmsen presentation, 2013. 
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were employed to establish association between the presumed source and 
those that were infected.
González-Candelas explained that by early 1998, the Spanish pub-
lic health authorities had noted a steady rise in HCV cases in Valencia 
since 1994. The cases appeared to be unrelated. Because intravenous (IV) 
drug use was on the rise and viruses are transmitted easily by blood, the 
increase was at first attributed to drug use. But in early 1998, a physician 
reported that four of his patients who had been sent to a private hospital 
for minor surgery had tested positive for HCV a few weeks afterward. 
The hospital stay seemed to be the only common denominator. Pub-
lic health officials launched an epidemiological investigation, analyzing 
66,000 surgical patients in two hospitals. They concluded that an anes-
thetist working at the private hospital was the likely common source. A 
search for other potentially infected patients revealed a sizeable outbreak 
of HCV that appeared to be clearly linked to this one medical profes-
sional. The anesthetist was ultimately convicted for being responsible for 
the infection of 275 of patients with HCV.
Both the hospital and the anesthetist were sued. Public health authori-
ties and the judge heading the respective epidemiological and judicial 
investigations requested that González-Candelas and his colleagues use 
their expertise in evolutionary biology to specifically ascertain
•	 Was there an outbreak?
•	 What was the source?
•	 Can other sources be excluded?
•	 Which patients were included in the outbreak and which were 
not?
•	 When did it start and how long did it last?
•	 When was each patient infected?
•	 When was the index case infected? (González-Candelas et al., 
2013)
The question “when was each patient infected?” was highly relevant to 
the judge and multiple insurance companies who had provided malprac-
tice insurance coverage to the anesthetist during his working years; the 
time of transmission could determine liability. In addition, the anesthetist 
contended that he was a simply another victim. 
Many people who are infected with HCV remain without symptoms 
and are unaware of their infection yet still can transmit the virus. Of those 
infected, 15-30 percent experience spontaneous clearance of the virus, and 
70-85 percent become chronic carriers, of whom 25 percent do not experi-
ence a progression to disease. But HCV can be silent for many years. Of 
those in whom illness progresses, a process that can take 10-30 years, out-
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comes can include cirrhosis, end-stage liver disease, and hepatocellular 
carcinoma (Bowen and Walker, 2005). 
The HCV genome is organized as a positive sense single-stranded 
RNA virus and has a high mutation rate, similar to that of HIV. It evolves 
quickly—one million times faster than human DNA—but variability is 
not equally distributed across the genome, and some areas evolve much 
faster than others. The rapid evolution is due to high mutation rates, high 
virus production (approximately 1010 viral particles/day in an infected 
patient), and a short generation time. Cell-infection cycles occur within a 
few hours (Penin et al., 2004).
The background prevalence of HCV in Spain is about 2.5 percent, 
which is relatively high, and many of those infected are unaware that 
they are. Evolution can occur quickly within an infected individual, and 
over years of infection, the number of viruses that accumulate in that indi-
vidual can be substantial. In addition, there are reports of compartmen-
talization of HCV in individuals; various organs and tissues in the same 
individual can be infected by slightly different and divergent populations 
of the virus (Di Liberto et al., 2006). For this reason, one cannot expect to 
find the same virus at the same time throughout the host. In addition, 
although transmission between infected patients is horizontal (i.e., from 
person A to person B), the viruses are related through vertical processes. 
Whenever there is an infection, there is a strong “bottlenecking” of the 
infections passed on, such that patients infected by the same source may 
receive slightly different samples of the virus. Therefore one cannot expect 
to see exactly the same viral genome in the source and all patients infected 
by the source.
González-Candelas and his team sequenced about 134 clones for each 
patient who agreed to supply a sample. This limited sampling is why con-
sideration of compartmentalization is so important. He gave an example 
of patients co-infected with two HCV genotypes, who, depending on 
the day of sampling, showed only one of the two genotypes, alternating 
from one day to another. The dynamics of viruses within an individual’s 
blood are largely unknown, but are more complicated than one simple 
representation of a viral population. There are many populations, and the 
longer a person is infected the more opportunity exists for minor differ-
ences. Most differences appearing in the widely divergent clade shared 
by the patients in the Valencia HCV outbreak probably represented sam-
pling from the same source at different times over 10 years. The source 
would transmit a slightly different virus, but one still recognizable as a 
sample of the source’s viral diversity; it was still possible to determine the 
common ancestor. González-Candelas proposed that if one can find the 
common ancestor of a sample, compared with the common ancestor of 
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the reference population, one is in a good position to make all additional 
inferences.
For the court case, phylogenetic inference and coalescent theory6 
were used to analyze the outbreak. González-Candelas believes that these 
approaches should be incorporated into microbial forensics.
In 1998, González-Candelas and colleagues were using gel-based 
Sanger sequencing. They decided to use two approaches to analyze the 
clinical viral samples: (1) direct sequencing of PCR products generated 
with primers directed to a relatively slow-evolving polymerase region of 
the HCV genome (NS5B), and (2) sequencing of PCR products derived 
from the faster-evolving regions (E1 and E2). For the latter, they analyzed 
several clones from multiple victims to estimate viral diversity in each 
individual (González-Candelas et al., 2013). They also cloned sample 
sequences from local population controls, which were not related to the 
case based on epidemiological determinations. In analyzing 300+ samples, 
it was also possible that some were positive for HCV but were not related 
to the source despite the fact that they had either been anesthetized by the 
alleged source or there were other circumstances that could have made 
him the presumed source of their infection.
Analyzing a single gene from the virus samples, however, did not 
provide all the necessary information. The graph in Figure 3-5 shows 
the distribution of differences when compared with the sequence in the 
NS5B region (229 nucleotide [nt]) of each patient isolate with that from the 
presumed source. There were many identical sequences, which appeared 
to be the “smoking gun” that linked about 150 patients to the anesthetist. 
The scientists, however, wanted to know how they should characterize 
possible victims who show a single nucleotide difference between their 
6  Coalescent theory and phylogenetic inference: Phylogenetic inference uses the genetic 
variance between members of a population to infer evolutionary relationships; at the level 
of specific genes, alleles are used to create trees to represent how members split into sepa-
rate branches, converge, or become extinct. Coalescent theory, on the other hand, seeks to 
analyze all known alleles of a specific gene to identify the most recent common ancestor 
(MRCA). In its simplest form, coalescent theory does not consider evolutionary pressure, 
recombination, or other interactions with the environment. If one follows the ancestry of two 
haploid organisms, eventually a single organism (the MRCA) will be identified that gave rise 
to the two lineages and the two organisms will have coalesced. These analyses can be used 
to predict the time of appearance of the alleles, as a sort of molecular clock, by converting 
the degree of change in a sequence to a specific interval of time. Gonzalez-Candelas and his 
colleagues were the first to use these two approaches in understanding origin and related-
ness in the context of a criminal trial. Problems remain with juror perception of the validity 
of these kinds of data, in view of the complexity of the concepts and the tendency to accept 
all DNA-based evidence as incontrovertible; validation of the approach for use in criminal 
court remains to be performed. Nevertheless, the Valencia case highlights the value of using 
phylogenetics in conjunction with traditional epidemiological data when building a case 
(Vandamme and Pybus, 2013).
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virus and that of the presumed source—a circumstance that occurs com-
monly in virology. The court decided that those showing one difference 
could also be considered victims, which increased the number of potential 
victims to 200+. But, the scientists asked, if one difference is accepted, 
why not two differences? They had controls with as few as three differ-
ences from the source. Being concerned about false negatives, they asked 
whether they should use this number as a threshold defining those with 
three or more differences as not part of the outbreak.
The second problem with NS5B phylogeny is illustrated by the 
Differences from the IC in the NS5B region (229 nt)
FIGURE 3-5 Differences from the Index Case in the NS5B region (229 nt). The bar 
graph (left) shows the distribution of differences in the NS5B region. Sequences 
were compared with a 229-nt fragment of the NS5B gene derived from the pre-
sumed source. The graph shows the distribution of nucleotide differences (Ham-
ming’s distance) for sequences derived from patients included in the outbreak 
(red bars), from patients excluded (dark purple) from the outbreak, and from 
local controls (gray). The bar graph inset shows the same distribution for puta-
tive outbreak samples (dark blue) and local controls (gray) before the former were 
divided into included and excluded from the outbreak. The neighbor-joining tree 
(right) was obtained with the NS5B-region sequences of hepatitis C virus (HCV)-
1a samples analyzed. Color codes: outbreak sequences are in black, red, and green, 
excluded from the outbreak are in dark purple, and local unrelated controls are in 
gray. The presumed source (PS) sequence is shown in blue. No clade was found 
with bootstrap support higher than 70 percent. 
SOURCE: González-Candelas et al. (2013). 
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neighbor-joining tree analysis in Figure 3.5 (right), which failed to group 
all of the control samples in a monophyletic group. Furthermore, none of 
the nodes in this tree receive bootstrap support higher than 70 percent by 
either method. Analysis with the slowly evolving NS5B region was unable 
to discriminate among the three epidemiological groups: local controls, 
patients infected by a common source, and patients infected by alternative 
sources. Therefore the emphasis was shifted to the more rapidly evolving 
E1-E2 regions.
Sequencing of the E1-E2 region was carried out for a total of 4,184 
cloned PCR fragments, representing 134 clones sequenced from the pre-
sumed source, 321 samples initially considered part of the outbreak, 
and 42 local controls; the average number of clones from each sample 
(excluding the presumed source7) was 10.77. Multiple alignments were 
performed with the 4,184 sequences to derive neighbor-joining and maxi-
mum likelihood phylogenetic trees for the 4,184 cloned sequences, shown 
in Figure 3-6. The conclusion of this approach was that sequences from 
274 patients were grouped with the sequences from the presumed source, 
while the second group included all the sequences derived from the local 
controls and sequences from 47 patients initially considered to belong to 
the outbreak. Thus the separation between the two groups became clear.
However, while they could show the global analysis of the phylog-
eny, the data could not represent a forensic conclusion, because forensics 
normally requires an individual analysis. This requirement had not previ-
ously been applied to an epidemiological analysis. They adapted a statisti-
cal framework for forensic analysis to molecular epidemiology (González-
Candelas et al., 2013). They used Evett and Weir’s (1998) method for 
applying genetic analyses to forensic settings, using a Bayesian frame-
work. Evett and Weir propose that scientific experts limit their contri-
butions to forensic analyses of genetic information to the evaluation of 
available genetic data in light of two competing hypotheses, those of 
the prosecution and the defense. The forensic expert should present the 
likelihood ratio: what is the likelihood of the genetic information seen in 
light of two mutually exclusive hypotheses combined with other types 
of evidence? The police or other investigators would provide additional 
independent evidence.
It is up to the judge or jury to evaluate and integrate this informa-
tion with the information provided by other types of evidence, ideally 
in a numerical way. Molecular phylogenetics provides a logical way to 
provide likelihood ratios or probabilities. In this case, there were two 
large groups—the outbreak and the non-outbreak. Based on what was 
7  Under Spanish law, only a single sample is required to be provided by a suspect.
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FIGURE 3-6 Maximum likelihood tree for cloned sequences in the E1-E2 region. 
The tree includes 4,184 sequences from a 406-nt fragment of the E1-E2 region 
including hypervariable region (HVR)1 and HVR2. Sequences were obtained 
from patients included in the outbreak (274 patients, 3,038 sequences), patients 
excluded from the outbreak (47 and 559, dark purple), local controls (42 and 453, 
gray), and the presumed source (PS, 134 sequences, dark blue). Sequences and 
branches in the monophyletic clade defined by all the cloned sequences from 
the PS are labeled in red. Sequences from polyphyletic samples with some rep-
resentatives in the clade delimited by the PS sequences and others outside it are 
labeled in green. Relevant nodes with bootstrap support larger than 90 percent 
are indicated by red dots.
SOURCE: González-Candelas et al. (2013).
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being tested, the results were either tests of the defense or the prosecu-
tion hypothesis. 
Eventually, González-Candelas and his team answered all of the ques-
tions posed by the court. There was an outbreak, and the source was a 
practicing anesthetist. Other potential sources could be discarded; molec-
ular surveillance of HCV has never turned up another case with samples 
from the clade of the outbreak samples. No other common source of 
infection was found. They identified 275 individuals in the outbreak and 
excluded 47. The outbreak began at the end of 1988, and ran until 1998, 
intensifying from 1996 onward. The presumed source had been infected 
for 10 years, and this infection was prior to the time of his patients’ infec-
tion. Two-thirds of the estimates for the time of infection coincided with 
those offered by the prosecution. The anesthetist was convicted of profes-
sional malpractice and was sentenced to a lengthy jail term.
For moving forward, González-Candelas’ conclusions are
1. Molecular phylogenetics and coalescent theory are essential for 
microbial forensics.
2. A meaningful statistical treatment (maximum likelihood, Bayes-
ian inference) is mandatory.
3. In particular, this case shows that recent developments in evo-
lutionary biology can be used to estimate dates and places of 
relevant events.
4. A good sample of a reference population is absolutely essential 
to draw any conclusion about the origin of a set of samples. This 
may change from one case to another.
5. The forensic expert is one among others: his/her conclusions 
have to be evaluated in the appropriate context.
6. Although current sequencing methodologies allow us to work 
with complete genomic information, a lot of work remains to 
be done to standardize and control laboratory and analytical 
procedures.
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Clinical and Forensic Approaches 
to Microbial Identification
TECHNOLOGIES FOR MICROBIAL FORENSICS
In this chapter we review both the biological and physical science 
techniques and methods that are commonly used or have potential for 
further development for use in microbial forensics. The law enforcement 
and legal context of microbial forensics and the challenges imposed by 
this context are emphasized and contrasted with clinical diagnostics in 
medicine.
Dr. Dana Kadavy, Senior Microbiologist at Signature Science LLC, 
reviewed the microbial forensic process from systems and technical per-
spectives, described challenges in microbial forensics compared with the 
needs of clinical diagnostics and public health, and reviewed technologies 
applicable to identification of organisms for microbial forensics. These 
technologies can be roughly grouped into four classes depending on their 
targets for detection: protein (antibody and toxin) signatures, nucleic acid 
signatures other than sequencing (e.g., PCR), gene sequencing, and mass 
spectrometry (IOM/NRC, 2014). 
As previously noted, microbial forensic analyses are conducted in the 
context of a criminal investigation, which shapes the differences between 
its technologies and/or best practices and those used for clinical diagnos-
tics and public health. The drivers for the analytical differences between 
microbial forensics and other sectors are legal requirements it must meet 
regarding (1) sample type, (2) level of characterization, and (3) interpreta-
tion and reporting. Sampling and sample types are discussed elsewhere 
in this report. 
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In addition, the level of characterization and reporting requirements 
are specific for the microbial forensics “space.” Some are shared with 
clinical diagnostic practices and food analysis systems, and Dr. Kadavy 
suggested that the two sectors should leverage one another. At the same 
time, microbial forensics must drill very deep for pathogen identification. 
Analysis extends to strain, subtype, or isolate; type and/or abundance of 
organism present in simple to complex samples; the presence of antibiotic 
resistance and virulence genes; evidence of genetic engineering and/or 
isolate evolution (is it endemic wild type or a cultured strain repeatedly 
passed around labs?); and in-depth, sample-to-sample comparison that 
may be informed by SNPs. 
When reporting to a court,1 investigators must have confidence in 
their results and understand the power and limitations of the procedures 
they have used, which can only be gained through accumulated experi-
ence in testing and validation. Investigators also must consider reason-
able alternative explanations. Moreover, they must provide known error 
rates and detection limits when possible for a judicial audience that is 
unlikely to include scientists. These factors inform the choice of analyti-
cal technologies to be used. Traditional microbiology and culture are the 
current gold standard in clinical diagnostics, but it is not always possible 
or practical to culture microbes in a forensic investigation. 
A capability needed in microbial forensics is sample processing to 
achieve desired sensitivity/accuracy in complex sample matrices, such as 
soil samples from forensic exhumations of graves linked to the Bosnian–
Serbian war. Sensitive nucleic acid–based and antibody-based detection 
technologies also are needed. Although these diagnostic assays may not 
provide in-depth information, they potentially offer rapid, inexpensive, 
high-throughput screening to rule in or rule out various samples. Inves-
tigators and responders need to know quickly what kind of threat they 
face; additional in-depth analysis can be performed later. 
Traditional microbiology methods and features do have forensic 
value. These methods include culture, phage sensitivity, staining, and 
microscopy (all used in the U.S. anthrax letters case), as well as fatty acid 
analysis and serotyping. It is not always possible or practical, however, 
to use these on complex, degraded, and/or inactivated samples, or for 
isolates or mixtures that cannot be cultured.
During the 1980s and 1990s, antibody-based techniques dominated 
biological agent detection. The “backbone” of antibody-based identifica-
tion relies on the ability of the immune system to recognize “non-self” 
components of pathogens, especially antigenic proteins and polysac-
1  Before trial, experts must prepare reports summarizing their analysis and conclusions, 
and share the reports with all other parties.
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charides (Schaudies, 2014). Most antibody-based identification methods 
(such as enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay, or ELISA) involve immobi-
lizing antibodies for particular antigenic targets on solid substrates. These 
“capture” antibodies then bind to the antigens produced by the micro-
organismal cells. This binding is then detected with a second antibody 
to the same antigen that contains a “reporter molecule” that produces a 
detectable signal based on optical absorbance or fluorescence. Examples 
of antibody-based platforms include Luminex, PathSensors, Inc., and 
TacBioHawk. (See Schaudies, 2014, for a more in-depth review.) The most 
notable advantage of antibody- or protein-based detection systems is their 
speed—many of them can provide answers in 3 to 10 minutes. Some of the 
systems can reach sensitivities approaching that of nucleic acid amplifica-
tion techniques, such as PCR-based assays. However, for microbial foren-
sic purposes, they often lack sufficient specificity to discriminate beyond 
the level of species. Platforms that perform protein and antibody/antigen 
detection, such as electrochemiluminescence (ECL), are also needed to 
detect protein toxins, such as ricin and botulinum. Schaudies (2014:175) 
states that antibody-based systems are “more effective and consistent than 
nucleic-acid-based systems for the detection and identification of toxins.” 
This statement is based not on efficacy of an assay, but more on the degree 
of toxin purification; in some toxin preparations, the DNA that codes for 
production of the toxin may not be present or nucleic acid concentra-
tions may be reduced below limits of detection. Toxin treatment also may 
degrade DNA from the sample. As with PCR, these platforms are only 
as good as the assays developed for the intended target. Knowledge of 
the target being pursued is necessary as are thoughtfully designed and 
validated assays to use ECL effectively.
Nucleic acid–based detection and identification technologies pro-
vide the ability to examine the genetic as well as structural information 
associated with a pathogen. Among the early tools developed to access 
an organism’s genetic information were nucleic acid amplification tech-
niques, such as PCR. PCR allows specific fragments of genomic DNA to 
be isolated and their copy number amplified. Over time, variations of the 
basic PCR technique have developed, such as “multiplex PCR,” which 
allows several DNA genomic regions to be amplified in the same reac-
tion set, and quantitative or “real-time” PCR (qPCR), which can measure 
the quantity of a target sequence in real time. Multiplex PCR technolo-
gies do have limitations. Most allow up to five different fluorophores to 
be detected simultaneously. Other platforms have attempted to increase 
this to as many as 20 fluorophores simultaneously, which would be a big 
advance in multiplex capability. Real-time qPCR is a rapid and sensi-
tive nucleic acid signature detection technology that has proved effec-
tive in both clinical and microbial forensic applications. Some platforms 
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have a closed system, which may be fine for some situations. However, 
a closed system may not be optimal if an open-architecture system is 
needed to port novel assays to determine genetic elements more fully 
or to screen quickly for elements that are most likely of diagnostic value 
in isolate characterization. The power of qPCR lies with assay selection, 
some multiplex capability, optimization, and validation of the PCR assays 
themselves. 
There is a wealth of available PCR assays that are validated to certain 
standards, although they must be validated again in each laboratory that 
implements the assay(s). Many are Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approved and enable qualitative detection of hundreds of pathogens and 
hospital-acquired infections to the level of species and sometimes strain. 
Qualitative tests can provide solid evidence for determining the next 
step of an analysis as well as generating a quick answer. Some detect 
antimicrobial resistance genes. There are also assays in the food safety 
arena to draw upon. Matrices in the food industry are complex, and food 
is a common target of intentional and accidental contamination. There 
are many food industry investigations about such events, and microbial 
forensics should learn from these, understand the assays, and have access 
to the assays should a food-related microbial forensic investigation arise. 
There are fewer assays for animal and plant pathogens, yet they are 
important, and the microbial forensics community can communicate their 
importance. 
 The limitation of PCR is that the list of what can be detected is con-
tingent on the validated assays in one’s toolbox. Even if one has many 
assays, it is still limiting and restricts one’s multiplexed capability. The 
MassTag PCR technology marries PCR with traditional chemistry tech-
niques (mass spectrometry) to provide the resolution quality of mass 
spectrometry coupled with the sensitivity and specificity of PCR. It has, 
for example, revolutionized the ability to identify respiratory pathogens 
and hemorrhagic fever viruses. 
Mass spectrometry also is useful in identifying many non–nucleic 
acid chemical species that may provide clues to microbial identity, ori-
gins, and production processes. Proteins, peptides, lipids, carbohydrates, 
inorganic metals, and organic metabolites may provide information about 
an organism’s source environment, how it was produced, and the level of 
sophistication of the preparation (Wahl et al., 2011). For example, micro-
organisms respond to the conditions in their environment by altering 
which of their genes are transcribed and then translated into proteins. 
For pathogens isolated from samples other than patients, the profile of 
proteins an organism produces can sometimes provide valuable informa-
tion about the environment in which the organism originated. A mass 
spectrometer generally consists of an inlet for introducing the sample, 
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an ionization source to turn the analyte into charged gas-phase particles 
(ions), and an analyzer that detects and separates the charged particles 
based on their mass-to-charge ratio. Two ionization methods are used for 
biological mass spectrometry: electrospray ionization and matrix-assisted 
laser desorption/ionization (MALDI). Wahl and colleagues (2011:456-457) 
point out that although nucleic acid sequencing is invaluable in micro-
bial forensics, proteins “may offer improved stability over DNA markers 
. . . and have fewer or different inhibitors to analysis methods.” It is also 
useful to have additional detection modalities. More in-depth reviews of 
mass spectrometry and its role in microbial forensics are available in Wahl 
et al. (2011) and Snyder and Jabbour (2014).
Dr. Jongsik Chun of Seoul National University pointed out that in Korea, 
use of MALDI—specifically the MALDI–time of flight (MALDI-TOF)2—is 
becoming very popular in routine clinical laboratory analyses. The poten-
tial of this technique exceeds most techniques discussed by Kadavy except 
for sequencing. Kadavy agreed that the MALDI-TOF technology is a very 
good option although it does not have capacity equal to sequencing. The 
CDC is using MALDI-TOF to identify the protein toxins of B. anthracis and 
Clostridium botulinum (Boyer et al., 2011; Kalb et al., 2011). The CDC’s tests 
are used both for assays for the presence of the toxins and for identifying 
the correct botulinum neurotoxin subtype for administration of the most 
effective therapeutic immunoglobulins to affected patients. 
Microarray platforms provide similar capabilities but in a more mul-
tiplexed format. They have the ability to detect both nucleic acid and pro-
tein signatures. Many panels have 1 million assays on a single array chip; 
some have up to 5 million assays. There are custom and standard micro-
array panels. Microarray panels are available for microbial detection, 
SNP detection, and genome-wide association studies, gene expression, 
and protein presence and abundance. Laboratories that use a microarray 
reader for other purposes, such as oncology or infectious disease screen-
ing, could be leveraged by the development of custom chips that are 
directed to answering microbial forensic questions. Most assays are avail-
able; it is a matter of customizing a single chip to combine them. Micro-
arrays will not achieve the level of information provided by sequencing, 
but they are quite impressive. They may be a rapid and cost-effective 
alternative or supplement to sequencing. 
For microbial forensics purposes, NGS is a powerful set of technolo-
2  Matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization-time of flight (MALDI-TOF) mass spec-
trometry can establish the identity, purity, or other aspects of protein samples, genetic 
materials, and microorganisms. MALDI-TOF uses the time for a target particle to traverse 
a specific distance after being dislodged from a surface by a precise amount of energy. This 
allows a determination of the molecular weight of the target. http://www.ndif.org/public/
terms/11543-MALDITOF_mass_spectrometry.
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gies that offers a state-of-the-art approach. However, NGS also poses a 
new set of issues for implementation. For example, the same data run on 
two different systems—the benchtop MPS (massively parallel sequencing) 
instruments, Personal Genome Machine™ or PGM (or Ion Torrent, Life 
Technologies) and the MiSeq (Illumina)—can produce somewhat different 
answers. These issues will have to be resolved or at least understood for 
the microbial forensics context.
Detter and Resnick (2014) provide a brief review of NGS. In general, 
sequencing consists of four steps: preparation of the sample by nucleic 
acid (either DNA or RNA) extraction, library preparation, sequencing, 
and data analysis. Following extraction of the material from the sample 
as described above and in Chapter 5, the DNA molecules to be sequenced 
must be converted into sequencing “libraries.” This preparation entails 
fragmenting the DNA and then adding adapter molecules to the ends of 
the fragments to facilitate sequencing. Each DNA fragment in a library is 
then clonally amplified before sequencing. The precise process and how 
automated it is depends on the NGS platform being used (Detter and 
Resnick, 2014). 
NGS produces huge amounts of data as “reads,” which are strings of 
DNA that correspond to the sequence of the original DNA or RNA being 
investigated. Reads have three important features: length, number (or 
“coverage”), and quality. All of these differ according to which platform 
and sequencing kit are used as well as the quality of the sample and library 
preparation. Kadavy discussed three platforms that were described in a 
2012 article that compared the three, head-to-head, using real data (Quail 
et al., 2012). However, new improved instruments come out frequently 
and displace those already on the market. The new high-throughput 
sequencing methods have greatly improved the overall process. Some 
novel approaches beyond these platforms incorporate single-molecule 
real time, or “smart cell,” and also preparation adaption-ligation strate-
gies; alternative chemistries, and so, less RNA/DNA input is required; 
and longer read lengths. These decrease the time to results. The approxi-
mate sequencing capacity of thousands of bases per day of 1995 has been 
increased to billions per instrument per day in 2013. 
All sequencing-platform workflows share general themes—
fragmenting DNA, various adaptor-ligation strategies, and novel 
chemistries—and efforts are under way to reduce preparation time and 
sample input requirements and improve the quality of results. The CDC, 
the College of American Pathologists, and others have developed guide-
lines for its use with human diagnostics (Ellard et al., 2012; Gargis et al., 
2012; Pont-Kingdon et al., 2012; Rehm et al., 2013). But these guidelines do 
not address the range of possibilities encountered in microbial forensics, 
that is, from the homogeneous sample to the very complex metagenomic 
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or microbiome samples. Sequencing remains a huge investment in time, 
materials, and money and also demands a huge investment in data analy-
sis because none of the data are meaningful without bioinformatics, and 
bioinformatics and software issues must be factored in (see Chapter 7). 
Bioinformatics pipelines that can handle a continuum of samples from 
pure isolates to complicated metagenomic samples that may contain only 
trace amounts of the threat agent are needed. Kadavy stated that it is 
necessary to be prepared for all possibilities, so building on the current 
technologies to meet future needs must continue. 
In terms of bioinformatics, Kadavy stressed that accurate and updated 
genomic databases are critical. The dialogue has only just begun on how 
to share such data. Bioinformatics tools must be usable and practical. 
They must be applicable to the questions posed and validated for forensic 
application. A challenge is that in a field that is evolving so quickly, how 
can methods that are themselves continually evolving be validated in a 
timely fashion and in an economically feasible manner?
Kadavy suggested that investments in technology should be pri-
oritized according to what is best for the common good. It is possible to 
leverage advancement that helps microbial forensics and public health 
simultaneously. These fields should not compete for resources, but should 
share them to meet their respective goals.
The issue of proprietary restrictions that make some technologies 
inaccessible was raised by Dr. Raymond Lin. For example, there are good 
publications on MassTag spectrometry, but many of the technologies are 
proprietary. Consequently investigators have had to develop their own 
panels, and results have not been good enough for application. Published 
microarrays are often proprietary, so other groups have had to develop 
their own chips. One group in Singapore has licensed arrays for about 
70,000 pathogens, but they tend to be undersensitive, and do not perform 
as well on respiratory pathogens. Lin believes that the future may be in 
using one of the NGS instruments that is less biased as far as target analy-
sis and target enriched with certain non-eukaryotic sequences.
Kadavy agreed that the proprietary issues are an important consid-
eration. It is also important to know what technologies people are using. 
How does the MALDI-TOF operate in one’s own hands? To what do other 
countries have access? What technologies should one be considering?
She suggested the workshop consider how to link up experts—in 
microbiology, clinical medicine, public health, research and diagnostics, 
and food science—in order to leverage and build on knowledge and 
for reach-back purposes. She noted that small laboratories and research 
groups can leverage existing infrastructure and expertise in public health 
systems. How can information, including sequencing data, be shared in 
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the international microbial forensics community? This will require policy 
decisions. 
Dr. Munirul Alam raised the problem of sharing data in areas where 
limited resources restrict technologies. Bangladesh is part of PulseNet 
Asia Pacific (part of PulseNet International3), which enables access to a 
database for threat pathogens. He asserted that labs in developing coun-
tries cannot afford everything, so it is important to collaborate as much 
as possible.
Dr. Ruifu Yang agreed that sharing is key for developing microbial 
forensics. He has collaborated with others to standardize methods, using 
the same data but analyzing them in different laboratories, and then pub-
lishing the results. If scientists work together, they can share more than 
just published data.
Piers Millet of the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs pointed out 
the potential of the technology and international collaborative arrange-
ments that enable sharing sequences and related data via the Internet. 
He cited the example of the rapid response to the posting of the viral 
sequences of the H7N9 avian influenza by the Global Initiative on Shar-
ing Avian Influenza Data (GISAID) by the Chinese CDC in March 2013.4 
This process enabled Novartis, in partnership with a unit of the J. Craig 
Venter Institute and support from the U.S. CDC, to synthesize the genes 
of the new virus and begin initial work on developing a vaccine using 
its cell-culture production process, which is itself much faster than tradi-
tional egg-based flu vaccine development (Brennan, 2013). The synthesis 
was completed and shared with CDC before physical samples of the virus 
arrived by mail. 
Dr. Gilles Vergnaud, Institut de Génétique et Microbiologie, France, 
works for the French Ministry of Defense, Defense Procurement (DGA). 
In 2001, he headed the department of dangerous biological agents in the 
DGA. Following the U.S. anthrax event, many countries experienced 
thousands of threat hoaxes. In France alone, there have been 3,000; the 
defense establishment dealt with most, and his division undertook about 
1,500. They needed an easy way to determine which incidents were hoaxes 
and which, if any, were real threats. A hoax is massively disruptive; many 
involved hospitals, post offices, and other public spaces. In every case, 
evidence was processed as quickly as possible to differentiate hoaxes 
3  PulseNet International is a network of national and regional laboratories that track 
foodborne infections worldwide. Each laboratory uses standardized genotyping methods 
and shares information in real time More information available at http://www.pulsenet 
international.org/. See also Global Food Safety, http://www.slideshare.net/Adrienna/
global-food-safety2013.
4  Further information about GISAID can be found at http://platform.gisaid.org/epi3/
frontend#283e41; accessed March 31, 2014.
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from real threat agents, although even this simple question requires a 
confident answer. He went on to say that he has long had an interest in 
database issues, but there are many political problems. He believes it 
will never be possible to share all forensic-quality data, but some level of 
slightly degraded information may be shared, and he believes that even 
that would be a great achievement. 
Dr. Rocco Casagrande of Gryphon Scientific added a cautionary 
note by suggesting that a guiding principle when developing new tech-
nology should be to consider the consequences of its day-to-day use. 
Better surveillance capabilities and better technologies for identifying 
unusual microorganisms can result in “events” that otherwise would not 
be interpreted as such. Had it been possible, for example, to detect Aum 
Shinrikyo’s release of anthrax spores in Japan in 1993, there might have 
been an “event” even though there were no public health consequences. 
Similarly, in the United States, when grapes imported from Chile were 
allegedly contaminated with cyanide (Rushing, 1994), the cyanide was 
insufficient to cause human health concerns, but the detection caused sig-
nificant economic harm to the exporter. John Clements further noted that 
it is important to distinguish between meaningful events and background 
“noise.” For instance, there are approximately seven cases of plague due 
to Y. pestis diagnosed in the United States every year. Although a sharp 
increase in number or distribution may be important, the mere existence 
of the disease is “background.” Also, in the Aum Shinrikyo anthrax case, 
cult members failed to spread the disease because they used the nonviru-
lent vaccine strain of the organism. Use of an insufficiently discriminatory 
assay would have picked up B. anthracis and may have started a full-scale 
panic even though the public was at no great risk. There are consequences 
for public safety, the economy, and individuals for making declarative 
statements about things that are merely suggestive. 
INVESTIGATING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
IN CLINICAL MEDICINE 
Professor Alemka Markotić shared her perspective as a scientist and 
a clinician who daily faces a variety of infectious diseases in patients 
and has used elements of microbial forensics to deal with public health 
outbreaks. She offered lessons learned through experience with zoonotic 
diseases—diseases transmitted between animal species and from animals 
to humans—which she believes could be useful to public health experts, 
clinicians, and microbial forensic investigators. She pointed out natural 
vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit, and proposed areas where 
research is needed.
Zoonotics can cause severe disease both in animals and humans and 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
88 SCIENCE NEEDS FOR MICROBIAL FORENSICS
therefore constitute a serious public health problem. Animals and their 
vectors play an essential role in maintaining zoonotic infections in nature. 
Zoonoses may be due to bacterial, viral, or parasitic organisms or may 
involve unconventional agents. In addition to being a public health prob-
lem, many of the major zoonotic diseases (e.g., brucellosis, salmonellosis, 
listeriosis, trichinellosis, campylobacteriosis, and hepatitis A or E) prevent 
the efficient production of food of animal origin and create obstacles to 
the international trade of animal products (World Health Organization, 
2014). Markotić noted that many of the agents regarded as potential bio-
weapons are zoonotic. 
Preparing for a biological threat event requires knowledge of patho-
genic agents; a clinical picture of disease incubation, transmission mode, 
and treatment; knowledge of which molecular diagnostics and technolo-
gies to apply to which pathogen; and characterization of a usual versus 
an unusual outbreak (see Box 3-1). But Markotić stressed that in real life, 
the picture is not always clear.
Hantaviruses are transmitted to humans through contact with hanta-
virus-infected rodents or their urine and droppings. Infection with Old 
World hantaviruses can progress to hemorrhagic fever with renal syn-
drome (HFRS), and infection with New World viruses to hantavirus pul-
monary syndrome (HPS). The clinical picture for hantavirus ranges from 
mild illness to a severe form with fulminant hemorrhagic fever. Mortality 
can be as high as 20 percent with Old World hantaviruses and 60 percent 
with New World hantaviruses. 
Croatia is a natural center for many rodentborne zoonoses (e.g., lep-
tospirosis, babesiosis, and HFRS) because of to its diverse forest ecology 
and abundance of small rodents (Markotić et al., 2002a; Tadin et al., 2012). 
In January through April 2012, 33 patients were hospitalized in Zagreb, 
experiencing something that resembled flu but did not exhibit its typical 
symptoms (Tadin et al., 2014). This outbreak occurred against the back-
drop of a normal flu season, including cases of influenza A subtype H1N1. 
However, it was subsequently determined that all patients had either 
attended the “Snow Queen Trophy” skiing competition at Medvednica 
Mountain, a popular ski resort, or lived near or had links to the mountain. 
Acting on their suspicions, Markotić and her colleagues performed point-
of-care tests and found that all patients were serologically positive for 
specific antibodies to Puumala virus, a hantavirus (Markotić et al., 2002b).
There are three lessons to be learned from this event. First, a simple 
clinical test can quickly distinguish between influenza and HFRS. Results 
were received within hours of patient admission. Such tests can be a pow-
erful tool for providing orientation in the field at the onset of an unusual 
outbreak.
This outbreak comprised an extremely high number of HFRS cases 
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within a small geographical area. Moreover, the timing was unusual 
because HFRS cases typically peak during the summer months. The 
patients’ clinical symptoms were first compared with those of previously 
published cases and there were no differences. To confirm the origin of 
the infection, both human and rodent samples were analyzed. Through 
collaboration with the forestry and veterinary medicine sectors, rodent 
samples from different altitudes of the mountain were collected. 
Markotić and colleagues discovered that almost 80 percent of 
rodents at the altitudes of the mountain’s ski track were infected with 
hantaviruses—a rate never reported previously in Croatia or in the litera-
ture. Molecular and phylogenetic analyses of viral nucleic acid sequences 
obtained from human and rodent samples confirmed an almost 100 per-
cent similarity between the samples, which helped rule out the virus 
having been imported or deliberately created. 
The second major lesson learned was that molecular analysis enabled 
linking the human outbreak with a pathogen in a natural reservoir, 
rodents, in a specific geographic location. A major contributor to the 
dispersal of hantaviruses in the Medvednica Mountain outbreak was 
that, because of warm winter temperatures, the ski resort had distributed 
aerosolized artificial snow to prepare the snow track for the competition. 
Moreover, high winds blew the snow off the track.
A third major lesson came from an unusual outbreak of HFRS cases 
that began in a community of former drug users whose rehabilitation 
program included gardening near a forest (Medved et al., 2002). Many 
community members became infected with hantaviruses and developed 
HFRS, and one died. Fifty-two percent of all community members were 
infected with hepatitis B or C, or both. Of those with HFRS, 82 percent 
were co-infected with one or both types of hepatitis virus (Medved et 
al., 2002). It appeared that the multiple infections were associated with 
altered immune responses. Markotić suggested that there is a need to 
consider whether multiple infections pose an investigative problem, both 
in terms of public health and microbial forensics. 
Markotić posed the questions, “What if mother nature can do it better? 
And what if terrorists copy it?” She and her colleagues, using an existing 
bank of rodent samples, investigated what pathogens rodents in northern 
Croatia carry. Their research revealed that the rodents typically carry one 
to four zoonotic infections (Tadin et al., 2012). In light of this fact, one 
must consider the public health implications of multiple infections. When 
physicians diagnose a patient with one microorganism, they tend to be 
satisfied with that diagnosis, and treat the patient accordingly. Even if we 
record unusual immunopathogenic responses (e.g., strong inflammatory 
response or immune suppression) in patients, the possibility of multiple 
infections is not typically considered. Co-infection and multiple infections 
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should be the target of public health research. The literature shows that 
more severe disease occurs in the presence of co-infection (e.g., influenza 
with pneumonia), as well as higher mortality (Chertow and Memoli, 
2013). Bacterial co-infection has occurred in influenza pandemics through-
out the world, including those with H1N1 influenza (Wang et al., 2011). 
In the event of co-infection or multiple infections, there exists a different 
immunopathogenic basis for disease (Guidi et al., 2011).
Immune response is altered in the presence of more than one infec-
tious disease. Markotić’s research shows the level of proinflammatory 
cytokines to be several times higher in patients infected with both hanta-
viruses and leptospira than in patients with a single infection (Markotić 
et al., 2002a). A study examining the interacting roles of cytokines and 
viral load in Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever showed that viral load 
and immune response parameters can be useful as biomarkers to predict 
disease severity and outcomes (Saksida et al., 2010). Therefore, in addition 
to using multiplex technology to detect co-infection or multiple infections, 
the capability to measure immune response in unusual outbreaks or dis-
ease presentations should be developed. 
An important “omics” research field that holds great promise for both 
clinical medicine and microbial forensics is immunogenomics, an emerg-
ing field that focuses on the intersection between genomics and immu-
nology. It takes into consideration the host and pathogen proteomes, and 
combines bioinformatics technology, genomics, proteomics, immunology, 
and clinical medicine (Gupta et al., 2009). Professor Indrani Karunasagar 
of the Karnataka Veterinary, Animal & Fisheries Sciences University of 
India, commented that a syndrome may be precipitated by a certain fac-
tor, but the condition is exacerbated by the presence of bacteria. Perhaps 
addressing changes in climate or other environmental factors might be 
used for prevention. She agreed that immunogenomic bioinformatics is 
very important. It might answer, for example, why when two people are 
exposed to the same situation, one becomes infected and the other does 
not. The genetic makeup of an individual could aid in addressing possible 
contributing environmental factors. 
Markotić emphasized that there are very powerful simple techniques. 
Flow cytometry, a well-known cell sorting tool, can sometimes quickly 
orient one to whether a pathogen is a virus or a bacterium when the clini-
cal picture and diagnostic results are not clearly distinctive. At the Zagreb 
hospital where Markotić practices, they have used this technology to dif-
ferentiate HFRS from leptospirosis (Markotić et al., 2011).
To improve clinical and forensic approaches to microbial identifica-
tion, Markotić believes interdisciplinary approaches and advanced tech-
nology are needed, specifically:
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1. Molecular epidemiology data and field research. 
2. More extensive clinical databases, for example, descriptions of 
“usual” and “unusual” cases and outbreaks. 
3. A translational medicine approach to link basic and applied 
research to clinical data and diagnostic tool development and a 
One Health medicine approach to zoonotic diseases.
4. Development of robust, powerful, multiplex molecular diagnostic 
tools and bioinformatic analysis tools. 
5. Development of rapid and inexpensive diagnostic tests. 
6. Powerful immune-response measurement and bioinformatics 
analysis tools. 
7. The ability to understand and synthesize a huge amount of data, 
and react promptly and properly. 
8. The ability to quickly communicate (e.g., via telemedicine) with 
world experts knowledgeable about the clinical manifestation 
and detection of dangerous pathogens. 
In a final note on zoonotics, it was pointed out that the National Cen-
ter for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense (FAZD, http://fazd.
tamu.edu/) at Texas A&M University in the United States has a program 
in which they are trying to integrate data and information from clinical 
and field observations provided by any stakeholders—from pet owners 
to production/processing facilities. Participants can electronically enter 
observations (e.g., presentation, diagnostics) into the system. Normally, 
there is a problem with unwillingness of people to share such information 
because any indication of a serious zoonotic situation can have significant 
financial ramifications. FAZD provides a shield for reporting this informa-
tion and they are assimilating the data at a high level, looking for multiple 
loci or anything that will give them information about natural outbreaks, 
deliberate attacks, or other sources. 
CULTURE-INDEPENDENT TESTS:  
CLINICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVES
Dr. Stephen Morse of the U.S. CDC spoke about how rapid develop-
ments in technology and clinical laboratory test methodologies are lead-
ing to culture-independent testing. He discussed the advantages and limi-
tations of culture-independent tests from the clinical and public health 
perspectives, noting that his comments should not be assumed to reflect 
CDC policies. In the case of a large outbreak of an infectious disease, par-
ticularly an enteric infection, careful epidemiological investigation will 
likely be needed to differentiate between an intentional and a naturally 
occurring event.
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Currently public health surveillance is isolate-based, but this approach 
is changing. For example, PulseNet, which was founded in 1996, is the 
molecular subtyping laboratory network for conducting foodborne dis-
ease surveillance. It relies on the availability of isolates for testing using 
pulse field gel electrophoresis. This culture-based diagnostic and typing 
method is, however, likely to be replaced by more rapid PCR-based tests 
(CDC, 2011). A move toward rapid nonculture testing is expected to 
improve the speed and cost-effectiveness of diagnostics. However, it also 
likely will result in a decrease in the availability of isolates for PulseNet 
subtyping and susceptibility testing. The issue of how to adapt to rap-
idly changing technology is a major one for the U.S. CDC. CDC and its 
partners in the State Public Health Laboratory network are working to 
develop higher resolution diagnostics, new rapid and standardized data 
collection methods, new analytical software, and improved environmen-
tal assessments (CDC, 2011). President Obama’s FY 2014 budget proposed 
the establishment of the advanced molecular detection (AMD) program 
to begin to replace CDC’s decades-old methods of detecting microbes, 
which will soon be obsolete, as well as increasing understanding of their 
lethality to humans.5
In the United States, public health surveillance has a number of func-
tions (Cronquist et al., 2012). Surveillance assists in individual case man-
agement and investigation at the local level. It is used to assess disease 
burden and trends in order to prioritize and assess the impact of popu-
lation-based control methods. It is relied upon for outbreak detection to 
protect the population, as well as to identify gaps in control measures. 
Isolates collected for public health purposes undergo characterization to 
improve understanding of pathogens and their virulence mechanisms 
and to assess infection epidemiology.
The needs for testing in patient management differ from those in pub-
lic health. For patients, an ideal test is fast, accurate and, when necessary, 
can establish antimicrobial susceptibility. In the case of most infections, a 
patient will be treated with an antibiotic before the test results arrive, and 
subtyping or virulence testing is seldom used. As we understand more 
about the genetics of virulence factors, however, such testing may play a 
greater role. 
In contrast, population-based testing values specificity and sensitiv-
ity over speed; the goal is to ensure that outbreak-associated cases are 
identified unambiguously. The public health sector requires more detailed 
information on isolates, and subtyping becomes important because it 
enables detection of outbreaks due to particular strains. In this context, 
5  More information on AMD can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/amd/; accessed April 
7, 2014.
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monitoring antimicrobial susceptibility is particularly important for two 
reasons. First, antibiotic-resistant organisms are associated with more 
severe disease. Second, livestock and poultry are commonly treated with 
antibiotics to enhance their growth, which selects for antibiotic-resistant 
organisms. Monitoring can aid in attribution, particularly in foodborne 
outbreaks in which antibiotic-resistant organisms are associated with 
meat and poultry. 
From a clinical perspective, the advantages of culture-independent 
testing to patients include more rapid diagnoses, the potential for easier 
specimen collection and decreased costs, and the detection of a wider 
range of pathogens (e.g., non-O157 Shiga toxin–producing E. coli) as well 
as better sensitivity for some pathogens, such as those that are difficult to 
culture. Challenges include false-positive findings that result in unneces-
sary treatment or incorrect diagnosis, and an inability to test for antimi-
crobial susceptibility (Cronquist et al., 2012). Specifically, the presence 
of a genetic sequence coding for a factor associated with antimicrobial 
resistance (e.g., an enzyme) does not mean that the gene is expressed or 
that the microbe is resistant, only that the associated genetic sequences 
are present. 
From a public health/population-level perspective, the advantages 
of culture-independent testing include rapid case detection; a potential 
for increased testing, leading to greater case capture; detection of a wider 
range of pathogens; and again, better sensitivity for some pathogens 
(Cronquist et al., 2012). Limitations can include resources and time wasted 
following up noncases, incorrect or unstable estimates of the number of 
illnesses, and disruption of trend monitoring. Other challenges are the 
loss of subtyping for outbreak detection, the possible investigation of 
pseudo-outbreaks, and a decreased ability to monitor trends in subtypes,6 
such as Salmonella enteritidis (Cronquist et al., 2012).
PERSPECTIVE OF A CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGIST 
IN THE PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR 
Dr. Raymond Lin of the National University of Singapore offered 
a perspective on the challenges and issues clinical microbiologists who 
work in the public health sector face in terms of technology, policy, and 
legal issues.
6  Infectious disease outbreaks are currently monitored by culturing organisms from pa-
tients or contacts, identifying those organisms by serology, biochemistry, fermentation pat-
terns, and antimicrobial susceptibility. Changing to a nonculture system would not provide 
sufficient continuity to allow us to continue monitoring infectious disease trends (down to 
the subtype level of the microorganisms) that have been established over the last 100 years 
using the aforementioned technologies.
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New technologies, such as the MALDI-TOF mass spectrometry tech-
nique, have brought great change into clinical microbiology and public 
health labs because they enable earlier pathogen identification. However, 
as with any technology, limitations exist. Currently MALDI-TOF cannot 
always provide needed differentiation because some important public 
health pathogens are genomically very similar to nonpathogenic species. 
For example, B. anthracis may not be easily differentiated from B. cereus 
or B. thuringiensis, so extra testing may be required. 
Dr. Lin pointed out that public communications about the meaning 
of data generated by the new technologies can also present a major prob-
lem. The media and the public typically do not understand the science 
underpinning a report of “a new pathogen,” “a new chimera,” or “a new 
mutation.” They assume the worst and fear there is a serious danger to 
public health, whether there is or not. Better communication could pre-
vent unnecessary disruptions and delays.
In public health, the needs for gene typing are relatively simple. Most 
investigations focus on outbreaks, and seek clustering over a short period 
of time to provide leads for further epidemiological investigation. Most 
commonly, action needs to be taken to address the most likely cause of an 
outbreak based on the epidemiology, with or without laboratory results. 
In his experience with foodborne outbreaks, one or two people with diar-
rhea meeting the case definition may prove to have an unrelated pathogen 
or unrelated strain. Usually it is not difficult to piece the story together, 
but a capacity that is very much needed is a database of the baseline 
types of the worst pathogens—even something as common as Salmonella. 
Certain species are so common that adequate baseline databases are not 
available to public health authorities to help identify how different a cer-
tain isolate may be from what is known to be in the community. 
Lin also believes that a problem with typing/sequencing capability 
is that it may encourage litigation. He asks if, in foodborne outbreaks, 
whether action should be taken against the food vendor? He tries to 
avoid being drawn into cases alleging, for example, that one person trans-
mitted HIV to another person. The courts ask many questions, and Lin 
believes that public health lacks the manpower to spend time in court 
for such cases. Public health investigators are obligated, however, to be 
involved when commercial products are suspect in pathogen transmis-
sion. In Singapore, there are many imported disease cases, and these 
must be resolved. Were a “local” transmission of cholera to rise above 
a certain threshold, for example, the country would lose its cholera-free 
status. Similarly, people who come from malaria-endemic countries may 
be infected by more than one strain of Plasmodium, be fairly asymptom-
atic, but still transmit the infection(s), possibly with antigenic variations. 
Lin would like to see studies using benchtop NGS instruments. Much 
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of the literature has focused on the large expensive machines. The PGM 
(Ion Torrent, Life Technologies) and MiSeq (Illumina), both benchtop 
machines, are not used much in public health in Singapore.
He agrees that there is a need to build databases and to standardize 
how to report the data internationally. How does one communicate in 
plain language so that the implications of an analysis with MLST+, for 
example, are understandable? Lin agreed with Morse in his concern that 
viral isolation has become almost a thing of the past in diagnostic labs. 
He believes that public health labs must make an effort to collect speci-
mens of bacteria and viruses. Even something as common as investigating 
foodborne outbreaks is still done by culture, but Lin thinks that with an 
increasing move toward multiplexed PCR, public health will have to take 
over the responsibility of collecting isolates so that long-term bacterial 
and viral archives can be created and maintained.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
5
Sampling and Preservation Methods
THE BROAD PERSPECTIVE
Smith (2011) references a Department of Homeland security meeting 
in 2005 from which a report on sample collection, handling, and preserva-
tion was issued. The authors of this report stated that the collection and 
preservation of vital microbial forensic evidence is a critical element of 
successful investigation and ultimate attribution subsequent to a biologi-
cal event.
A primary goal of collection is to obtain sufficient biological agent to 
support both species/strain or toxin identification for critical public 
health decisions and complete signature characterization for valuable 
lead information. Also, the collection of other relevant traditional foren-
sic evidence must not be overlooked. Trace evidence, fingerprints, and 
other traditional evidence should be collected and preserved in order to 
support the attribution mission. (Smith, 2011:380)
This chapter explores the principles and practices that guide the collec-
tion, handling, and preservation of microbial forensic evidence.
Mr. Adam Hamilton, President and CEO of Signature Science LLC, 
gave an overview of sampling and preservation, reviewing potential appli-
cations of microbial forensics both inside and outside of law enforcement. 
He also discussed the challenges of collecting and preserving immensely 
diverse evidence samples for multiple purposes, and made suggestions 
for specific areas of opportunity for international collaboration to advance 
the discipline. 
97
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In all cases, the bottom line in sampling is that samples must be col-
lected and preserved in a manner that prevents or minimizes degradation 
or contamination. This requirement makes sampling and preservation as 
important to the microbial forensic process as is scientific analysis. The 
key messages of his presentation were that microbial forensics is a multi-
disciplinary field developed to serve law enforcement needs and provide 
criminal attribution. However, although it was initially motivated by 
biocrimes and bioterrorism, there are many new applications for micro-
bial forensics that create both opportunities and challenges. Expanding 
roles for microbial forensics also provide opportunities for leadership on 
the development of international guidelines for sampling and handling 
practices. “Standardized flexibility” is required to accommodate myriad 
applications. In addition, while quality control is a necessity, so is trans-
parency. Anyone who is potentially affected by the outcome of microbial 
forensic analyses should be provided insight into what transpired and 
how conclusions were derived.
The expansion in potential applications of microbial forensics is being 
driven by the availability and accessibility of new technologies, such as 
NGS and bioinformatics. As the cost of using these technologies drops, 
more communities will use them to address the problems they face, as 
has already been well illustrated by the public health cases discussed 
in a previous chapter. Security and surveillance are possible new areas 
of application for microbial forensics. Microbial forensics could be used 
to identify strategic locations for collecting monitoring samples and also 
could inform approaches for monitoring systems, such as those needed 
in agriculture. In the clinical and public health realm, microbial forensics 
could play a major role in pathway identification of health care–associ-
ated infections. The combination of an increase in multidrug-resistant 
pathogens, shrinking therapeutic pipelines, and enhanced access to health 
care has the potential to produce a health crisis. Phylogenetics determined 
through sequencing and other technologies can complement traditional 
epidemiology. Microbial forensics also could aid the development of diag-
nostics and interventions for transboundary diseases, particularly animal 
and zoonotic diseases. 
As with other forensics, the collection and preservation of microbial 
evidence are critical for efficient and successful investigation and attribu-
tion. Moreover, a relatively small number of samples may be the basis for 
highly significant strategic and policy-level decisions. Evidence sampling 
approaches must include (1) planning and design; (2) protocols for quality 
assurance and quality control; (3) logistics and preparation; (4) collection, 
which is a fairly small part of the overall process; and (5) documentation, 
which is particularly important for maintaining the chain of custody. Evi-
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dence handling must take into account storage conditions, packaging and 
labeling, shipment/transportation, and maintaining the chain of custody. 
Best practices need to be developed for sampling and handling sys-
tems to create a viable microbial forensics system. This is well recognized, 
as exemplified by the 2008 recommendation made to the U.S. Department 
of Defense that “[t]he broad group of government agencies . . . should 
develop and promote best practices for microbial sample collection that 
best preserve the genetic and epigenetic signatures of interest” (JASON 
Advisory Panel, 2009). Because the need for microbial forensics is interna-
tional, there should be internationally accepted practices. Efforts to evalu-
ate and improve collection methods and standards are under way at the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National BioForensic Analysis 
Center1 (NBFAC) and National Biodefense Analysis and Countermea-
sures Center2 (NBACC), but similar efforts are needed globally in order 
to advance the science of microbial forensics as a whole. 
The goals of sampling and handling are shown in Box 5-1. Hamilton 
stated that the first goal is to ensure the health and safety of the evi-
dence collectors, any resident populations near the location of an outbreak 
event, and those who may have already been exposed in a real attack. The 
design for evidence collection must sufficiently demonstrate the hypoth-
esis or hypotheses that investigators propose. The capabilities of sample 
analyses must be evaluated with the knowledge that results will be fed 
not only into a microbial forensics system, but also into other forensic 
systems. And flexibility must be incorporated throughout, owing to the 
variety of matrixes and samples that can be collected. 
To ensure the broad applicability of preserving and protecting the 
integrity of samples, the methods that are efficient and low cost are most 
1  NBFAC is part of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center 
(NBACC), which applies science to challenges critical to defending the nation against 
bioterrorism. The Department of Homeland Security’s Directorate for Science and Technol-
ogy established the NBACC to be a national resource to understand the scientific basis of 
the risks posed by biological threats and to attribute their use in bioterrorism or biocrime 
events. NBFAC’s mission is not primarily research. Rather, NBFAC conducts bioforensic 
analysis of evidence from a biocrime or terrorist attack to attain a “biological fingerprint” 
to help investigators identify perpetrators and determine the origin and method of attack. 
NBFAC is designated by Presidential Directive to be the lead federal facility to conduct and 
facilitate the technical forensic analysis and interpretation of materials recovered following 
a biological attack in support of the appropriate lead federal agency (http://www.dhs.gov/
national-biodefense-analysis-and-countermeasures-center).
2  NBACC’s National Biological Threat Characterization Center (NBTCC) conducts stud-
ies and laboratory experiments to fill in information gaps to better understand current and 
future biological threats; to assess vulnerabilities and conduct risk assessments; and to de-
termine potential impacts to guide the development of countermeasures such as detectors, 
drugs, vaccines, and decontamination technologies. Neither NBFAC nor NBTCC has as its 
primary responsibility to conduct research on microbial forensics.
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desirable. Spending $10 per collection kit for every sample is unrealistic; 
ideally it should cost pennies. Although compared to the cost of sequenc-
ing, $10 per collection kit may not seem unreasonable. However, it is pos-
sible that many samples will be collected on a routine basis, and it would 
be desirable to be more cost-effective by reducing the cost to a few cents. 
Lower cost collection devices would allow more samples to be collected 
and preserved for subsequent analyses, if warranted. 
Documentation and training in how to conduct sampling missions 
are needed so that collection efforts can be delegated to people with other 
responsibilities or who may not be involved in the microbial forensic field 
at all (e.g., first responders). Cerys Rees of Porton Down in the United 
Kingdom noted that because first responders are often police or military 
personnel, results of sampling are much improved if the microbial foren-
sic experts can advise the samplers before they begin to collect evidence. 
When the scientists are asked in advance for their recommendations for 
the sampling process, analytical results tend to be better. Also, when sam-
plers are told what the scientists plan to do with the samples in the labora-
tory, they are better equipped to sample appropriately. Matts Forsman of 
the Swedish Defense Research Agency also related that in Sweden, first 
responders may include police, fire, and rescue squad personnel, but a 
specially trained bomb squad is then called in to sample, pack, and trans-
port samples to the Swedish National Laboratory for Forensic Science.
Some generic sample matrices for evidence collection appear in Box 
5-2. Microbial forensics incorporates both clinical and environmental sam-
ples, which in turn vary in size, shape, matrix, procedure, and method 
used to collect them. Portions or the entire sample or item may be col-
lected. For example, the entire house of the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, 
BOX 5-1 
Sampling and Handling Goals
•	 Health and safety
•	 Sufficiency of design
•	 Analytical compatability
•	 Preservation and integrity
•	 Low cost and high efficiency
•	 Documentation and training
•	 Quality and transparency
•	 Flexibility!
SOURCE: Hamilton presentation, 2013.
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was moved to a controlled area for evidence analysis. Standardization is 
needed for handling bulk as well as minute samples. As pointed out by 
Dana Kadavy, because microbial forensic investigators deal with such a 
broad range of sample matrices, they should maximize cleanup proce-
dures to enhance typing success.3 A laboratory may need more than one 
sample processing method, particularly if it receives a variety of samples 
that reside in different matrices. One technology may be particularly effec-
tive for processing clinical samples, for example, but not soil, effluents, 
or plant material. Automated technologies can reduce labor, minimize 
hands-on time, and reduce human error in extraction and preparing PCR 
plates and sequencing libraries. However, an automated technology is not 
necessarily a superior methodology. Validation studies at each laboratory 
must determine whether the technology reduces error and/or contamina-
tion, affects yields, and/or improves the analysis.
Bruce Budowle also touched upon sampling objectives, which may 
address elements such as real-time monitoring, screening, random sam-
pling, targeted sampling, collecting bulk material and suspicious items, 
and the conditions of the crime scene. Each element is accompanied by 
3  This is required to remove most of the interfering substances from the matrix and to 
promote the concentration of the analyte.
BOX 5-2 
Sample Matrices for Evidence Collection
Environmental Clinical
•	 Air and liquid filtrates •	 Swabs
•	 Water  •	 Feces
•	 Soil  •	 Urine
•	 Vegetation •	 Blood and components
•	 Wipes and swabs •	 Sputum
•	 Aliquots •	 Fluids
•	 Filtrates •	 Washes
•	 Food  •	 Tissues
•	 Vectors •	 Hair
•	 Fomites •	 Etc.
•	 Bulk items
•	 Etc. 
SOURCE: Hamilton presentation, 2013.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
102 SCIENCE NEEDS FOR MICROBIAL FORENSICS
a set of criteria that must be considered. Each of the different sampling 
approaches will require incorporating different considerations when plan-
ning the collection process. (For further detail, see Chapter 6.)
Ideally, ready-for-prep samples arrive at the microbial forensics labo-
ratory, are fed into the system, and research and analysis are performed. 
But in operational terms, collecting samples is complicated. First, the 
investigator must determine how to optimize the collection of the clinical 
or environmental samples from the various sources and how to preserve 
them in an appropriate manner. At the same time, the collection proce-
dures should not disturb other forensic processes. In fact, the goal is to 
leverage the microbial samples for use for other forensic applications. 
Finally, the evidence must be preserved so it is available for future analy-
sis, be it for a secondary analytical or validating process, or for analysis 
one day using a not-yet-invented technique. 
Randall Murch added that sampling from a facility or location identi-
fied as worthy of investigation but from which law enforcement may wish 
to gather evidence unobtrusively while building a case can be a challenge. 
Because they do not wish to draw attention to themselves, investigators 
may be constrained in how long they are on site, what they carry, includ-
ing protective gear and sampling equipment, and how many samples 
they collect. This constraint will affect strategies, design features of sam-
pling kits all the way through the analytics, and conclusions drawn from 
the effort. How conclusions should be caveated, given the uncertainty 
that may accompany collection under these circumstances, is a topic that 
needs further consideration.
Hamilton summed by stating that there is a global need for microbial 
forensics. Areas of opportunity for international collaboration to advance 
the discipline include the following:
•	 Standardized terminology for the discipline;
•	 Novel solutions (e.g., for sampling from multiple sources and to 




•	 Quality assurance and quality control (e.g., blanks, proficiency 
tests, QC samples, spikes)—At what point is each introduced, and 
in what standardized manner?
•	 Experimental design—judgmental (targeted) and statistical;
•	 Information management (e.g., an expert should be able to easily 
access and analyze a file remotely), capabilities for which should 
be in place before an event; 
•	 Accreditation;
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•	 Training and certification—collaboration should be multidisci-
plinary (e.g., public health, veterinary, food safety, environmental 
science) as well as multisectoral (academia, industry, law enforce-
ment, and defense); and
•	 Data records that should accompany a sample (e.g., temporal, 
spatial, custodial, storage) to aid epidemiological and forensic 
analysis.
Hamilton noted that there are a number of potential starting points 
for collaboration. These include the public health, veterinary, agricultural, 
food safety, environmental, defense, law enforcement, industry, and aca-
demic communities; international organizations with accrediting agencies 
and governing bodies; and sovereign states. He noted that two important 
questions are
•	 What standards or guidelines should be used as the starting point 
for microbial forensics?
•	 What sample characteristics are most critical to preserve for cur-
rent and anticipated analytical methods?
SPECIFIC ISSUES
Food and Agriculture
The National Research Council report Countering Agricultural Bioter-
rorism summarized the historical evidence of planned or actual use of 
biological agents against livestock and crop plants as follows:
Historical evidence suggests that a number of nations have considered 
using or have even used biological agents against plants and animals. 
During World War I, German agents infected horses with bacteria that 
cause glanders, a fatal equine and human disease. The Soviet Union 
military also used glanders in the early 1980s during war in Afghanistan. 
In World War II, the United States, Great Britain, and others all had of-
fensive biological-warfare programs directed against plants or animals, 
and these continued after the war until three years before the adoption of 
the Biological and Toxic [sic] Weapons Convention of 1972 (BWC). Some 
countries continued their offensive programs after 1972. Iraqi bioweapon 
development in the late 1980s and early 1990s included anticrop efforts 
based on wheat smut, a disease caused by a fungus in the genus Tilletia. 
There is also evidence that the Soviet Union had an extensive agricul-
tural-terrorism program aimed at animals and plants. (NRC, 2003:18) 
Fletcher et al. (2006) also pointed out that agriculture makes an 
attractive target for terrorism using plant pathogens because it (1) is a 
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$1 trillion/year sector of the U.S. economy, (2) employs 17 percent of 
the U.S. workforce, and (3) is not subject to regular surveillance so that 
there could be long lag times between the deliberate introduction of a 
plant pathogen and its detection. Given the economic and health-related 
importance of agriculture, Fletcher et al. advocated for “the integration 
of the traditional discipline of plant pathology and the specialized field 
of forensic science. . . .”
With these thoughts in mind, Dr. Bruce Budowle discussed sampling 
and preservation in the food and agriculture context. His purpose was to 
provide a sense of the range of evidence sampling and collection possibili-
ties that a microbial forensic investigation might confront and the outlines 
of a comprehensive plan for approaching such varied circumstances and 
challenges. A review of the major issues dealing with plant pathogen 
forensics can be found in Fletcher et al. (2006), which builds a case for 
the integration of plant pathology and forensic science. It describes the 
potential threats to plants and addresses the development of a program 
in microbial forensics and criminal attribution that addresses crops and 
other plant targets.
The challenges in microbial forensics might be greater than sim-
ply working with an isolate from an individual. The evidence may be 
a degraded sample on a laboratory floor or in soil or effluent from a 
clandestine laboratory. In cases where evidence is highly degraded, NGS 
technology may not work well whereas a real-time PCR assay may work 
better.
Natural outbreaks in food make good models for microbial forensics. 
During the passage from “farm to fork” there are many potential targets 
for investigation and evidence collection. The list in Box 5-3 gives an idea 
of the range of access for a potential attack. To investigate contaminated 
sprouts, for example, one may need to go back to the farm or to any of 
the many places the food has traveled along the way. There have been 
many examples of deliberate contamination of food: salad-bar tampering 
in The Dalles, Oregon; cyanide-tainted grapes; Shigella-spiked muffins. 
Each event comes with its own set of circumstances and questions. In the 
cyanide-tainted grapes case, for example, only two tainted grapes were 
ever identified. What happened to the others, or were there others? 
Contamination can occur unintentionally through bad planning. A 
country may use mycoherbicides for biocontrol—to halt cocaine produc-
tion, for example—but inadvertently cause more far-reaching toxicity. In 
Australia, a virus was introduced to reduce the population of introduced 
and invasive rabbits. Terrorists may be interested in such biocontrol 
agents or how they were effectively administered.
Evidence-gathering tasks can also be diverse. In 2003, the USDA Ani-
mal and Plant Health Inspection Service had to determine whether an out-
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break of mad cow disease in Canada originated with U.S. cows. Kinship 
tests were performed on cattle to trace ancestry, and evidence collection 
included tracking down the hides of parent cattle for DNA trace-back. 
Plants tend to make good vehicles for an attack because the perpe-
trator is unlikely to be at risk when preparing the agent, and plants are 
poorly protected. Picture the huge areas of unguarded farmland around 
the world on which it is nearly impossible to impose security. This lack 
of security (which is impossible to impose) represents both a safety and 
a forensic challenge. Box 5-4 details some reasons why plants make such 
an excellent target for agroterrorism.
Various factors must be considered depending on the circumstances 
when collecting and preserving evidence. For example, in the case of a 
wheat streak mosaic virus, the mite vector may be implicated. A farm’s 
wheat may be tainted, but it may not be recognized until 8 months later, 
after the harvest has been cleared. Does the virus exist underground in 
roots in the winter? Is it in other reservoirs that are in the vicinity, such 
as grasses? Sample collection under these circumstances is very difficult, 
and the difficulties do not end with evidence recovery. If samples are 
maintained at room temperature, for example, other microbes may take 
over and mask the one of interest. Under certain conditions, the agent 
may actually be destroyed.
A general approach to sampling appears in Box 5-5A, and a more 
focused approach—in this case, for wheat streak mosaic virus—appears 
in Box 5-5B. When considering approaches to evidence collection and 
BOX 5-3 




•	 Food in grocery stores







•	 Trucks, railroads, ships
•	 Restaurants, and more
SOURCE: Budowle presentation, 2013.
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sampling, the technology that is available and appropriate must be incor-
porated into the logic of the process. A sampling and collection strategy 
should be structured, yet the structure cannot be overly rigid. One may 
decide, for example, to systematically collect a sample every 3 meters in a 
field. But if a tainted sample appears half a meter away, rigid rules would 
prohibit collecting the sample. A comprehensive plan should guide efforts 
(see Box 5-6), but owing to myriad possibilities that investigators may 
encounter, there is not a single sample collection and preservation strat-
egy that is suitable in all situations. A key step in the comprehensive plan 
is to identify experts in advance so that when an event occurs, investiga-
tors can quickly develop consultation plans before they begin collection. 
Again, the chain of custody must be maintained throughout the process.
Environmental Contamination: The Public Health View
Dr. Stephen Morse reviewed the needs of the public health sector in 
the event of environmental contamination, and provided a sense of how 
the site, what is known or not known about the extent of contamination, 
and the nature of the contaminant will direct the manner of sample collec-
BOX 5-4 
Plants Are Vulnerable and Efficacious 
Targets for Agroterrorism
•	 	Many agents are readily available in nature, from low-security laboratories, 
even from commercial sources, that require little effort or risk to obtain.
•	 Most agents pose no risk to human health.
•	 There is less risk in handling and dispersing the pathogen.
•	 	Once released, an agroterrorism event may go unnoticed for days to weeks or 
longer.
•	 	By that point, it may be nearly impossible to determine if the event was deliber-
ate or occurred naturally.
•	 Tracking the perpetrator is more difficult.
•	 Vulnerable targets have low security.
•	 Moral barrier that perpetrator must cross is lower.
•	 Maximum effect may not require many cases.
•	 Mimicking natural introduction can be effective. 
•	 	Multiple point-source outbreaks can be initiated by contaminating imported feed 
or fertilizer, without even entering the country.
•	 	Agronomic practices reduce the genetic variability and create conditions (large, 
dense populations) that facilitate disease spread.
SOURCE: Partially adopted from Burden (2010); Budowle presentation, 2013.
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BOX 5-5 
Sampling Strategy
A.  General B.  Wheat Streak Mosaic Virus
•	 Logical and systematic  •	 Develop plan with consultation
 o Air movement  •	 Use experience of practiced
 o Cross-contamination   collectors for how to collect
•	 Work toward or away from source   (pattern and cutting and bagging)
•	 Scheduled  •	 Maintain chain of custody
•	 Risk-based  •	 Use targeted and statistical
•	 Targeted   sampling plans —symptomatic/
•	 Statistical   asymptomatic
•	 Known sources  •	 Collect mites (rolled up leaves)
     •	 	Collect samples from multiple 
plant parts, multiple plants
	 	 	 	 	 •	 	Collect samples from other 
nearby plants
	 	 	 	 	 •	 	Preserve and transport sample 
material (“breathing” of bags)
	 	 	 	 	 •	 On ice, 4°C
SOURCE: Budowle presentation, 2013.
BOX 5-6 
Comprehensive Plan for Sampling and Collection
•	 	Develop a mechanism for quickly formulating a “consensus” analytical plan 
when a new sample (or set of samples) arises. 
•	 	Keep and update a set of standard operating procedures and validation data 
for analyzing case samples.
•	 	Maintain a set of documented guidelines, requirements, and procedures for 
sample preparation for each analytical procedure.
•	 	Maintain approved procedures for handling and storing samples.
•	 	Develop standardized methods for data analysis, reporting, and presentation.
•	 	Maintain reliable channels for sending and receiving samples.
•	 	Maintain secure conduits for data, information, and discussion.
•	 	Develop a mechanism for formulating an on-the-fly validation plan for a new 
procedure.
SOURCE: Budowle presentation, 2013.
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tion and preservation. He views validating collection methods as a major 
challenge because the number of potential surfaces from which samples 
can be taken is unlimited.
From the point of view of high-level decision makers, in the event 
of an environmental threat, sampling and analysis will enable them to 
(1) determine who has potentially been exposed, (2) characterize the 
extent of contamination, (3) remediate indoor sites of contamination, 
and (4) clear the facility for reoccupation or use. A public health agency 
wants to establish certain facts, some of which also are sought by law 
enforcement. In fact, the FBI and public health officers often investigate 
a site simultaneously, collect specimens together, and share specimens 
and results. 
The type and method of the release or event will determine the impact 
of sampling. If it is a covert event, and the first indication is sick people 
appearing in an emergency room, collecting environmental samples 1 to 
3 weeks after the fact may not accomplish much. On the other hand, if 
the release point is determined, trace evidence and dispersal items may 
still be accessible. If it is an overt release, however, and the site of release 
can be identified, sampling and modeling can be used to determine the 
extent of contamination in a particular area. Contamination via food or 
water presents a further level of challenges.
Whatever the circumstances, identification of the crime scene and 
sampling are generally the first steps. The entire process—from sample 
collection, to transport, to analysis—must be validated. Investigators who 
understand the performance parameters of a process can effect superior 
analyses. After the Amerithrax letters event, the CDC and other respond-
ers received criticism from the U.S. Government Accounting Office about 
the extent of their ability to interpret performance of sampling methods. 
For example, does a negative result mean an area is free of contamination? 
Or could a sampling method simply be inadequate, and contamination 
still be present? Are the limits of the detection method clearly under-
stood? This becomes very important when making a decision to reopen, 
for example, the Hart Senate office building after the anthrax attack. What 
degree of assurance can one give to leaders that a building is actually free 
of contamination? These questions are necessary for remediation but do 
not contribute realistically to a microbial forensics investigation.
Methods for sampling can be difficult to validate. The B. anthracis 
sampling methods have been evaluated, but these methods represented 
a low hurdle because the organism is stable in the environment. Less is 
known about sampling methods for other organisms, particularly Gram-
negative organisms and viruses that do not survive for long on environ-
mental surfaces. 
Swab and wipe methods have been validated for nonporous surfaces, 
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and validation is under way for a vacuum method for porous surfaces. To 
further complicate validation, the sampling tool used is validated only for 
a specific area of surface. A swab, for example, is validated for a 2 × 2-inch 
square, and a wipe for a 10 × 10-inch square. Samples cannot be taken 
from a wall using a single swab because the swab may not be adequate 
for the sampling or at a minimum no validation was performed to guide 
the collection under best practices.
In the laboratory, one might encounter various types of surfaces, 
both porous and nonporous. Nonporous surfaces, for example, might be 
painted wood or wallboard or various types of wood, plastic, glass, and 
metal. But each of these nonporous surfaces has individual characteris-
tics. A surface may have an electrical charge or may have micropores, 
which will affect the ability to remove microorganisms. Similarly, porous 
surfaces, such as fabric and carpeting, have their own characteristics. 
Although the number of potential surfaces is unlimited, it is only possible 
now to validate sampling methods for a small number and then extrapo-
late the experience as necessary.
Environmental conditions, such as humidity, affect the ability to 
recover organisms from surfaces. Although one can control such factors 
and validate methods for the laboratory environment, conditions out in 
the field are uncontrolled and will vary. Another variable is the person 
collecting the sample. The individual may or may not be well trained. 
Even if personnel are trained, they may not perform in the same manner 
every time, especially if sampling guidelines are not available. Moreover, 
the person is likely wearing personal protective equipment (PPE), which 
is hot and uncomfortable. Getting the sample quickly becomes the pri-
mary goal.
Transportation methods must be carefully selected. B. anthracis is a 
hardy organism, but some agents require a specific transport medium. 
Also, after decontamination, particularly via chlorine dioxide or vapor-
phase hydrogen peroxide methods, a neutralizing agent must be added 
to the transport medium to remove the decontaminant, or anything that 
survives will die before it reaches the laboratory and will not be cultur-
able. Recovery efficiency once in the laboratory is another factor, and 
again, it will vary from agent to agent. 
Sampling approaches are chosen based on the situation. The easiest 
approach is judgmental, which is typically used in the early characteriza-
tion phases of a response to establish whether an agent or toxin is present. 
In a meeting room, for example, an investigator would likely first sample 
from heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning vents in the wall, and 
from computer screens, which are great attractants for airborne organ-
isms. When there is a large quantity of organisms or toxin, this sampling 
method works well. One of the simpler scenarios to handle is a white-
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powder incident, where the agent is visible; standard methods exist for 
collecting white powder for analysis and forensic use. If, however, there 
is only trace evidence in a room, a random, probability-based method—
sampling X number of places in the room in a random fashion, to provide 
a 95 percent chance or greater of picking up material—is appropriate. In 
general, the larger the room, the greater the number of samples required.
After decontamination, a combined judgmental and random sam-
pling would be appropriate to ensure that the area is free of contamina-
tion. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses composite 
sampling. They collect samples, put them in the same tube, and analyze 
the contents. They simply want to know if there is contamination present, 
regardless of its location. This approach could apply to forensic sampling 
to reduce labor and cost. But it will reduce the ability to reconstruct the 
event with that/those sample(s). 
In the event of a wide-area release, for example, if someone releases 
B. anthracis over a city, there is a limited time to remediate the area. 
According to statements made at several exercises, substantial delays in 
remediating the affected area would reduce the likelihood that people 
would return. Leaders will want to be able to tell the public when or 
whether it is safe for them to return, and that decision will also be based 
on sampling. However, the public could lose confidence in their leader-
ship if any residual infections occur after they move back in.
Morse was asked to comment, in terms of validating collection meth-
ods, how much confidence he has that there are no spores when he gets a 
zero response from sampling a room, and how he establishes probability 
or statistical confidence limits. Morse responded that a negative result 
only means that there were no viable spores detected, but one does not 
know if there are spores below the limit of detection; current sampling 
methods will detect less than 1 spore per cm2 on a surface. The CDC feels 
comfortable saying that a negative response would be equal to less than 
1 spore per cm2. Although the analytical method may be able to detect a 
target at very low levels, sampling may or may not be efficient. Therefore, 
lack of detection may be related to collection method, sampling efficiency, 
and limit of detection of the analytical assay. 
In the United States, the CDC has a network of analytical laboratories, 
the Laboratory Response Network, comprising 160 laboratories through-
out the country. Similarly, the Food Emergency Response Network has 
protocols for analyzing food for the presence of threat agents, the Ani-
mal Health Network has them for agricultural animals, the EPA has an 
Emergency Response Laboratory Network, and there is a plant network. 
All use basically the same methods. The labs can process environmental 
samples using the exact same method; the results in one lab are equivalent 
to those in another lab. This is important because in the case of a wide-
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area threat release, the nearest lab may be contaminated and unavailable. 
Samples collected using chain of custody are shipped to the closest lab 
for analysis. Morse pointed out that one problem with giving confidence 
limits is how to equate that to risk. Because the lowest dose that will 
infect a human is unknown for many, if not most, pathogens, it is hard 
to say there is no risk, which is never zero. Also, detecting something on 
a surface does not necessarily equate to an inhalational risk; it has to be 
able to detach from the surface and get into the air, to be breathed in. So 
it is difficult to say, “I am really confident that this room is safe to be in.” 
Budowle noted that calculating false-negative rates and the like is a 
problem because the approach is borrowed from human clinical genet-
ics, in which a true negative can be defined. Minimum criteria should 
be established for the output of the selected analytical method, such as 
depth and uniformity of coverage. Defining output thresholds for metage-
nomic samples may be difficult given the immense quantity of data and 
microbial diversity; therefore, single-source samples and defined mixtures 
might be used as a guide. These limitations may be necessary in defining 
false negatives and false positives. Clearly, there will be ambiguous calls 
due to sequencing noise and novel genome composition. The specific 
parameters and settings used to establish thresholds, false-positive, and 
false-negative rates should be detailed thoroughly to enable sound inter-
pretation and accurate comparison to alternative methods and protocols.
Keim said that the situation he encountered was detecting something 
above zero, but only in 1 in 1,000 samples. The question was whether that 
finding was informative or significant given that the sampling had never 
been validated to that level and the processing labs had never validated 
the sampling. They concluded it was contamination by the processing 
system. So one can have a positive result and still not be confident. A 
single colony of B. anthracis on a plate is still just one, and may or may 
not be meaningful. 
Perspective from a U.K. Government Laboratory
Dr. Cerys Rees works with the U.K. Ministry of Defense’s Defense 
Science and Technology Laboratory based at Porton Down. This facility 
provides chemical and biological analysis capability on behalf of defense 
and security customers, including the military and law enforcement. The 
Laboratory’s law enforcement experience includes the analysis that sup-
ported the first U.K. prosecution under the Chemical Weapons Act, which 
concerned the production of ricin. White supremacists in northeast Eng-
land were arrested and convicted in 2009 for producing ricin in their 
home. Porton Down analyzed samples taken from the house, and by 
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combining several different methods, produced evidence that supported 
a conviction.
Proficiency testing is particularly lacking in the biological area. 
Dr. Rees’s colleagues in chemical labs undergo stringent Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) chemical testing annu-
ally to maintain their designated laboratory status. Rees would like to see 
similar training in the biological area, perhaps starting with confidence-
building tests, and then moving on to proficiency testing. 
In the United Kingdom, a forensic science regulator who has overall 
responsibility for activities that support the U.K. criminal justice system 
oversees evidence sampling. The regulator may soon be granted statutory 
powers, which would enable him to enforce International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) 17025 accreditation on all laboratories that sup-
port the criminal justice system. He also is very motivated to require ISO 
17020 accreditation of crime-scene examiners and personnel who collect 
samples. It is the international standard of competence for inspection 
bodies, which may not fit perfectly with crime-scene examiners, but it is 
likely the only standard that is potentially applicable. 
Rees noted that the Laboratory has frequently worked with defense 
and security customers to address the requirements for chemical and 
biological analysis and attribution capability that support the different 
communities’ needs, which appear to be very similar. All require high-
confidence information that enables defense customers to make strategic 
decisions and security customers to support the criminal justice system.
In their laboratories, validated tests are required to assess staff com-
petence and to ensure that there is standardization in how tasks are per-
formed (e.g., chain of custody) so they can demonstrate that the labora-
tory has high confidence in the information they produce. 
Rees and her colleagues would like to pursue attribution based on all 
materials, not just the agent alone. They would like to develop methods 
that enable them to exploit the matrix and anything else associated with 
the sample, including traditional forensic materials, such as fingerprints, 
hair, and fibers. Her lab is working with police and forensic colleagues 
to develop these methods. Ideally they would provide information that, 
coupled with intelligence and situational information, could lead to a 
higher degree of attribution of an attack and perhaps identify the perpe-
trators. Dr. Franca Jones, U.S. Department of Defense, also said that there 
needed to be more discussion about other signatures in microbial samples 
that might be used for microbial forensics, such as media components. She 
encouraged that these nongenomic methods under development receive 
more consideration.
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Weapons Inspections in Iraq
Dr. Rocco Casagrande, founder and managing director of Gryphon 
Scientific, reviewed the technological challenges he experienced while 
supporting biological disarmament missions in Iraq for the United 
Nations. His experience provided an example of the kinds of problems 
those doing work in the field can encounter, especially in sampling. He 
emphasized that although his unit was not equipped as well as it could 
have been, most problems lay in how to apply good technology in an 
austere environment.
From November 2002 to March 2003 he served as a U.N. biological 
weapons inspector in Iraq. As chief of the biological analysis laboratory, 
he collected and tested most of the samples collected by his unit. At peak 
staffing, the number of inspectors did not exceed 25, and most were field 
or bioprocess specialists, so he had little assistance in the lab. The lab was 
small and rudimentary, containing a hood, a real-time PCR machine, and 
equipment to perform DNA extraction. Real-time PCR was the assay most 
frequently used owing to its simplicity, low false-positive rate, and excel-
lent sensitivity. The process was labor-intensive because DNA extractions 
were performed manually. The inspectors were limited to the primer sets 
provided, and had no input in the choice of reagents. During the first 
month in Iraq, the equipment was inoperable because they had not been 
supplied with a transformer adaptable to Iraqi electricity. 
Their immunological methods originally included hand-held lateral 
flow immunoassay devices, but their unacceptable false-positive rates 
for environmental samples prohibited their use. For toxin detection, they 
used conventional ELISA kits with antibodies prebound to 96-well plates. 
In addition to running the lab, Casagrande’s duties included inspections, 
writing site reports, and interviewing Iraqi personnel. Only 4 hours a day 
could be dedicated to laboratory work; the remaining time was spent in 
the field.
In early 2003, equipment was found from a facility that had been 
destroyed by U.S. bombardment in 1991. There were allegations that the 
facility had been used for the manufacture of biological warfare agents, 
but the Iraqis claimed it was a baby-formula factory. After the facility was 
destroyed, the damaged equipment was moved to another site, and it lay 
outside for 10 years. Inspectors disassembled the damaged equipment, 
and samples taken from protected joints showed a borderline detection 
of Brucella species. The heterogeneous melting temperature of amplified 
fragments suggested multiple species were present, which would be con-
sistent with natural contamination. A shortfall in inspectors’ equipment, 
Casagrande noted, was that they were not permitted to pick positive 
controls, and they had very few. The sample from the damaged equip-
ment proved similar to the Brucella species profile in a control Casagrande 
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created from the U.N. cafeteria milk. Therefore, the PCR technology was 
effective in detecting the trace contamination of dual-use items that had 
been blown up, moved, and then lay unprotected in the weather for a 
decade.
A great problem the inspectors faced, as in forensics in general, was 
where to apply the good technology and practices they had. Selecting 
sampling sites can be problematic; some sites are very large. An earthen 
berm, for example, had been built to encircle the Iraqi facility at Tuwaitha 
to shelter it from Iranian bombardment in the earlier Iran-Iraq war. From 
which sites of the berm should samples be taken? From which of the facil-
ity’s 150 buildings, and from which equipment within those buildings, 
should samples be taken? The assay technology is effective, but what 
is needed is better technology to determine the reliability of the intel-
ligence sources who direct inspectors to sampling sites. Better technol-
ogy is needed to identify activities at a suspect site to determine which 
of the 150 buildings in Tuwaitha, for example, were of interest to the 
bioteam. Reliable background information is essential to direct inspectors’ 
investigations. 
In 2002, for guidance the inspectors used a mid-1990s Iraqi declara-
tion of agents and activities putatively in their biological weapons pro-
gram. This declaration, plus traditional threat agent lists, was used to 
direct procurement of reagents, such as PCR primers, specific for certain 
microbes. Inspectors were able to detect B. anthracis and orthopoxvirus, 
but not any pathogens not contained in the lists, such as Machupo virus 
and Chlamydia psittaci. Casagrande suggested that usable technology that 
could detect the presence of threat agents regardless of identity would be 
revolutionary for this purpose. The technology exists, but in its present 
form it would be difficult to use in a one-person lab with limited work-
ing hours and a single source of electricity. In one case, for example, 
there were allegations that the BBs within a larger weapon projectile had 
been coated with Clostriudium perfringens, which causes gas gangrene, but 
inspectors lacked the technology to test for this bacterium, so the entire 
weapon was sent away for analysis. Casagrande suggested a need to 
search for dangerous traits of pathogens, or developing a more sensitive 
“zoo” chip.
The ability to identify modifications in an agent would also be 
extremely useful. It might yield clues about the intended target or use 
of a strain, determine if particular defenses are no longer effective, and 
indicate a degree of sophistication regarding the perpetrator. An example 
might be antibiotic resistance genes. For example, there are roughly 36 
genes that encode tetracycline resistance; however, even if inspectors 
look only for that phenotype, the PCR analysis would need to be a highly 
multiplexed assay. Moreover, frequently only nonviable samples can be 
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obtained from a site. They may have been sterilized in place, bombarded, 
left outside, or subject to efforts to “clean” the sites. Samples often are 
contaminated with—and outnumbered by—environmental microbes, 
making analyses more difficult. Therefore amplification for genomic or 
phenotypic analysis is complex.
Inspectors faced this kind of challenge when collecting samples from 
R400 aerial biological bombs that had been filled with B. anthracis spores, 
botulinum toxin, or aflatoxin. It was difficult to get a culturable sample 
even from inside the weapon because the Iraqis had attempted to decon-
taminate the weapons with potassium permanganate. A challenge also 
lay in analyzing viruses and toxins. Many threat viruses have RNA as 
their genetic material, and RNA, even double-stranded RNA, is generally 
less stable than DNA, and thus is harder to detect. Because it requires an 
additional step, reverse transcriptase might also reduce detection limits. 
Another challenge lay in detecting protein and small-molecule toxins, 
such as botulinum toxin and aflatoxin, which were both on the declara-
tion list. Inspectors used PCR to detect trace contamination of agent DNA 
because of its superior sensitivity and specificity over the ELISA assays. 
However, for a number of toxins of interest, such as ricin, inspectors 
hope to find DNA as well to indicate the presence of inactivated toxins. 
Although PCR detects DNA or RNA, not protein toxins, analyzing a 
sample by PCR might detect genetic sequences from the castor bean, even 
if the ricin had been inactivated or rendered undetectable. The Iraqis had 
legitimate castor oil plants, for example, and inspectors needed to deter-
mine if the ricin being produced was still active, if it was heat-inactivated, 
or if efforts were being made to extract it. A PCR assay cannot provide 
that information. 
Finally, Casagrande added that one thing that was very important 
for the weapons inspection/biological disarmament mission was profi-
ciency testing for people collecting samples from dual-use equipment. 
They needed to understand the equipment, know how to disassemble it 
and how to sample from the proper places inside the equipment. When 
inspectors confused very similar looking equipment or sampled from 
locations that had already been adequately decontaminated, they ran the 
risk of drawing falsely negative conclusions. Standardization, protocols 
that are widely disseminated and understood, and testing for the ability 
to take samples from dual-use equipment would desirable. 
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Validation and Reference Materials 
for Microbial Forensics
In the introduction to their chapter on validation of microbial foren-
sics, Murch and Bahr (2011:649) state the following:
The use of effective, robust, and properly validated methods for the 
collection, preservation, transport, analysis, interpretation, and commu-
nication of probative evidence is a linchpin of reliability and confidence-
building measures that contribute to the acceptance, use, and under-
standing of science by investigators, judges, attorneys, juries, the media, 
and lay public. Stakeholders expect that forensic methods, protocols, 
and techniques have been validated properly. All science proposed and 
admitted to court is subject to discovery and scrutiny under U.S. case law 
and prescribed legal procedures. In recent years, as courts and the media 
have become more aware of the value, power, risks, and uncertainties of 
forensic science, whether or not methods have been validated properly 
is receiving increasing attention.
Microbial forensics is a relatively new discipline and the science and 
technologies it uses are evolving rapidly. Because of the demands to 
produce and apply reliable and robust capabilities, validation measures, 
requirements, and protocols are essential. Dr. Bruce Budowle, one of 
the early developers of microbial forensics, and his colleagues Steven 
Schutzer, Roger Breeze, Paul Keim, and Stephen Morse produced a Micro-
bial Forensics textbook, now in its second edition (Budowle et al., 2011), 
which is used as an informative resource regarding many aspects of 
microbial forensics. In an authoritative presentation at the Zagreb work-
shop, Dr. Budowle reviewed established and recommended measures and 
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approaches for validating components of each stage of microbial forensics 
processes. He provided insight into gaps in validation coverage and the 
challenges of designing protocols in a system encountering substantial 
and often undefined diversity and sample variation.
Dr. Budowle began by stressing that a microbial forensics investiga-
tion does not have to produce a “smoking gun” solution to be informa-
tive. It needs only to provide a conclusion to the level necessary for pro-
ducing a useful piece of a puzzle. The goal is attribution, which is 
1.)  To establish the exclusion or possible inclusion of the source of a sam-
ple. The level of attribution can be determining the species or strain 
of a microbe to the individualization of a particular sample, that is, 
coming from a particular isolate or test tube. The latter is not readily 
achievable with currently validated genetic typing capabilities; and 
2.)  To integrate the microbial forensic findings with other forensic and 
investigative evidence to address the ultimate question of guilt or lack 
of guilt. 
He outlined four undesirable scenarios for the application of a 
methodology:
1.  Applying a bad method and doing it poorly. Operators are often unaware 
their methods and performance are poor. The information generated 
lacks a firm basis and is frequently incorrect.
2.  Applying a bad method well. Operators believe the data are good be-
cause they followed standard operating protocols carefully, but the 
data may be meaningless or, worse, erroneous.
3.  Applying a good method poorly. Operators produce content for which 
the criteria or limitations for use are undefined or compromised or, 
worse, erroneous. 
4.  Applying a good method well, but the science community or stakeholders do 
not accept the data. The operator may, for example, have validated the 
method without documenting the validation, so there is no confidence 
in the system, or there have been documented problems with the 
particular laboratory and there is a lack of confidence even though 
the procedure(s) were carried out properly.
The goal, of course, is to perform a good method well. Budowle 
noted that a great deal of focus is placed on technology. Empowerment by 
using sophisticated technology can be deceptive if its use is not validated. 
Moreover, while validation is necessary, perceptions of what constitutes 
validation vary. In practice, the basis for validation may be as tenuous as 
“because I’ve used it for so long it must be the right thing,” or “based on 
my experience of doing this three times” or “it is a community validated 
method so my use is valid.” Because there are no absolute criteria, and 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
VALIDATION AND REFERENCE MATERIALS 119
each application may have unique requirements, validation is a challenge. 
The goals for validation in microbial forensics are to
•	 Promote development of a program that is scientifically valid and 
rigorous.
•	 Define criteria for development and validation of methods that 
will support attribution for criminal investigations.
•	 Establish national/international working guidelines for quality 
assurance and quality control. 
There are two general types of validation for microbial forensics: 
developmental and internal. Both essentially have the same goal: to define 
limitations of use and/or interpretation.
1. Developmental validation refers to the acquisition of test data and 
the determination of conditions and limitations by the developers 
of the method. Measures or determinants of developmental vali-
dation would include specificity, sensitivity, reproducibility, bias, 
precision, false positives, false negatives, determining appropri-
ate controls, and the choice and/or quality of reference databases 
(Murch and Bahr, 2011). 
2. Internal validation refers to accumulation of test data within the 
laboratory that intends to use the method to demonstrate that 
established methods perform as expected. Methods must be tested 
in one’s own laboratory to ensure that they perform as expected 
and that limitations are understood, so that interpretations do not 
cross the boundaries of the abilities of the methodology.
Because microbial forensics may be applied in exigent circumstances, 
“preliminary validation” may be considered. For example, during the U.S. 
anthrax letters case when a research tool had to be applied to an investi-
gation, Paul Keim’s multiple-locus VNTR analysis (MLVA) was used to 
determine that the B. anthracis strain was Ames. In the midst of such an 
event, a result was needed in a short time to protect human health, and 
it was unreasonable to wait until the laboratory can validate a procedure 
to the degree normally desired. Response time does not allow for such a 
lengthy process. The criteria recommended for considering “preliminary 
validation” are (1) exigent circumstances, (2) an inability to wait for some 
lengthy time period to completely validate the method, and (3) the acqui-
sition of limited test data that will enable an evaluation of a method that 
provides support to investigate a biocrime or bioterrorism event. 
One caution raised was being so tied to a protocol that the scientist 
does not think about the assay and its result and operates more or less 
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as an automaton. Standard operating protocols (SOPs) are for routine 
work. A danger of SOPs is that they can restrict analytical thinking and 
disregard both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. The ideal balance 
to strike is one that enables thinking “out of the box” while still applying 
boundaries on use. 






•	 Analysis of specified samples commensurate with the intended 
application of the assay (e.g., reference panels and mock or non-
probative materials), and
•	 Limit of detection.
In his experience, Budowle has encountered scientists who contend 
that there is no need for a quantitative element in validation when the 
test result “is a yes/no answer.” He stressed that this view is absolutely 
incorrect because one must quantify the limits of detection in order to 
draw inferences about the meaning of what one is trying to assess. An 
assay will require some level of quantification. 
Validation measures should be applied from the very first stage of 
the investigation—sample collection—and through all subsequent stages 
of the process, including shipping and storage; extraction, which greatly 
impacts results; analysis; and finally, interpretation. It is critical that vali-
dation be applied to the interpretation stage. Interpretation is dependent 
on, for example, which databases and procedures are employed for draw-
ing inferences; a value can change based on the database or inference 
framework used. 
If evidence is not collected, it cannot be tested. If it is not collected 
correctly, results may be suspect or destroyed. The “proper” collection of 
evidence is not a new concept; clearly, mixing evidence items in a bag is 
unacceptable. Storing evidence improperly also will be problematic as 
crucial targets may be destroyed.
Microbial forensics relies not only on microbial evidence but also on 
additional forensic evidence, and the collection of microbial evidence can 
sometimes be incompatible with other types of forensic evidence. Given 
a choice between a fingerprint and a spore, the level of individualiza-
tion offered by the fingerprint could make it the more desirable piece 
of evidence to preserve. Swabbing may obliterate the fingerprint and 
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destroy valuable evidence. Triaging strategies must be incorporated into 
the sampling process.
A challenge is to develop investigative protocols that optimize the 
choice and priority of methods. Among factors to consider are the amount 
of sample available, evidence preservation/conservation, and trade-offs 
between speed and accuracy and/or precision. Given the limitations of 
wearing protective equipment speed may become a requisite over accu-
racy and chain of custody. Making priority decisions given collection 
constraints should be determined ahead of time and methods developed 
to minimize the loss of sample and less than desired collection and docu-
mentation. Simple strategies, such as pre-labeling tubes before beginning 
sampling due to difficult manipulation of labels when wearing protective 
gear, is an example of a simple consideration. 




•	 Target—organism or analyte (e.g., DNA, RNA, protein, toxin, 
agar), and
•	 Influence of sample matrix.
As an illustration, Budowle pointed out that the ideal swab is the one 
that adsorbs the sample well. But the worst swab for extraction of the 
target is the one that adsorbs well. A swab that adsorbs well may be bet-
ter for recovery from surfaces at a crime scene, but the swab matrix holds 
the target analyte such that it is not efficiently removed from the swab 
during extraction. The result can be low yield of a sample even though 
sufficient material was collected at the crime scene. Selection of collection 
tools often requires that a balance be struck. Samplers must work out 
these details and ensure that the application aligns with final objectives. 
Collecting an isolate from a victim is quite different from going into an 
air duct to collect trace samples. Good procedures exist for collecting, 
preserving, and shipping blood, but they do not exist for handling a flask 
of liquid that no one wants to open during collection. It may be necessary 
to make an educated guess about the target in the sample or the nature of 
the sample may dictate the best option for preserving the sample. Options 
to preserve the contents of a flask can vary from maintaining it as a liquid 
or frozen. There may be presumptive testing that can be performed at the 
scene or intelligence to guide this determination—rightly or wrongly. If 
there is a substantial amount of material, it may be desirable to store it 
multiple ways to increase the odds of preserving the target of interest. 
Procedures must continue to be developed.
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Extraction efficiency depends on the collection medium. Different 
extraction procedures can be productive or counterproductive in obtain-
ing the particular target medium. When choosing an extraction proce-
dure, analysts must consider
•	 Specific target—virus, bacteria, fungal, toxin;
•	 Spore vs. vegetative cell;
•	 Active vs. inactive (culture plan, amplification plan);
•	 Analyte that will be assayed—DNA, RNA, protein, lipid, stabiliz-
ers, media, fatty acid, etc.;
•	 Stability of analyte;
•	 Matrix effect—substrate, other co-extracted analytes, materials 
such as soil; and
•	 Downstream assay impact.
Budowle emphasized that it is essential to consider what effect extraction 
methods will have on downstream analysis. There is no point in extract-
ing material with a particular method if co-purifying compounds impedes 
the function of an assay downstream. 
The basic criteria for validation during the analytical stage appear in 
Box 6-1A, and additional criteria may be warranted. The amount of tar-
get that can be analyzed by an assay should be defined. It is not enough 
to implement an assay; it is essential to define the acceptable range. A 
low amount may be acceptable, but associated stochastic effects may 
affect interpretation. The critical reagents should be defined. Often assays 
are developed to perform in optimum ranges and performance criteria. 
Optimization can be misleading as it implies maximum performance. 
However, a window of performance criterion is established for robust 
methodologies. It is usually undesirable to design an assay that is at the 
edge of a window of performance because any small perturbation in some 
part of the process could cause it to fail. Windows can be set for criteria, 
for example, as simple as the temperature for annealing primers during 
PCR. If the highest temperature for successful primer annealing is 63oC 
it would not be best for a robust assay to set the temperature at 63oC. 
Given that thermocyclers have some variation, it may be desirable to set 
the temperature slightly lower so that the temperature in the tube is favor-
able for primer annealing. It is best to find the range for the performance 
criterion, and use a condition somewhere within the performance range 
of the analysis but not at the edge—so it will perform robustly. 
Another point is to consider a real-time PCR assay with a linear 
range between 20 and 30 cycles, and the user observes a positive result 
somewhere between 40 to 50 cycles. Since the result is no longer in the 
linear range, one cannot predict quantity of the target, but there is a posi-
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tive result. The challenge becomes in determining the meaning of a posi-
tive result that may be due to a single molecule. Highly sensitive assays 
may detect a signal but the reliability or confidence in the result may be 
suspect. 
An important issue that Budowle believes receives too little attention 
is the process for handling conflicting results or considering alternative 
hypotheses. Conflicting results will occur. Good scientists should always 
question results. But in the face of conflicting results, the action to fol-
low could be to verify with orthogonal testing, if available. Alternatively, 
reports should contain language about results that may be questionable 
or that alternative hypotheses may be supported. 
Budowle and colleagues developed additional criteria (Box 6-1B) for 
the analysis-stage validation to supplement basic criteria. Their intent was 
to provide test/data recipients, funders, or stakeholders with a more com-
prehensive list of criteria. Being more informed, one could ask if appropri-
ate validation criteria were addressed with the development of a method. 
It is the responsibility of the developers and users to demonstrate why 
they chose the criteria they did to evaluate and validate the method and, 
just as importantly, explain why they rejected what they thought unim-
BOX 6-1 
Validation for the Analysis Stage
A.  Basic Criteria B. Broader Criteria
•	 Standard operating protocol •	 Resolution
•	 Control—positive, negative,  •	 Robustness
 and inhibition •	 Specified examples
•	 Specificity •	 Purity
•	 Dynamic range •	 Input values
•	 Reproducibility •	 Quantitation
•	 Reliability •	 Dynamic range
•	 Precision •	 Basic error rate




•	 Limit of detection
•	 Window of performance for operational steps of assay
•	 Critical equipment and calibration
•	 Interpretation criteria for results
•	 Resolve conflicting results 
SOURCE: Budowle presentation, 2013.
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portant. Thus, more accountability and documentation will be associated 
with “validated” methods. Not all criteria listed would apply in every 
situation. While testing, for example, specificity across a range of species 
may be necessary to validate a hand-held assay; once implemented the 
assay would not require a comprehensive database to effect interpreta-
tion. It may, however, apply to determining whether or not the Ames 
strain is common or rare in a particular circumstance. 
With a new technology or method, the results often are compared 
with the results of an existing technology—for example, comparing MLVA 
and canonical SNPs to determine if they correlate and where they do not. 
One would expect that at some point, one technology may resolve better 
than the other and that observation should not be considered discordant 
data in itself. If assessing an entirely new technology for assaying a target 
and generating results with no comparable existing data, one must define 
the criteria by which to test it, develop the test, and validate the perfor-
mance. Two approaches to evaluating new technology are portrayed in 
Figure 6-1. 
FIGURE 6-1 Process of implementing a test for diagnostic use. 
SOURCE: Mattocks et al. (2010).
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SOPs must be created, and once an entire system is created, another 
validation must be performed. The SOPs should contain sufficient detail, 
including, where appropriate,
1. All steps in the procedure,
2. Proper controls,
3. All reagents and preparations,
4. Calibration,
5. Criteria for analysis of results, and
6. Interpretation of results. 
Analysis and interpretation are two different things. Analysis could 
be “I have a positive result.” Interpretation would be, “It is ten times more 
likely to observe this result if X compared with if Y.” Budowle empha-
sized that there are feedback validation mechanisms in both approaches.
Validation is an ongoing process; it does not stop once the method is 
up and running. To illustrate its importance, he described an incident in 
which a lot of commercially available human DNA identification kits were 
sold to customers, and subsequently the manufacturer discovered that the 
deoxynucleotide triphosphates (dNTPs) could degrade while kits sat on 
the shelf. The company sent letters to crime laboratories apprising them 
of this possibility, but some laboratories continued using the kits. The 
signal of results was dropping (i.e., a loss of sensitivity of detection) and 
in actuality could have presented negative results. This outcome is a very 
serious problem when working with small amounts of DNA. The positive 
control supplied with the kit also was diminishing in signal intensity. Yet 
some users ignored it or were not cognizant of the signal loss. Instead, 
as long as they had a qualitative call that was consistent with the profile 
of the positive control, the users were satisfied that quality control was 
acceptable. Both qualitative and quantitative signals should have been 
monitored. Had the users done so, it would have been evident early on 
that the system was not performing appropriately and the assay could 
have been halted rather than consuming valuable evidence.
Error is an important consideration because error is ubiquitous. Dif-
ferent types of error are shown in Figure 6-2. There is, for example, sys-
tematic error, which includes measurement error. There also is bias, both 
in methods and in the individuals interpreting the data. It is human 
nature to want to accommodate data to scenarios that make sense to us, 
regardless of alternative hypotheses or explanations. This human nature 
affects how we perceive false positives and false negatives. There is no 
absolute point where the line can be drawn between the two false catego-
ries for acceptable performance. As the line shifts in one direction or the 
other, more false positives will be obtained at the expense of false nega-
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tives, or vice versa (see Mattocks et al., 2010). The reality is that a deci-
sion is made based on an evaluation of the necessary risks related to the 
application at hand with available resources, and these must be defined. 
The sample analysis flowchart in Figure 6-3 provides an idea of the 
variety of microbial analyses one might consider. Investigators might 
perform classic taxonomic analysis, for example, and analyze for weap-
onization engineering. They also might examine spore density. If a sample 
FIGURE 6-2 Performance characteristics, error types, and measurement metrics. 
































FIGURE 6-3 Sample analysis flowchart. 
SOURCE: FBI Quantico laboratory.
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is collected from a host, this analysis might not be very helpful, but if it 
is collected from a package found in a train station, it might be useful. 
The range of possible analyses in the flowchart conveys the chal-
lenge encountered with microbial forensic evidence. The field comprises a 
number of subdisciplines, each requiring substantial expertise. Moreover, 
it illustrates why next-generation sequencing (NGS, also known as mas-
sively parallel sequencing), is so appealing. Many other techniques have 
been designed to identify a specific target or targets; but they require 
knowledge about the target to be able to design the assay. But with 
NGS, the technology can target all bacterial and viral select agents using 
the same basic approach. NGS also provides high throughput, which 
can translate into a high sensitivity of detection and resolution. Higher 
throughput can result in greater depth of coverage, potentially allowing 
for detection of low-abundance or trace-level targets. Therefore, NGS 
will likely become one of the primary tools for microbial forensics. To 
use the technology, or for that matter any of the microbe identification 
methodologies, a panel of isolates is required to validate the assays. Much 
thought should go into the appropriate panel to test/validate the tool. The 
panel should be broader than two samples, but narrower than all possible 
samples, because the latter would be impractical. The challenges will be 
to define the panel breadth, how to obtain the materials, and who will 
make them available.
Many procedures for collection exist but have not been compiled, 
some have never been disseminated, and some have not been validated. 
These protocols, however, should be leveraged. Budowle believes that 
the literature, particularly older literature, should not be ignored. Access 
to older literature is needed because some perpetrators may not have the 
same resources that advanced laboratories have for routine microbiologi-
cal research. It may be delusional thinking to assume that someone will go 
into a BSL-3 facility to produce a weapon when that someone may actu-
ally be in a garage using a washing machine as a centrifuge. If we are not 
familiar with the old procedures, we may miss telltale signs that a weapon 
is being developed, miss invaluable leads, and may not collect informa-
tive evidence. Digital archives could be created to preserve older litera-
ture. Workshop participant Jens Kuhn of the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) agreed that access to older literature is very important. Moreover, 
he believes that researchers who rely solely on PubMed for research and 
database creation may be unaware that there is a bias in this resource. The 
journals of many countries and even the literature on specific diseases are 
underrepresented in PubMed. PubMed is, for example, of little value if 
you seek case representations on hantaviruses, whereas some countries 
produce much literature on the subject. Another problem is that younger 
scientists may mistakenly believe that older literature has little value. It 
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is important that libraries receive funding, and that libraries retain their 
old relevant journals, which even the NIH library finds difficult to do. 
Budowle believes that interpretation is perhaps the most critical step 
requiring validation because there is a tendency to become unthinkingly 
trusting once a protocol is running. For example, in a real-time PCR 
assay, if a signal is obtained at 48 cycles, it may not have much value, or 
it may have some lead value. With enough amplification cycles, it is likely 
everything will become positive. There is a need to have an interpretation 
of “inconclusive.” He pointed to a situation in 2005 in which a partial 
signal was indicative of the presence of Francisella tularenis in the area 
of the National Mall in Washington, DC. Four positive amplicons were 
considered sufficient for identification of F. tularensis; however, only two 
were positive, and there was no clear interpretation for a partial profile 
and what actions to take. 
Budowle believes the concept of “missing data” is also an important 
factor to be considered when interpreting results and should be part of 
the validation equation. As an example, he recounted an anecdote about 
the process the Allies in World War II followed to protect bombers from 
being shot down during bombing runs in Germany. This anecdote may 
or may not be true, but either way, it is instructive. Returning planes were 
examined, the location of bullet holes mapped, and vulnerable areas were 
reinforced with shielding based on the location of the bullet holes. Much 
later, it was pointed out that the planes that returned were not neces-
sarily informative. The planes that did not return should have been the 
focus. The investigators were missing key data. Budowle sees this as an 
ongoing challenge in microbial forensics because a lot of data is missing. 
Interpretations must be made using limited data, and biology is mutable. 
The sample an investigator tests today may be linked to something ten 
passages back, or may have traveled through a host and mutated. We 
must accept that we lack data, yet build around this to make the process 
work as well possible. While we can never have absolutes, we must still 
produce conclusions, but they should be tempered appropriately. 
Considerations to help guide this interpretation process are listed in 
Box 6-2. Putting a confidence limit on a conclusion can be very difficult. 
In some cases, a qualitative statement may be all that is possible and may 
be appropriate, as it was in the Amerithrax case in which there was no 
accompanying statement of a percent confidence that the microbe was 
the Ames strain. Limitations are a reality. An answer with limitations is 
not a wrong answer; it simply reflects what we know and can do. Even 
with a qualitative statement, some verbal constraints are necessary on the 
strength of the evidence or extant data support. In addition, saying, “I am 
92 percent confident of X” may not convey the right information for the 
circumstances. Instead of quantitative or qualitative statements, we may 
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need qualitative statements with extra information to guide the end user 
or other scientists who may review the analysis.
Databases also have limitations. Our databases comprise samples 
of organisms that infected something. The organisms that did not infect 
anything may be just as prevalent but have lacked the opportunity or 
ability to infect. This reality should be considered during the investigation 
process. We do not know what is endemic, and this can be an issue in the 
overall interpretation process. If we identify a “match” or a “similarity” 
or the most common ancestor, the significance of these associations must 
be supported by something defensible.
Thresholds are another challenge. Thresholds are critical not just 
for the analytical phase but also for the bioinformatics phase of NGS. 
Budowle stressed that there always can be alternative explanations and 
that good scientists should confront them, position them appropriately, 
and through good hypothesis testing determine whether they have low 
probability or high probability of support. Especially in forensics it is cru-
cial to follow the scientific method, which is to attempt to disprove one’s 
hypothesis rather than to prove it. 
Some of the major questions that might be asked during a source 
exclusion, association, and attribution analysis appear in Box 6-3. Perhaps 
instead of asking whether samples are the same or different, we should be 
asking “how different are they?” What conclusions can be made, and how 
do they associate in an evolutionary context? In contrast, one might argue 
that the question to ask about the evidence in the Amerithax case—the 
BOX 6-2 
Interpretation of Results
•	 Statements—qualitative, quantitative, semiquantitative 
•	 Database—type, relevance, representative, quality 
•	 Background data—normal values, reference range, endemicity
•	 	Does a result require follow-up or further analysis—temporal/spatial analysis, 
effect of passage
•	 	Limits of interpretation




SOURCE: Budowle presentation, 2013.
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flask marked RMR 1029—might not have been an evolutionary question 
since the flask’s contents comprised a mixture of samples. A more appro-
priate question may have been “How probable would it be to observe 
these variants if they arose from a single source versus from mixtures?” 
A great quantity of epidemiological data exists that can be consulted to 
help us understand associations.
Forensic questions include “What is it, and was the release intentional 
or natural?” How the threat agent was made can be a critical piece of 
evidence for an investigation, which in turn can feed back to help answer 
other questions and also may provide a lead to the perpetrator’s identity.
Forensic questions based on genetics-based analyses appear in 
Box 6-4. Investigators want to know, “Is the information provided with 
genetic markers probative? Is it meaningful?” For example, in a foodborne 
pathogen investigation, one might ask if there is an expectation that E. coli 
will be in a room besides what we carry in our bodies? The probability of 
E. coli being in a room occupied by humans (and animals) is high. What 
the appropriate level is may be unknown but it could affect the confidence 
of our conclusions. 
Richard Vipond of Public Health England, Porton Down, offered an 
observation based on his experience of trying to take PGM (Ion Torrent 
Personal Genome Machine™) through validation for metagenomics work. 
His lab wanted to “freeze” the technology in time to assess performance 
and result quality. Because the manufacturers are in competition with 
each other and the technologies are evolving rapidly, every couple of 
months there is a release of a new version—for example, a chemistry 
BOX 6-3 
Challenges for Any Target:  
Source Exclusion, Association, and Attribution
•	 	Are these isolates the same or different? What are the discrimination criteria? 
•	 	How dependent is the conclusion on samples taken, method used, and inter-
pretive approach? 
•	 	What would an exclusion, association, or “match” really mean? How precise 
can or should one be?
•	 	Do the methods and interpretation account for variation, evolutionary change 
(genome dynamics), and influences imparted by environment and ecology?
•	 	How should significance to a comparison be assigned? What are the confi-
dence limits? Can a probability or likelihood be assigned?
SOURCE: Budowle presentation, 2013.
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or server upgrade—and this can dramatically change performance. The 
Porton Down laboratory has seen error rate, critical to any decision it 
makes, decrease with quality enhancements, and then increase with the 
introduction of a novel step. It is quite difficult to freeze assessment. The 
lab cannot even go back and rerun tests using the same reagents and soft-
ware because these materials will not be available 6 months later. How-
ever, the rapidly evolving technology environment must be embraced or 
there will be a risk of reducing capabilities. 
Deep sequencing generates substantial data, and sequencing capa-
bilities are enabling scientists to develop elaborate databases tailored 
specifically to the demands of a case. This capacity demands novel ways 
to handle and analyze data that are now routinely obtained in terabyte 
amounts. Given the immense quantity of data, bioinformatics is an abso-
lute necessity. It is unlikely (at least in the United Kingdom), however, 
that bioinformaticians will be on staff in application-oriented laboratories, 
so investigators will need to validate the bioinformatics pipelines and 
there will be a demand that the pipelines be sufficiently robust. 
Factors to consider that affect data interpretation and quality include
BOX 6-4 
Microbial Forensics Questions: Genetics
•	 	What might be deduced concerning the nature and source of the evidentiary 
sample?
•	 	Is the pathogen detected of endemic origin or introduced?
•	 	Do the genetic markers provide a significant amount of probative information?
•	 	Does the choice of markers allow effective comparison of samples from known 
and questioned sources?
•	 	If such a comparison can be made, how definitively and confidently can a 
conclusion be reached?
•	 	Are the genetic differences too few to conclude that the samples are not from 
different sources (or lineages)?
•	 	Are these differences sufficiently robust to consider that the samples are from 
different sources?
•	 	Is it possible that the two samples have a recent common ancestor or how long 
ago was there a common ancestor?
•	 	Can any samples be excluded as contaminants or be recent sources of the 
isolate?
•	 	Are there alternative explanations for the results that were obtained?
SOURCE: Reprinted from Hunt et al. (2009) with permission from Elsevier.
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•	 Quality metrics of sequence data;
•	 Sequence errors and uncertainties; 
•	 Reliable standards for genomic data representation; 
•	 Uncertainty with databases used;
•	 Inferences based on available data, including metadata;
•	 Formulation of well-defined hypothesis/hypotheses: testing 
methods for assessing the weight of microbial forensics evidence; 
•	 Criteria for comparisons: match, similar, different, inconclusive; 
•	 Rigor of reasoning by the expert; and
•	 Software.
Quality metrics are another important issue. What criteria should be 
used? Budowle pointed out that while some analysts use Q20 (a quality 
metric score associated with a base call) for base calling, others use Q30 
(a higher quality score by an order of magnitude than Q20). He sug-
gested that neither by itself may be sufficient, and validation is necessary 
to guide the user on how best to use quality metrics. For example, if the 
user were to encounter 500 reads with a Q9 score for one base in a homo-
polymeric stretch in all these reads, despite the low Q score, there may be 
high confidence associated in this single base with complete representa-
tion because the low score might be the result of a chemistry artifact. The 
PGM system is more refractory than the MiSeq with sequencing of homo-
polymers but with so many reads (or fragments) that the data may still 
be reliable because of the quantitative representation. Such considerations 
will be necessary to validate so that data can be used as effectively as pos-
sible. It is very difficult for one lab to replicate all essential details of any 
bioinformatics pipeline used by another lab because there are so many 
factors that affect outcomes. Attention to documentation will be requisite.
The extraction method one uses can cause variation of the result, as 
can the amplification method, including enrichment, PCR, and primer 
selection. The primers may seem to be an obvious consideration, but the 
enrichment process or capture method may not. 
There are also differences in sequencing techniques. One technique 
will show a gap in a sequence whereas another will show a base. We must 
consider how to resolve such differences. Budowle’s lab runs analyses 
on both MiSeq and PGM so he can exploit orthogonal chemistries to 
help determine what is reliable and valid. Neither system is immune to 
problems that need to be addressed. This testing enables one to improve 
both systems. Standards and controls must be created to better assess 
such concerns.
Box 6-5 lists the components of a “bioinformatics genetic toolbox” 
for microbial forensics. Budowle noted that there are processes in which 
alignment is used, and processes in which it is not; the processes are 
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different and must be validated. Assembly may be sought for simple 
samples, but currently would be extremely challenging for metagenomic 
samples. Phylogenetic algorithms differ and also must be validated. Vali-
dation also will be an issue in data management. An enormous amount 
of data is being generated, and there is a recommendation or trend in the 
greater science community toward deleting raw data and simply saving 
the data at the fast level. This approach may be practical and economi-
cally appealing, but concordance testing may require that the biological 
material initially used for sequencing be archived. Otherwise, there may 
not be proper comparisons made as modifications or novel approaches 
are developed. Note that the large amounts of data common today require 
new bioinformatics algorithms because old tools (e.g., BLAST) will not 
scale to handle large data needs. 
There are inference and error validation concerns, as well (Box 6-6). 
The base error rate of the particular sequencing protocol used must be 
defined. Moreover, there are different kinds of error. Sequencing errors, 
which vary from site to site, may occur as a result of chemistry and soft-
BOX 6-5 
A Bioinformatics Toolbox for Microbial Forensics
•	 	Assemblers;
•	 	Aligners;
•	 	Phylogenetic algorithm(s) for clonal and sexually inherited markers, recombina-
tion, gene conversion, and horizontal gene transfer;
•	 	Capability to identify informative markers and their power to address specific 
forensic issues;
•	 	Better understanding of mutation rates and the effects of environment and host 
on these rates;
•	 	Discrimination and match criteria to quantitatively interpret results with confi-
dence bounds;
•	 	Endemicity;
•	 	Capability to relate diversity to function;
•	 	Capability for comparative and functional genomics; 
•	 	Ability to contain or access curated (genetic marker) databases on pathogens 
and near neighbors and their background occurrence with epidemiological his-
tory, when available; and
•	 	Data management with the capability to access and process large amounts of 
diverse genetic data and to communicate data rapidly with stringent informa-
tional security (i.e., fully functioning information interoperability).
SOURCE: Budowle et al. (2005).
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ware. Alignments can cause a great deal of noise, and there is other noise 
that cannot be identified solely by simulation, for example, with a metage-
nomic sample analysis in which chimeras have been created. 
When scientists perform 16S rRNA diversity studies, everything that 
differs from what has been previously seen is considered “new”—another 
organism—yet Budowle notes that this might simply be junk. The diver-
sity of what has been identified may be overstated or understated because 
of stochastic effects in the process. 
Validation of materials is essential to a successful microbial foren-
sics program, both for cross-comparing data and for running routine 
tests. Controls—reference samples, panels, and reagents—are required 
and must be accessible. The magnitude of the problem of developing 
material standards is illustrated by the wide variety of targets, which 
include but are not limited to genes, proteins, morphology, physiology, 
and biochemistry. Reference materials are needed for all developers and 
analysts. Moreover, standards will change. The Ames strain has become 
a sort of standard for B. anthracis only because it was used as a weapon. 
But how we define or select a standard for each species should be made 
more judiciously. A single strain may never suffice as a standard, but a 
standard must be established at some level because using 50 standards in 
a run with one sample may not be practical and currently would be costly. 
Establishing standards becomes a process in itself.
The number of technologies is wide and expanding. Among them are 
NGS, other DNA/RNA assays, traditional morphological and biochemical 
identification approaches, SEM/TEM, micro-Raman spectrometry, atomic 
force microscopy, isotopes, secondary ion mass spectroscopy, particle-
induced X-ray emission, and field immunoassays. A single method cannot 
BOX 6-6 
Inference and Error Issues
•	 	Forensic analysis of whole-genome sequence data often will compare two or 
more sequences, for example, an evidence sample profile with that of a refer-
ence sample that may be considered a direct link or have a common ancestor. 
•	 	Sequencing error and other factors will most likely inflate the dissimilarity be-
tween samples, creating a degree of “uncertainty” to some extent. 
•	 	Defining and quantifying the error rates associated with each platform/chemis-
try is critically important and includes extraction, amplification, library prepara-
tion, software.
SOURCE: Budowle presentation, 2013.
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address all targets and all evidentiary materials that will be encountered. 
Nor can one validation method or standard address all technologies; each 
technology must be validated individually.
There are two types of standards: performance standards and mate-
rial standards.1 Most often, users focus on material standards, but per-
formance is equally important. Traceability, a documentation of mea-
surements to some standard, is needed. In the United States, standards 
developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
are typically used, but the available standards do not meet all needs. We 
need to decide who will make the standards to bridge the gaps in what 
is available. Some of the gaps in standard reference materials appear in 
Box 6-7. A major concern is how to identify a good standard versus “just a 
standard.” For example, surrogates may or may not suffice; they are often, 
but not always, suitable (Anderson et al., 2005). Near neighbors will be 
required to describe the sensitivity and specificity of an assay. Budowle 
also posed the question of who will prepare these standard reference 
materials and who will maintain them? Is it government’s, industry’s, or 
an individual laboratory’s responsibility? Likely the responsibility will 
vary based on the need. 
Whole-genome sequencing of a metagenomics sample will generate 
sequences that span the genomes of the microorganisms that reside within 
the sample. In metagenomic samples, species and/or strains can be repre-
sented in widely varying abundance. The limited depth of coverage and 
amplification-bias stochastic effects on portions of individual genomes 
might affect representation of critical sequences that define species, caus-
ing them to be missed. Part of a genome will likely be represented, but 
phylogenetically and genetically the parts that are detected may not be 
able to resolve at the species level (most importantly near neighbors) or 
even at higher taxonomic levels. An analytical assay may perform per-
fectly well but may be uninformative on the presence of a target even if 
it is truly in the sample. So, we have to consider this process of resolving 
at the near-neighbor level and understanding which sequence reads are 
informative for taxonomic resolution or classification. One should rightly 
pose the question, whether only one, two, three, or more reads are suf-
ficient to render an interpretation of identification. 
Primer development and the quality of primer synthesis require vali-
dation as well. Primer design programs do not validate primers, and the 
need for such validation is underappreciated. Similarly, bar coding or 
1  A performance standard specifies what is to be accomplished but does not dictate the 
particular method or material to be used as long as the desired end is achieved. A materials 
standard specifically directs that a certain material or method be used to accomplish the 
desired end.
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indexing for NGS may require reliability testing. Some reads may have 
uninformative bar codes,2 likely because the index is low quality, because 
there may be synthesis errors in the generation of the barcodes. Perhaps 
adequate differentiation between/among indices should be implemented 
so that an error does not place sequencing content in the wrong sample. 
Computationally it should be feasible to define barcodes, but depend-
ing on how they are used may limit the numbers of samples that can be 
indexed. 
New reference materials must be generated, but old ones must be 
maintained, or there may be no good way to compare back with existing 
or former methods going forward. It will be necessary to select the best 
methods for generating databases. Concerns that should be addressed 
2  Barcodes or indexes are short unique sequence tags added to every fragment of a sample 
during library preparation to “tag” the fragments unique to a sample. Thereby, different 
samples can be pooled (or multiplexed) and data separated (i.e., demultiplexed) bioinfor-
matically after sequencing, based on the unique tagged sequences.
BOX 6-7 
Gaps in Standard Reference Materials (SRMs)
•	 	Traceability of controls. At this point, most reference materials lack SOPs for 
routine typing.
 Preanalytical, assay, and interpretation: reaction mode
•	 	Sensitivity, specificity, contamination, technical issues: framework for 
investigators.
•	 	How to identify a good standard?
•	 	Supporting materials, for example,
 o nucleic acid 
	 	 §	 	extraction method,
	 	 §	 	quantification method, and
	 	 §	 	integrity, purity.
•	 	NIST-traceable model.
•	 	Criteria to qualify a reference sample: What is the reference?
•	 	Standards for preparation of SRM:
 o process
 o appropriate analyte of interest
•	 	Validation—also acquire samples other than reference: range (and the logic 
behind that)
•	 	Can surrogates suffice?
•	 	Are near neighbors required? Or should this be an individual researcher 
responsibility?
SOURCE: Budowle presentation, 2013.
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appear in Box 6-8. For years, there has been discussion about the concept 
of (1) a centralized database or (2) a decentralized virtual centralized 
database. There are challenges to creating these databases. One is how 
to convince and incentivize people to share. Potential solutions might be 
to make funding dependent on sharing, or to provide database access in 
return for sharing. There will be patent and intellectual property issues. 
There should be, at a minimum, some centralized knowledge database of 
what is held by governments and the private sector. 
Any centralized entity or group of entities that produces reference 
materials should have access to a sufficiently comprehensive collection, 
understand the rationale for isolates, and have sufficient long-term sup-
port. Such an entity would need to maintain the highest possible QA/QC, 
using accepted, standardized methods. It should be responsive to research 
and development (R&D) and support and incorporate R&D that updates 
extant knowledge of diversity. Finally, it should be governed as a com-
munity resource, while balancing this access against security concerns.
Budowle does not foresee development of an “ideal” reference 
resource because the characteristics of such a resource will continually 
change. Instead he foresees the creation of multiple reference resources, 
some of which may be set up in real time during events. Another limita-
tion to achieving an ideal reference resource is the inability to capture 
the full diversity of the microbial world and all the permutations neces-
BOX 6-8 
Databases and Resources
•	 	The Select Agent Registry system has created a database, but it has 
limitations—no uniformity, and decentralized holdings hamper the speed, ac-
curacy, efficiency, and reliability.
•	 	Databases could refer to physical materials and/or related data; microbes, 
toxins, nucleic acids; and metadata; genomic, proteomic, transcriptomic, and 
metabolomic data.
•	 	A centralized, comprehensive physical archive of reference materials would 
facilitate
 o Implementation of a standardized characterization system, 
 o Uniform QA/QC,
 o Development of standard typing techniques,
 o Standardization of new techniques and analytical methods,
 o Reference samples for high-resolution genomic comparisons, and
 o Duplication.
SOURCE: Budowle presentation, 2013.
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sary for the multitude of analytical methods. For archival purposes, it is 
reasonable to maintain representatives of pathogens that may be used in 
biocrimes or bioterrorism. Centralized collections are likely to be inad-
equate for most investigations, but suitable for basic research. Culturing 
strains from an archive will be done on a limited basis owing to the cost 
of maintaining a comprehensive set that is continually cultured and tested 
over time to ensure viability. 
Microbial forensics investigators need increased access to reference 
resources, yet there is a real conflict: One position may demand that access 
be restricted for security reasons while another position is that tests and 
countermeasures cannot be developed without access to the materials. 
To make any progress, we must consider and understand both positions. 
Budowle’s suggestions for immediately moving forward are to
•	 Identify the experts now. There should be a global consortium 
of experts who have agreed to be available for, at a minimum, 
consultation should an event occur. 
•	 Review the current (and past) state-of-the-art technologies.
•	 Establish scientific working groups and guidelines.
•	 Establish standards and standardization.
•	 Better define—and encourage—validation and peer review of the 
science.
•	 Share information and capabilities within the law enforcement 
and intelligence communities.
•	 Foster partnerships.
•	 Develop ways for greater access to genomes or microorganisms 
to facilitate validation.
Budowle emphasized that we must begin an interactive and com-
mitted process to address issues now. Scrambling to prepare as an event 
occurs is not a desirable scenario. 
Cindi Corbett of Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory agreed 
that the idea of microbial working groups is a good one. Large problems 
exist, but they can be attacked one step at a time by the typing experts, 
database experts, and so forth. She would like to see Round Robins 
because investigators do things differently. Given the same set of data, 
would we all come up with an acceptable answer? Initially such an exer-
cise could use just data, instead of an actual sample. Many opportunities 
exist for collaboration, interacting with the community, and for employing 
experts in various areas. 
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REFERENCE COLLECTIONS AND DATABASES
As noted in numerous places in this report, there is widespread agree-
ment that more reference collections and databases that are properly 
curated and maintained are needed. Reference collections house actual 
organisms while databases comprise only genomic or other information 
about microorganisms. 
The American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) is one of the premier 
sources for microbial reference strains. It contains the world’s largest 
collection of bacteria, viruses, yeast, fungi, protozoa, nucleic acids, and 
molecular tools. The ATCC Bacteriology Collection contains more than 
18,000 strains in over 750 genera as well as more than 3,600 type cultures 
of validly described species and nearly 500 bacteriophages. For viruses, 
ATCC houses a wide assortment of cultures for use in research related to 
pathogenesis, epidemiology, molecular assay development, and vaccine 
discovery and production. ATCC offers an extensive array of infectious 
disease organisms intended to promote research leading to novel methods 
of detecting, minimizing, and treating infectious diseases. It is an entity 
that could be studied as a model for a reference collection devoted to 
microbial forensics. 
Dr. Juncai Ma, a member of the organizing committee for the Zagreb 
workshop, is the Director of WFCC-MIRCEN World Data Center for 
Microorganisms (WDCM) of the Institute of Microbiology at the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences and an executive of the World Federation of Culture 
Collections. He discussed the WDCM,3 which is a user-friendly inter-
national database resource for the compilation of data on the location 
and function of culture collections of microorganisms, cultured cell lines, 
and genetic elements. The WDCM also provides access to the data, serv-
ing as an online gateway to international databases on microbial diver-
sity, culture collection catalogs, services, and molecular data relating to 
microorganisms. 
The WDCM was developed under the auspices of the World Federa-
tion of Culture Collections and UNESCO’s Microbial Resources Centres 
(WFCC-MIRCEN). The WFCC is a Multidisciplinary Commission of the 
International Union of Biological Sciences (IUBS) and a federation within 
the International Union of Microbiological Societies (IUMS). The WDCM 
is now located at the Institute of Microbiology, Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences (IMCAS) in Beijing. Brief descriptions of the WDCM databases and 
resources appear in Box 6-9.
The Information Center of IMCAS is collaborating with the interna-
3  More information is available at http://www.wdcm.org/; accessed November 23, 2013.
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tional Barcode of Life (iBOL) project,4 and with the China Central DNA 
Barcode of Life program. WDCM collaborates with multiple collections 
throughout the world to advance the field and to organize educational 
workshops and symposia. WDCM also cooperates with the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) to develop the WDCM Reference 
Strain Database for all microbial resources in conformance with ISO stan-
dards, and all of this information is available to the public.
Ma believes that the WDCM can make contributions to microbial 
forensics and perhaps serve as another model for information on culture 
4  More information is available at http://ibol.org/; accessed November 23, 2013.
BOX 6-9 
Databases and Resources:  
The World Data Centre for Microorganisms (WDCM)
1. World Directory of Culture Collections (CCINFO). 
  Directory of all registered culture collections: 652 collections from 70 countries/
regions.
  Microorganisms: 2,304,840  Viruses: 36,807
  Bacteria: 966,143   Cell lines: 31,178
  Fungi: 689,946 
  Can be browsed by country, region, or acronym. Can be searched by collec-
tion, strains, or keyword. Drill-down information and statistics on culture collec-
tions—including key collection personnel, subject coverage (e.g., agriculture, 
biotechnology), preservation methods, culture availability criteria, services, and 
entry and update information. 
2. CCINFO Strains.
  List of holdings of registered culture collections.
3. Reference Strain Catalogue. 
  Provides access to the reference strains listed by the ISO TC 34 SC 9 Joint 
Working Group 5 and by the Working Party on Culture Media of the Interna-
tional Committee on Food Microbiology and Hygiene (ICFMH-WPCM) from its 
Handbook of Culture Media for Food and Water Microbiology.1
4. Analyzer of Bio-resource Citations (ABC). 
  A platform to support researchers in checking literature citations. Data-mines 
3,005 journals; years 1953-2012. Can search by paper, patent, and strain num-
ber. Offers drill-down statistics on most-referenced strains. Users can upload 
their own papers.
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5. Global Catalogue of Microorganisms (GCM). 
  A free information-service platform to help culture collections to manage, dis-
seminate, and share information related to their holdings. Fifty-two different 
collections from 25 countries. By year end 2014, there will be 100 collec-
tions. Small collections will be offered support in creating their own linking 
homepages. Includes detailed strain information (e.g., patents, sequences, 
bioinformatics analysis), related citations, isolation sources, geographic origin, 
phylogenetic analysis, species identification, and access to online exchange 
of data. Drill-down information available for countries. Searches can be refined 
by collection, temperature, organism type, and isolation origin, and can be 
displayed in multiple formats. Android version available; iPad version soon to 
be released
6. Statistics on Organism Patents. 
  Via collaboration with World Intellectual Property Organization, information and 
statistics on patents associated with culture collections.
7. Resources:
  Nomenclature—National Center for Biolotechnology Information, Species 
2000, List of Prokaryotic Names with Standing in Nomenclature.
  Metagenome—Joint Genome Institute (JGI, U.S. Department of Energy). 
Metagenome portal, European Bioinformatics Institute Metagenomics, metage-
nome submission guide.
8. The World Directory of Culture Collections. 
  Book. Sixth version will be released in 2014; 191 collections updated their 
information in 2013. 
1
 WDCM Reference Strain Catalogue, available at http://refs.wdcm.org/home.htm.
SOURCE: Ma presentation, 2013.
collections and databases. Issues that should be addressed by all culture 
collections before sharing would include
•	 Data standards: What do we need? What can we share? Mini-
mum datasets (MDS) and recommended datasets (RDS). Range 
of microorganisms and software development. 
•	 Data policy, software availability for data sharing, data club 
(should it be member only?). The data in WDCM’s Global Cata-
logue are currently open to all.
Ma proposed development of a Global Catalogue for Microbial Foren-
sics, as outlined in Box 6-10. He noted that a Global Microbial Forensics 
Catalogue and its knowledge base would make the discipline more vis-
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BOX 6-10 
Proposed Global Catalogue for Microbial Forensics
Proposed Content: Proposed Functions:
•	 Definitions of microorganisms  •	 Provide quick and accurate
 groups  identification
•	 Identify strain providers  •	 Analyze isolation and storage of
 (collection)  strains
•	 Documents and material  •	 Provide experts list for dealing with
 transfer agreements for   specific microorganisms
 provision of strains •	 Consolidate and offer as much
•	 Prices and contact information  information as possible for strains
•	 Data could include strain data,  •	 Make bioinformatics tools available
 characterization, genetic  •	 Link experts through online
 fingerprint, whole genomics,   communication tools
 protein structure (could be 





SOURCE: Ma presentation, 2013.
ible, and pointed out that it is much easier to begin cooperative efforts 
among stakeholders when working in the information field. Working 
groups could be organized to address information issues.
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Bioinformatics and Data
THE ROLE OF BIOINFORMATICS IN MICROBIAL FORENSICS
 In a 2009 report, the American Academy of Microbiology stated 
that the application of computer analysis to molecular biology, otherwise 
known as “bioinformatics,” is “a fundamental corollary to biodefense 
research” (AAM, 2009b). The report also pointed out a theme very much 
consistent with the presentations at the Zagreb workshop—that advance-
ments in biodefense and bioinformatics research, although meant to lead 
to national security improvements, will also reverberate across almost all 
biological disciplines. Specific fields that will benefit include





•	 Systems biology, and
•	 Personalized medicine.
As most of the workshop speakers noted, WGS has made possible 
giant steps forward for epidemiology and microbial forensics. The abil-
ity to examine and compare the genetic sequences of bacteria, archaea, 
viruses, and microbial eukaryotes has revolutionized microbiology and 
provided researchers with insights “into the processes microbes carry out, 
their pathogenic traits, and new ways to use microorganisms in medi-
143
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cine and manufacturing” (AAM, 2009b). Gene sequencing, WGS, and the 
techniques these make possible are moving microbiology forward more 
rapidly than ever before. They also have given rise to new tools—genom-
ics, proteomics, metabolomics, transcriptomics, molecular phylogeny, and 
others—that now are available to scientists studying the relationships 
among microbes, their pathogenicity mechanisms, and their metabolic 
potential (AAM, 2009b). The AAM report went on, however, to note that 
a “major effort in functional annotation to understand the DNA sequence 
we already have” is needed (2009b:16). “Annotation is a critical part of 
making genome sequences into resources, but it represents a huge bottle-
neck.” It also called for the implementation of a set of standard annotation 
platforms and a central annotation resource “with defined methods and 
standards, and guidelines for people to use the resource” (2009b:16).
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SEQUENCING 
AND BIOINFORMATICS
Dr. Jongsik Chun of Seoul National University in South Korea believes 
that WGS provides the ultimate information for both epidemiology and 
microbial forensics. As an illustration of the power of WGS, he pointed 
to its use in tracking the transmission of carbapenem-resistant K. pneu-
moniae among individuals during the NIH Clinical Center’s 2011 outbreak 
(Snitkin et al., 2012). WGS is superior to all other identification methods 
if cost, time, and bioinformatics are not issues. However, using genomic 
information is the area of microbial forensics in which the application of 
bioinformatics is most needed. Chun sought to provide an understanding 
of the scope of microbial knowledge that is lacking and the uses to which 
the data that are available could be applied with better tools. He reviewed 
the challenges faced in assembling and curating databases, as well as in 
developing bioinformatics to efficiently and effectively exploit the data. 
Chun, who is a trained taxonomist, reminded the workshop par-
ticipants that the traditional concept of species is “groups of actually 
or potentially interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively 
isolated from other such groups” (Mayr, 1942). But in the bacterial world, 
this definition falls short because there is no “sex” or “breeding,” per se. 
Instead, bacteria may exchange genetic information through lateral trans-
mission both within species and among different species, allowing for 
high genetic diversity. For bacteria the fundamental concept of a species 
is actually based on how similarity between strains is measured. Bacte-
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rial classification and identification should be based on the comparison 
between type strain1 and isolate.
Chun believes that the indirect DNA-DNA hybridization method—the 
previous “gold standard” for determining the genetic distance between 
two species—is not a reliable methodology. The 16S rRNA sequencing is 
revolutionizing taxonomy and now WGS is available. A new index has 
been developed called Average Nucleotide Identity (ANI). In DNA-DNA 
hybridization, the DNA would be fragmented and hybridized in solu-
tion. The same general analysis now can be done digitally. The DNA of 
one strain is fragmented, the sequences are compared using BLASTN or 
MUMmer programs, the similarity of each fragment is established, and 
the findings are averaged. The method has been demonstrated to be very 
reliable (Goris et al., 2007). 
NGS and ANI have provided for the first time an accurate, objec-
tive, and reproducible method for bacterial classification and identifica-
tion. Sequencing may be expensive but capacity is not a problem. High-
throughput NGS sequencers have a capacity equal to tens of thousands of 
conventional Sanger sequencers. However, Chun noted that big gaps exist 
between the ability to sequence and the cost of accessing the necessary 
hardware and bioinformatics. Genomics in microbial forensics presents a 
typical big data problem: high-volume, high-velocity, and high-variety, 
coupled with a need for quick answers. 
A very conservative estimate puts the number of prokaryotic species 
at 1 million, of which only approximately 11,000 species have valid names. 
The routine use of 16S rRNA sequencing is accelerating the description of 
new species, and in 2012, 721 new species were described. However, Chun 
pointed out that there is little or no taxonomy funding in many countries, 
except perhaps China. Chinese microbiologists are now responsible for 
the description of over 30 percent of new species of bacteria and archaea.
 There has been a huge jump in genome releases since the onset 
of NGS. Of the roughly 11,000 bacteria and archaea species with valid 
names, 99 percent have 16S rRNA gene sequences in public databases. 
There are genome sequences, however, for only 24 percent of these pro-
karyotic species and only 16 percent of prokaryotic species have been 
sequenced for type strain. Thus about 85 percent of known species have 
no genome sequences for their type strains. Applying genome sequencing 
to species-level identification is limited because reference genomes do not 
exist. Accurate identification based on genome data is possible with ANI, 
but more type strains should be sequenced. 
1  Usually the first strain of a new species of bacteria to be described is known as the 
“type strain.” A bacterial species is a collection of strains that share many common features 
(Black, 2002).
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Chun pointed out that sampling for genomics is biased toward clini-
cally important strains, such as E. coli, Staphyllococcus aureus, S. enterica, 
and Enterococcus faecalis. There are big gaps in genome-sequenced taxa. 
If there is bacterial contamination in soil, for example, how much back-
ground can be identified? Only about 5 percent of detectable soil bacteria 
can be identified as species with valid names, while 95 percent cannot. 
This is because most soil bacteria are not cultivable. Perhaps single-cell 
genomics can solve this problem, but the currently available technology 
is not suitable for large-scale surveys.
Creating a database is easy, but maintaining a large and rapidly grow-
ing database is very difficult. If someone adds 2,000 E. coli strains to a 
database, it can take a year to curate. Many databases have been retired or 
destroyed, likely owing to the inability to cope with the quantity of new 
data and the lack of the funding to maintain existing databases. Databases 
Chun considers to be up to date and stably funded include the following: 
•	 NIH’s National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) 
maintains several databases: GenBank, RefSeq, Microbial Genomes 
Resources.
•	 Integrated Microbial Genomes and Metagenomes (IMG) supports 
the annotation, analysis, and distribution of microbial genome 
and metagenome datasets sequenced at DOE’s JGI.
•	 The European Bioinformatics Institute’s (EBI) Ensembl Genomes. 
•	 EzGenome.2 
Chun explained that his lab created EzGenome because it wished to 
provide a prokaryotic genome database that was manually curated, taxo-
nomically correct, and useful for microbial systematics as well as ecology 
and microbial forensics. In the GenBank database, for example, genomes 
are identified to the species level in some cases. EzGenome contains about 
12,000 prokaryotic genomes. All genome projects have complete hierar-
chical taxonomic information (from phylum to species) according to the 
EzTaxon taxonomic system. Some genome projects are identified at the 
genus level owing to a lack of 16S rRNA sequence and adequate reference 
genome sequences to which to compare them. ANI-based dendrograms 
are produced for all genera and families.
Chun agreed that GenBank is a good primary database, but its entries 
may be incorrectly labeled and include contaminants, likely due to con-
tributor’s error, which is a common occurrence in databases. A survey by 
2  Information is available at http://ezgenome.ezbiocloud.net/; accessed November 23, 
2013.
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Chun’s lab of GenBank revealed many errors, and such errors can lead to 
problems—for example, when taxon-specific primers are designed.
 Chun used work his laboratory has done with pandemic strains of 
Vibrio cholerae as an example of the power, and limitations, of current 
technology and bioinformatics. Cholera researchers continually encounter 
newly emerging and reemerging pathogenic clones with diverse combi-
nations of phenotypic and genotypic properties, and this hinders con-
trol of the disease (Chun et al., 2009). The seven pandemic V. cholerae 
strains belong to O1 or O139 serotypes and have almost identical genome 
backbones, including only about 100 SNPs. However, they show highly 
variable gene content in some regions of the genome (Cho et al., 2010). 
Short-term evolution is caused by a combination of SNPs and lateral 
gene transfer, but it is possible to trace the gene transfer events. Chun’s 
laboratory performed SNP analysis on a variety of V. cholerae strains, 
mapped these findings, and created the phylogenetic tree in Figure 7-1. It 
portrays the genomic islands in closely related strains. They discovered 
that sequence variations among orthologs were more common than SNP 
variations and that SNP variations appear to be rare among highly con-
served genes. They also determined that the degree of genome variation 
appears to be species specific; for example, there is more variation within 
V. cholerae than within Streptococcus agalactiae. The tree appearing in Figure 
7-1, however, was based on only 26 genomes and took 6 months to cre-
ate. How long would it take to perform analysis on 1,000 E. coli? Better 
bioinformatics are needed. 
Examples of two targets in microbial forensics are the pure culture 
sample or a single microorganism or virus, and the metagenomic sam-
ple, which can comprise a mixture of organisms (e.g., human, bacteria, 
viruses). Metagenomic sample analysis involves detecting target-specific 
information against a large background by using single-gene-based com-
munity analysis (e.g., 16S rRNA-based microbiome) or shotgun metage-
nomic DNA sequencing. Issues, methods, and bioinformatic analyses dif-
fer for pure cultures versus metagenomic samples, but Chun emphasized 
that properly curated genome databases are necessary for both. 
Pure culture sample analysis involves the assembly of genomes, taxo-
nomic identification, identification of variation, such as SNPs, gene con-
tent, tracing of gene transfer, and matching against a database. Metage-
nomic sample analysis involves assembly of a metagenome, taxonomic 
analysis of community composition, and matching against a database. 
Chun stressed that the technical difficulty of a metagenomic sample anal-
ysis is 1,000 times greater than that of a pure culture sample. Clinicians 
continually ask him, “Can you do quantification using NGS sequencing?” 
He believes the answer is no, and a method for quantification needs to 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
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be developed. The components of a bioinformatics program for microbial 
forensics should include
•	 Curated, regularly updated databases;
•	 Data mining tools for large-scale databases;
•	 Real-time analytical capability;
•	 Adequate reporting functions; and
•	 Effective data visualization—it is crucial to import user experi-
ence into this process because people (e.g., judges, decision mak-
ers, first responders) must understand the outcome of an analysis.
Challenges that Chun sees in microbial forensic bioinformatics include
•	 Integrating data generated by different methods, such as WGS, 
multilocus sequence typing (MLST), and pulsed-field gel electro-
phoresis. The answer lies in bioinformatics and manual curation.
•	 Integrated real-time sharing of NGS data. Labs A, B, C, and D 
should be able to share in real time. We can even upload raw 
data to the cloud servers while sequencing. This is doable (e.g., 
via BaseSpace genomics cloud computing),3 but poses a policy 
problem.
•	 Storage capacity is not an issue, but processing secondary data 
for microbes is. 
For efficient sharing, standardization must be developed for
•	 Metadata (data about data) and database format/schema,
•	 Sequencing instruments,
•	 Protocols for sequencing-library preparation,
•	 Minimum sequencing depths (for each species),
•	 Assembly software and/or pipeline,
•	 Annotation software and/or pipeline, and
•	 Other bioinformatics tools.
There are challenges to achieving analysis repeatability. A bioinfor-
matics pipeline typically involves many software tools, parameters, and 
hidden “know-how.” For this reason it is difficult to reproduce most of 
the large-scale genomics papers (e.g., genome assembly, metagenome 
comparison). Two solutions he suggests are
3  A cloud platform directly integrated into the industry’s leading sequencing platforms. 
Built by Illumina on Amazon’s AWS cloud infrastructure. For more information, see https://
basespace.illumina.com/home/sequence; accessed November 24, 2013.
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•	 Virtualization. A model could be the ENCODE Virtual Machine 
and Cloud Resource for human DNA.4 Complex bioinformatics 
pipelines and parameters are packaged as an image and can be 
plugged into any computer. 
•	 Cloud computing. If a lab does not have adequate information 
technology (IT) infrastructure, software can be applied using 
cloud computing. The cloud service comes with IT.
There is a need for bioinformatics and databases for the purposes of 
detecting antibiotic resistance and genetic engineering. A retrospective 
study revealed the potential for rapid WGS to reduce the time it takes to 
diagnose a patient with multidrug-resistant tuberculosis from weeks to 
days (Köser et al., 2013). In this study, the patient’s first sputum sample 
became culture-positive after 3 days in the mycobacterial growth indica-
tor tube (MGIT) culture system. The DNA was extracted directly from the 
MGIT tube and sequenced using the Illumina MiSeq platform. Antibiotic 
susceptibility was determined in less than 2 days. For this purpose, a 
database of SNPs responsible for antibiotic resistance would be enor-
mously helpful. Similarly, the ability to genetically engineer microbes 
would be greatly empowered by assembling databases of sequence data 
to compare. This could be particularly useful for analyzing viruses. A 
great number of kits exist—for example, for PCR and microarrays—and 
if new virus sequences were to be added to the dataset, one could mine 
the database to update primers, probes, and other tools. 
Chun believes that bioinformatics for metagenomics faces serious 
hurdles. The computational challenges are (1) the databases are ever-
growing, (2) software and hardware are needed to improve searching/
matching, and (3) improved data visualization capabilities are needed. 
Cloud computing offers a way to share metadata, and to send out 
streams of data that can enable accurate identification, provide global 
epidemiology and treatment information, and inform genetic engineer-
ing. Overall, Chun believes that cloud computing technology and bio-
informatics will find a way. But he sees real barriers in policy. Two key 
questions are
•	 Who owns the data? Only 23 B. anthracis sequences are in public 
databases (versus more than 1,000 E. coli). So it is likely that many 
B. anthracis genome sequences have not been shared.
•	 Who is responsible if something goes wrong? If there were to be 
a problem with a certain software that was used in a court case, 
4  For more information, see http://www.nature.com/encode; accessed November 24, 
2013.
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for example, would the developers be liable? This can be a prob-
lem, especially because most popular bioinformatics software is 
developed in academic institutions.
One possible solution to the information-sharing dilemma, since the 
majority of genome data for biothreats may not be publically available, 
is defining and establishing two data tracks, one that can be shared and 
one that cannot. Ideally, academia and governments can at least share 
standards for data, if not the data itself. In this way, the data can be easily 
integrated when possible.
In a discussion following Dr. Chun’s presentation, Dr. Paul Keim 
noted that technology development today differs from that of a decade 
ago. Technologies then were not forward compatible, which limited their 
power. But WGS is forward compatible. If one investigator has a genome 
sequence using Life Technologies’ PGM sequencer and another using 
an Illumina MiSeq sequencer, the data can be easily compared, put in a 
database, and will be forward compatible with any technology that comes 
along. He agrees that a committee will never decide anything, but the 
genome is the genome and once we have it, we can use it. 
 Dr. Munirul Alam of the International Center for Diarrhoeal Diseases 
Research in Bangladesh suggested that individual committees be formed 
to guide what typing tools, for example, should be used for each patho-
gen. Scientists are sporadically doing everything, but not in a collabora-
tive way leading to consensus. The findings could be used in microbial 
forensics. Dr. Dag Harmsen agreed it would be desirable to have an 
international committee to agree on typing methods, but thinks that such 
a thing is unrealistic—committees cannot even agree on names. In addi-
tion, needs differ between developing and developed countries, so there 
will never be one assay method that fits all needs. It is ultimately the users 
who decide what is going to be used and will declare a de facto standard. 
Also, technology continues to evolve, and novel and even more powerful 
analytical tools likely will arise in the near future.
MANAGING LARGE DATASETS
Dr. Aaron Darling reviewed changes that have already occurred and 
are still under way in the development of hardware, software, and sys-
tems for collaborative computing. Enormous quantities of data are being 
generated, and there are challenges to handling, storing, and analyzing 
them in reproducible ways that can be validated. He discussed the pros 
and cons of cloud computing and “software as a service” in a scientific 
arena. He touched on issues regarding the funding of and responsibility 
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for microbial forensics dataset management. He offered possible solutions 
for some of the obstacles he sees.
Looking backward, he noted that when there were few genomes to 
analyze, researchers performed analyses and then disagreed about the 
meaning of the analyses because there is a great deal of observational bias 
when data are limited. Now that a great deal of data exists, however, the 
taxonomic biases within databases should be considered, in particular, 
the lack of commensals. 
In addition to the uncertainties regarding which organisms to 
sequence, organisms are naturally and constantly changing. The sequences 
added to databases represent a moving target because they come from 
living systems that evolve. Is the population evolving, or is one observ-
ing “standing” variation?5 Moreover, the databases used for microbial 
forensics are likely to be based on public databases. The standards for 
contributions to public databases are unlikely to meet the rigor one would 
expect for admissibility in court. Can these data be trusted?
Ten years ago, a major challenge was how to sequence a genome. 
Today a major challenge is how to deal with the immense amount of 
sequencing data being generated. This issue is becoming a major problem, 
both in isolate genomics and metagenomics. Two years ago, the sequence 
read archive at NCBI reached 100 terabases, 11 percent of which was 
metagenomic (Kodama et al., 2012). The MG-RAST6 resource offers 38 
terabases of metagenomic data for download. 
Sending large amounts of data over the Internet is not a problem 
because the aggregate bandwidth of the network is enormous. Moving 
data is possible using available, well-engineered, peer-to-peer (e.g., Bit-
Torrent and Coral Content Distribution Network) and multicast solutions. 
However, although the aggregate bandwidth of the network is substan-
tial, the endpoint bandwidth (e.g., at the source and the destination) 
may be limited, which could be of concern for truly large data volumes. 
The nature of how data arrives and how analysis is performed is also 
changing. The trend is away from data arriving in batches and toward 
delivery of continuous data streams. Three examples of initiatives to 
release data streams as they are being generated by public health labs and 
other sources are (1) the Global Microbial Identifier (a multiorganizational 
international effort), (2) the 100K Foodborne Pathogen Genome Project 
(University of California, Davis, School of Veterinary Medicine), and (3) 
the Genome Trakr Network (FDA). The data-stream approach is changing 
the nature of how analyses are performed. The previous paradigm was 
that data were collected from various sources, computational analysis was 
5  Standing variation is genetic variation for fitness traits in natural populations.
6  For more information, see http://metagenomics.anl.gov/; accessed November 24, 2013.
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
BIOINFORMATICS AND DATA 153
performed, and the results were published. This approach does not adapt 
well to streaming data sources and may not be viable going forward. 
Unfortunately, most of the existing algorithms were engineered with the 
assumption that all data would be available from the start. Bioinformati-
cians need to start developing algorithms that scale to arbitrarily large 
datasets.
Algorithms in bioinformatics already exist that fit those two criteria. 
They include multiple sequence alignment with profile-hidden Markov 
models, phylogenetic placement on reference trees, and bloom filters. The 
nature of the data has changed, and more methods like these must be 
developed. Once it is possible to analyze all the data, researchers will have 
some basis from which to make a decision about whether data are useful 
or can be deleted from the data that are archived for future analysis.
The computing infrastructure used to analyze data also has changed 
greatly. The approach is shifting from individuals doing analyses on 
PCs or within a computing cluster to people performing analyses within 
cloud systems. The Amazon Web Services Elastic Computing Cloud is the 
best-known of these systems, and there are others, such as OpenStack, a 
cloud infrastructure that virtually everyone can download and set up on 
his or her own computer hardware. In Australia, the government set up 
a national research cloud named NeCTAR. Those at Australian research 
institutions are issued free allocations for use; in instances when large 
computing resources and many computing hours are needed, users can 
make special requests.
Other paradigms for using cloud computing have emerged, including 
the HTCondor project, which essentially leverages idle computing time; 
it is a cycle-scavenging system. The Condor can launch virtual machine 
images on idle computers. If an institution has a large number of comput-
ers that sit idle after everyone goes home at 5:00 p.m., that overnight time 
becomes a large computing resource.
The cloud-computing model is attractive because it enables one to 
rent time on a large, commercial, professionally managed computing 
facility, and to pay only for what is used. It enables a researcher to quickly 
scale computing resources up or down. One does not have to worry 
about how to dispose of all of the outdated computers in 5 years because 
the cloud provider will manage that. A challenge, however, is that data 
motion and storage in the cloud can become very expensive and will 
increase the funding researchers need from their sponsors. Researchers 
who wish to perform large dataset analyses in clouds must factor in how 
to most efficiently move the data around and store it. One possible solu-
tion is to use third-party providers for data storage.
Hardware architectures have changed also, largely owing to the fact 
that central processing unit (CPU) clock speed reached its limits about 
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10 years ago. A CPU cannot be pushed much further than 2.5 gigahertz 
without overheating. Speedups are largely attributable to doing more 
work in the same clock cycles. In particular, the graphics processing para-
digm has emerged; these systems are constructed to enable thousands of 
arithmetic operations in parallel during each clock cycle. Today there are 
a number of graphics processor–enabled bioinformatics applications. For 
sequence alignment, there is the Short Oligonucleotide Analysis Package 
(SOAP); for sequence indexing and generic sequence analysis algorithms, 
the SeqAn library; and for phylogenetic analysis, graphics processing 
unit–enabled versions of MrBayes and Bayesian evolutionary analysis by 
sampling trees, which use the BEAGLE Library (beagle-lib).
Another innovation in computing hardware that is very relevant for 
large-data processing is solid-state disk (SSD) architectures. SSDs are 
similar to “thumb drives” but are scaled-up higher performance versions. 
They use essentially the same technology except that these are used as a 
normal disk drive in a computer; their random read/write performance 
is much higher than the classic hard-platter disk drive. When coupled 
with the classic disk in a unified storage system, these provide both high 
capacity and the ability to do a very fast random-access and reading and 
writing of data, which is a very useful feature when performing large 
genome analyses.
Computing costs have begun to exceed sequencing costs (Loman et 
al., 2012; Sboner et al., 2011). The major costs are the development of novel 
algorithms and software and training and maintaining skilled personnel 
to perform the analyses. When computation results in a public good, one 
must determine who will pay for it. Darling believes that costs can be 
divided into three steps:
1. Development of novel algorithms and software (likely by 
academia);
2. Integration of new software with existing software for usable 
systems (engineering); and
3. Maintenance, support, and operation of computing.
Creating software is by nature very different from developing a physi-
cal technology. Once software is developed, it can be easily copied and 
disseminated. The cost for distributing it widely is negligible. The pre-
vailing model in bioinformatics, and perhaps scientific software in gen-
eral, is that through its funding institutions and scientific organizations, 
the public pays for step 1 and perhaps a portion of step 2. In Darling’s 
opinion, industry generally supports steps 2 and 3. This model appears 
to be reasonably workable because if a software system breaks, someone 
should be accountable, and private industry appears to be in a better posi-
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tion to handle this responsibility. A complication, however, is intellectual 
property considerations. Much of the intellectual property is generated 
during the first step, and recognition of this must be conveyed to the 
parties who operate and maintain the software. One of the most com-
mon approaches is to make the software open source. The open sourcing 
of software is actually advantageous for industry because it can avoid 
investing in the development step. It is attractive for the bioinformatics 
industry to pick up these open-source tools and operationalize and vali-
date them for users.
In microbial forensics analysis, absolute reproducibility may be an 
unachievable goal. So a challenge becomes, how reproducible should it 
be? In theory, computers should make repeatability and reproducibility 
very easy. Many scientists who practice data analysis, however, lack train-
ing in fundamental aspects of computing and software engineering that 
would enable them to undertake reproducible computing. A recent trend 
toward educating this community can be seen in the series of workshops 
called Software Carpentry.7 These workshops offer training in basic com-
puting skills, such as version control, as well as literate programming, 
so scientists can generate workflows that are reproducible on different 
systems and engineered according to standards generally accepted in 
software engineering. In addition, there are a number of efforts to gen-
erate point-and-click visual systems that will enable users to generate 
reproducible workflows. These include the Galaxy, Taverna, Knime, and 
Kepler systems. Users can access a large number of small bioinformatics 
components, which they can connect and reconnect for arbitrarily differ-
ent and unique workflows, and which they can then share with others. 
When users perform data analysis, the systems will track and record 
every step applied to data, and the users can share analysis metadata.
In terms of the operational aspects of repeatability and reproducibil-
ity, Darling believes that the ability to examine the software unit should be 
taken into account. With closed-source software, the best one can achieve 
is repeatability and copying the closed-source software to another com-
puter; one cannot know how or why it works, nor can the computation 
being performed by it be independently reproduced. With open-source 
software, it is possible to examine the nuts and bolts of why it does what 
it does. Often when software is developed, and a manuscript is published 
about it, there are inconsistencies, and frequently large discrepancies, 
between what the software is actually doing and what is described in 
the manuscript. This can be attributed to the fact that when software is 
engineered and implemented, the developer must make approximations 
7  More information is available at http://software-carpentry.org/; accessed November 
24, 2013.
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to the model described in the manuscript for basic engineering issues 
because computers have finite resources. The trend toward cloud com-
puting has largely been advantageous, but an important disadvantage 
exists. In the old model of computing, software developers sold copies 
of their software and users installed it on their computers. The problem 
was that the software was difficult to maintain, and it was very difficult 
for software developers to distribute bug fixes. The new model is that the 
user does not even receive a copy of the software. Instead, the software 
is purchased as a Web-based service. The software runs on a server that 
is managed by the entity that developed it, and the user pays for access. 
It simplifies software deployment and maintenance; updates are man-
aged centrally from the software developer servers; and piracy issues are 
eliminated. The disadvantage, however, especially when systems must 
be validated, is that the user has no control over software versioning. 
Therefore, reproducible research is not possible. The ever-present fear is 
that when the service provider decides to fix a bug in its software system, 
it could have unintended consequences for the analysis a researcher has 
already completed. Similarly, doing the same analysis on different days 
may yield very different answers.
Darling thinks that there is probably a way to generate reproducible 
results and still obtain careful version control of analyses using cloud 
systems, but it should be something that the service provider builds into 
the system at the very basic level. This needs to be thought about and 
discussed with the providers who develop the necessary software.
Chun suggested that there currently are too many software choices, 
and what is needed is a trusted body to evaluate this software. He added 
that bioinformatics is engineering and he believes all bioinformatics issues 
are solvable. Darling agreed, noting that software reviewers don’t always 
run the software or confirm that the source code is correct. A peer-review 
avenue for software systems is a good idea. The AAM (2009b) report also 
noted that there is a lack of statistical rigor for bioinformatics algorithms 
that needs to be addressed.
Some typing methods offer more sensitivity with less variability, and 
others offer more variability with less sensitivity. What can be relied on in 
the meantime? Darling said that he cannot comment on what should be 
relied on, but that genome-based phylogenies and their applicability are 
based on the type of organism one examines. Different lineages evolve in 
very different ways. Some recombine heavily, and if one builds phylog-
enies on these, a different result will emerge than if one builds a genome 
phylogeny on B. anthracis. For E. coli, he estimates it would be necessary to 
examine at least 200–400 kilobases of the genome in a concatenate align-
ment before getting a consistent answer about the phylogeny (Didelot et 
al., 2012).
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Findings and Conclusions: 
Initial Prioritized Science Needs 
for Microbial Forensics
The speakers and participants at the Zagreb workshop represent a 
collection of expertise from many disciplines, such as microbial forensics, 
epidemiology, public health, clinical medicine, genetics and genomics, 
phylogenetic analysis, and bioinformatics. Despite the great diversity of 
backgrounds, there were clear themes that emerged from the presenta-
tions and discussions. Most of these themes are consistent with the cur-
rent literature in the fields represented and with the views of the commit-
tee members. In this chapter, the committee synthesizes its views on the 
needs that emerged and the questions that require answers. 
BASIC SCIENCE
As discussed in Chapter 2, although the world of living things is 
dominated by microorganisms, very little is known about the vast major-
ity of microbes. Until recently, much of what is known was based on 
the very few microorganisms that are culturable and that were studied 
in laboratories using growth characteristics, Gram stains, serology, and 
other traditional techniques. Today, however, the ability to sequence the 
genomes of microbes has provided a great deal of knowledge about 
nutrient cycling, gene regulation, and reproduction for some bacteria and 
viruses. These processes, however, remain unknown for most microorgan-
isms and “knowledge of the evolution and ecology of microbial communi-
ties lags far behind cellular microbiology” (NRC, 2007). In addition, until 
recently there have been few systematic efforts to collect and describe the 
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microbes living in soil, seawater, freshwater lakes and streams, on plants, 
and even commensally in the guts or other surfaces of humans and other 
animals. The new techniques of metagenomics circumvent the inability 
to culture the majority of microbes by directly assaying microbial genes, 
sequences, and genomes from entire communities, such as those avail-
able from environmental samples and the human microbiome. The use of 
metagenomic techniques, however, is still an area of active development. 
Meanwhile, knowledge of the natural microbial communities residing 
throughout the world is still highly incomplete. Although the biology of 
the small fraction of bacteria and viruses that are pathogenic to human 
beings, livestock and companion animals, and crop or forestry plants is 
somewhat better known and understood, there is still much to be learned 
about their phylogeny and evolution, how many strains of pathogenic 
species exist in nature, what their distribution is throughout the world, 
and how this distribution interacts with ecological conditions.
Finding: For microbial forensics purposes, the dearth of information about 
microbial diversity, ecology, population genetics, evolution and phylog-
eny, and worldwide distribution represents a major scientific knowledge 
gap. Determining an organism’s source in the event of a biothreat will be 
greatly hampered by the absence of baseline information on the natural 
abundance and distribution of pathogens. If the normal distribution of a 
pathogen in background settings is unknown, it would be difficult, for 
example, to discern whether there is an unusually high abundance of that 
pathogen in an area experiencing an infectious disease outbreak. Back-
ground knowledge is also important in determining whether the presence 
of that pathogen is natural or the result of a deliberate or inadvertent 
release. Understanding the endemic microbial background is necessary to 
provide proper context for microbial forensics analyses, interpretations, 
communication, and resulting decision making. Currently there is insuf-
ficient understanding of microbial diversity and endemism to facilitate 
determining whether a pathogen has been intentionally released, where 
and how a biothreat agent was developed, and whether the presence of 
naturally occurring or endemic organisms could be exploited. 
Conclusion 1: Although efforts to characterize the diversity of bacteria 
and viruses existing in nature are under way, there is no comprehensive 
effort ongoing to describe microorganisms. An international collabo-
ration engaging the worldwide scientific community in a systematic 
effort to identify, monitor, and characterize a far higher proportion of 
global microbial species to increase knowledge about endemism and 
background is needed. The effort should begin with known pathogens 
and then expand to their close relatives as well as emerging pathogens. 
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To mount such an effort, formal international scientific collaborations will 
need to be created to ensure that technological resources are accessible 
to all nations, including developing countries that currently lack such 
resources, and that funding can be leveraged better. Other questions will 
need to be addressed: for example, what kinds of sampling and forensic 
characterization programs would be required to provide the most useful 
information? In addition, should there be an international committee to 
establish standards for typing and characterization of strains?
Finding: Skowronski and Lipkin (2011:173) state that 
Perhaps the most significant challenge in microbial forensics is the ability 
to differentiate the natural from the intentional biological event. Mother 
Nature continues her relentless assault on human, animal, and plant 
populations with an impressive array and diversity of microbes, and sit-
uational awareness of unnatural malicious intent can be hard to come by.
Although there are criteria (see Box 3-1) for considering whether a dis-
ease outbreak is unusual, determining whether such an event is due 
to natural, accidental, or deliberate causes, and collecting the informa-
tion to work through these criteria at the time of an event is likely to 
be time-consuming with slow response time. As noted in the Biological 
Response and Recovery Science and Technology Roadmap recently issued by 
the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC, 2013), a biological 
event demands “a quick and effective response in order to minimize loss 
of life and other adverse consequences and, in the case of suspected crimi-
nal activity or terrorism, to thwart ongoing activity and prevent follow-on 
attacks.” Timelines for making this crucial determination are currently 
unacceptable from both public health and law enforcement standpoints, 
which require development and management of appropriate and rapid 
responses, recovery measures, and resolution.
Conclusion 2: There is a strong need for the development of high-
confidence methodologies to distinguish among natural, accidental, 
and deliberate outbreaks of infectious disease. Although the research 
and development agendas of the U.S. federal departments and agencies 
are now being coordinated under the NSTC Roadmap mentioned above 
(NSTC, 2013), such coordination on an international basis is justified by 
the potential for rapid spread of disease through global transportation 
networks. This is a high-priority need for the research and funding agen-
das both inside and outside the United States that requires a coordinated 
effort on an international scale.
Metagenomic techniques offer the possibility of sequencing the 
genomes of unculturable microbes, which represent the vast majority of 
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microorganisms, particularly from environmental samples (e.g., soil and 
water). In epidemiology and public health, the need to move from culture-
dependent to culture-independent methods to identify pathogens is also 
being recognized as an important diagnostic capability. Metagenomics 
would avoid culture bias, but it is difficult to study rare taxa, which com-
prise many of the organisms in such samples. The probative value of the 
“small signal” of the rare microbe of interest in the “big noise” of a clut-
tered metagenomic sample is undetermined, and validation of the pro-
cesses to detect rare organisms is necessary but problematic, particularly 
because of artifacts, stochastic effects, abundance effects, and contamina-
tion. Questions that arise include: What is required to demonstrate that 
this is a viable approach and what are the limits to what could be stated 
from such analyses? Can these problems be overcome to meet forensic 
standards? How should the scientific and legal significance be determined 
and supported when the agent of interest is a minority constituent in a 
“probative sample”? How much of the threat agent of interest must be in 
a sample to be significant or meaningful in context?
Finding: Metagenomics has great promise for microbial forensics if it can 
be adapted to improve and speed up the ability to characterize microbial 
species and communities derived from environmental samples. But it 
is as yet unclear whether the “clutter” in metagenomics samples can be 
exploited for forensic value.
Finding: The other “omics” (e.g., proteomics, metabolomics, transcrip-
tomics, and glycomics) may also provide applications of value to micro-
bial forensics. Wahl et al. (2011) state that “Molecular variations in DNA 
sequence are widely used for organism and strain identification, but 
many other molecules and chemical species may be useful in determin-
ing microbial identity and origins; these include proteins, peptides, lipids, 
carbohydrates, inorganic ions, and organic metabolites.” For example, 
proteomics may be of forensic value because protein expression profiles 
can potentially provide information that can be traced back to the envi-
ronment in which the organism was cultured. Given that microorgan-
isms respond to environmental conditions by changing patterns of gene 
expression, the types of proteins expressed by an organism can reveal 
information for forensics about aspects of growth conditions. The chemi-
cal species produced by microbes must, of course, be correctly detected 
and identified and the results appropriately interpreted using computa-
tional algorithms and rigorous statistics (Wahl et al., 2011).
Conclusion 3: Priority research is needed to realize the promise of 
metagenomics and its application to microbial forensics and the devel-
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opment of the forensic value of the other “omics”: proteomics, metabo-
lomics, transcriptomics, glycomics, immunogenomics, etc.
NEEDS COMMON TO MEDICINE, PUBLIC 
HEALTH, AND MICROBIAL FORENSICS
Human and veterinary medicine, public health, agriculture, and 
microbial forensics clearly share many techniques and approaches and all 
are similarly motivated by the need to protect the health of humans, ani-
mals, and crops. With any infectious disease outbreak, the starting point is 
determining what the agent is, whether for epidemiological or microbial 
forensic purposes. The use of molecular techniques to identify pathogen 
species and strains has, over the last 10 years, become fundamental to 
microbial forensics and is rapidly being adopted in clinical medicine. 
Although hospitals do not yet routinely use sequencing strategies for 
diagnostics, recent examples (e.g., Snitkin et al., 2012) have demonstrated 
that hospitals can deal more quickly and effectively with nosocomial 
infections if they have the ability to integrate genomic and epidemiologi-
cal data. The importance of being able to access rapid molecular diag-
nostic capabilities in developing countries was described in the report 
Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological 
Laboratories (NRC, 2012).
Finding: Access to rapid and accurate molecular diagnostic equipment 
and techniques is important for controlling and responding to disease 
outbreaks as well as for microbial forensics. 
Conclusion 4: Improved worldwide access to molecular diagnostics 
(polymerase chain reaction [PCR], whole-genome sequencing [WGS], 
etc.), including refinement and distribution of bench-top next-gener-
ation sequencing (NGS) instruments that are fast and affordable and 
have simple workflow procedures, is a critical need. At a minimum, 
PCR technology should be universally available. WGS also could be more 
broadly available with the advent of small benchtop instruments that 
offer speed and accuracy of analysis and have become less costly. These 
tools should be in place as soon as is feasible, to allow more rapid detec-
tion, higher sample throughput, and swift response for both public health 
and microbial forensics.
Finding: In addition to increasing basic knowledge of the diversity, ecol-
ogy, phylogeny, and other aspects of basic microbes, there is a need to 
improve our knowledge of mechanisms of pathogenicity, virulence fac-
tors, antibiotic resistance traits, mutation rates, prevalence and impacts of 
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lateral gene transfer (AAM, 2009b), and host immune responses to patho-
gens. Some participants at the Zagreb meeting expressed the need for the 
development of databases on clinical infectious disease agents, which is 
not currently common practice in medicine and would be a daunting task. 
Skowronski and Lipkin (2011) pointed out that between 1998 and 2006 
there were 40 million hospital admissions for infectious diseases in the 
United States alone. They stated that 
it is literally impossible for the etiological agent to be identified, much 
less to a standard that would be considered a validated fact generated 
by a tertiary testing facility (CDC/Laboratory Response network/State 
Public Health Laboratories) and that would withstand legal scrutiny. . . . 
In many cases, presumptive diagnoses and minimal screening tests are 
often used when clinical signs are sufficient to treat. In practice, this has 
been sufficient for medical care but is not adequate to address the needs 
of microbial forensics. (Skowronski and Lipkin, 2011:174)
Nonetheless, insights into pathogenesis and the development of drugs 
and vaccines require live organisms and clinical samples from individuals 
who have been exposed to live organisms. Skowronski and Lipkin also 
noted that sequencing, microarrays, high-throughput NGS, and bioinfor-
matics represent new sensitive and exacting techniques for identifying 
and characterizing pathogens that will eventually have broad applica-
bility to public health, biosurveillance, and forensics and attribution. It 
also is worth noting that in November 2013, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approved Illumina’s MiSeq Dx DNA sequencing 
system for diagnostics, which until then had only been used for research 
(Dubay, 2013). 
Conclusion 5: An increased emphasis on research to determine mecha-
nisms of pathogenicity, including virulence factors and host immune 
responses, is needed.
Finding: A number of the participants in the Zagreb workshop called for 
better global disease surveillance. Although there are a number of pro-
grams already in existence for this purpose (see discussion of biosurveil-
lance in Chapter 2), there is considerable evidence that these programs 
have yet to fully bear fruit. For example, as noted previously, only 16 
percent of countries were able to meet the 2012 deadline for implement-
ing the International Health Regulations, and the U.S. government has 
recently announced a new Global Health Security Agenda to intensify 
worldwide efforts to achieve global health security. 
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Conclusion 6: Greatly improved global disease monitoring and sur-
veillance in humans, animals, and plants is needed to facilitate rapid 
response and better disease control. It also would increase our under-
standing of background levels for aiding in the detection of unusual out-
breaks. Although a daunting task, clinical databases of infectious disease 
cases in hospitals need to be developed to improve our understanding of 
pathogen distribution and characterization. An early-warning geographic 
information system could also be valuable for aiding these purposes.
METHODS AND TECHNOLOGIES USED 
IN MICROBIAL FORENSICS
Methods of great value in microbial forensics for identification of 
microbial agents and analysis of their source include both molecular 
genetic and nongenetic technologies. PCR, sequencing of 16S ribosomal 
RNA, multilocus sequence typing, and WGS are molecular genetic tech-
nologies used to characterize microbial agents. Other physical science 
techniques, such as mass spectrometry and electron beam–based meth-
ods, can be used to analyze the physical properties of microbial forensic 
evidence, for example, the presence of additives for stabilization and/or 
dispersability and physical signatures from the locale where the material 
was produced (Michael et al., 2011). Mass spectrometry is also useful for 
analyzing biological toxins, such as ricin and botulinum toxin, which may 
not contain co-purifying nucleic acid signatures (Johnson et al., 2011). In 
addition, proteins and other biochemical products may provide clues 
about an organism’s place or conditions of origin.
Nucleic Acid–Based Technologies
There are a number of approaches for interrogating nucleic acids 
for attribution. As described in Chapter 4, real-time PCR (qPCR) is a 
rapid and sensitive detection technology that has proven effective in both 
clinical and microbial forensic assay applications. The power of qPCR 
lies in simplicity, assay selection, multiplex capability, optimization, and 
already-validated assays. There are many available assays that are vali-
dated to certain standards, although they must be validated internally in 
each laboratory that uses the assay. Many methods enable qualitative 
detection of hundreds of pathogens and hospital-acquired infections to 
the species and sometimes the strain level and a number of assays are 
FDA approved. There also are assays in the food safety arena on which 
microbial forensics can draw. Matrices in the food industry are complex, 
and food is a potential target of intentional and accidental contamination. 
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There are many food industry microbial and epidemiological investiga-
tions, and microbial forensics can learn from these events and have access 
to the assays. 
Mass spectrometry exploits the different masses of atoms or mol-
ecules in a sample material. MassTag PCR combines PCR with mass 
spectrometry to provide high resolution, sensitivity, and specificity. This 
technology already has revolutionized the ability to identify respiratory 
pathogens and hemorrhagic fever viruses.
Microarray platforms accomplish a similar goal of organism iden-
tification via detecting nucleic acid or protein signatures in a higher-
multiplexed format. Many panels have 1 million hybridization or bind-
ing assays on a single array chip, and some have up to 5 million assays. 
Microarray panels are available for microbial detection, single-nucleotide 
polymorphism (SNP) detection, genome-wide association studies, gene 
expression analyses, and protein presence and abundance. Microarray 
readers for other purposes, such as oncology or infectious disease screen-
ing, could be leveraged by the development of custom chips that are 
directed to addressing microbial forensic issues. Many assays are avail-
able, but will need to be customized on a single chip to be more compre-
hensive for microbial forensic needs. Typically an array is dedicated to 
a specific organism or small group of organisms, although arrays suited 
to larger numbers of organisms do exist. Microarrays do not provide as 
much information as sequencing, but they approach the discriminatory 
power afforded by sequencing. These platforms may be a rapid and cost-
effective alternative or a supplement to sequencing. 
Until recently, it was laborious and expensive to sequence an entire 
microbial genome, and researchers and funding agencies were obliged 
to choose carefully, organism by organism, what would be sequenced 
(AAM, 2009b). The Sanger chain termination method dominated for about 
30 years before a new generation of technologies significantly changed 
how sequencing is performed. Today, NGS technologies are allowing 
rapid sequencing of thousands of microbial isolates as well as complex 
microbial communities at far less cost and effort (Fricke et al., 2011). A 
review of various early high-throughput machines coming onto the scene 
can be found in Parla et al. (2011). There have been numerous compari-
sons of current NGS devices, among them Quail et al. (2012), Loman et al. 
(2012), and Jünemann et al. (2013), that evaluate the advantages and dis-
advantages of the many devices already on the market or expected soon. 
NGS technology will continue to improve rapidly. Any reference in this 
report to a related methodology or specific technology for a case study is 
used for illustration and not to represent the state of the art.
Nevertheless, as a consequence of these recent advances, sequencing 
and genomics are revolutionizing our understanding of bacterial and viral 
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evolution and function. It is now possible to sequence the genomes of an 
unprecedented variety of microorganisms. However, there has not been 
a strong open effort to prioritize which organisms to sequence for micro-
bial forensics purposes. In 2009, the White House’s NSTC (2009) recom-
mended that a survey of all full genome sequences available at the time 
be conducted to assess whether the number and diversity of sequences 
are adequate for forensic purposes. On the basis of results of the survey, 
additional strains for WGS were to be recommended. However, this effort 
appears to be restricted to the United States and it is unclear what the 
outcome of the effort has been. The NSTC strategy document in which 
this recommendation appeared did not specifically address whether the 
effort was to be international in scope and the role of other countries in 
the task, if any, is not clear.
In addition, the enormous increase in sequencing has brought with 
it other needs that must be addressed. For example, the competing tech-
nology platforms for sequencing lack standardization, and there are no 
standards for how sequencing data should be reported. One consequence 
of this is that it is unclear whether differences in sequence data generated 
using different devices are a consequence of error or have some other 
significance. Sequencing error may inflate the similarity or dissimilarity 
between reference and evidence samples, increasing uncertainty. Defin-
ing and quantifying error rates associated with each sequencing plat-
form are critically important, but it is unclear how to go about this task. 
“Deep” sequencing routinely produces vast (terabyte) quantities of data 
that demand novel methods for analysis, handling, storage, etc. These 
data require expert annotation and curation, but there are no standardized 
annotation software systems. (This topic is covered in more detail under 
Bioinformatics and Data.) 
Finding: The development, validation, and standardization of rapid new 
analytical methods, including sequencing and non–nucleic acid assay 
technologies, will continue to be important. It is not likely that prolonged 
research, development, testing, evaluation, validation, and technology 
transfer programs such as those developed for the anthrax letter attacks 
case, which took 8 years, will be acceptable each time a biothreat event 
occurs, particularly if a novel agent is used or if exigent circumstances 
arise. To be as prepared as possible for the next outbreak event, this work 
needs to be carried out now, whether it is in response to a natural, acci-
dental, or deliberate event involving a biological agent. 
Conclusion 7: Development of more advanced, faster, and cheaper assay 
and sequencing technologies that can be standardized and made more 
accessible to benefit both microbial forensics and public health is nec-
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essary. Although industry is likely to pursue technology improvements 
on its own, increased accessibility of small and affordable benchtop NGS 
machines, such as those used in the German Escherichia coli O104:H4 out-
break, would “democratize” use and enable many countries that cannot 
afford sequencing to be able to implement such capabilities for routine 
diagnostic purposes. Further development of NGS would also enable 
detection and identification of organisms without a specific a priori assay 
design. Standards for reporting sequence data also need to be devel-
oped. Indeed, small handheld devices to digitize DNA results and send 
sequences over smart phones for real-time detection in the field might be 
a reasonable technology hope in the future. Of course, if handheld devices 
come to fruition, they will have to be applicable to, and meet the require-
ments of, microbial forensic analyses. 
Applications of Physical Science
Finding: As noted, a variety of nonsequencing techniques are available 
for identifying organisms and their biochemical properties. Although 
nucleic acid–based technologies are very sensitive, they will not identify 
all threats that may be encountered, such as toxins. Toxins can be purified 
to a degree that it is impossible to identify even trace levels of DNA or 
treatment may degrade DNA in the sample. Platforms that perform pro-
tein and antibody/antigen detection are being exploited to address this 
problem. One system is electrochemiluminescence (ECL), which enables 
antibody-based assays, as well as nucleic acid–based assays. Knowledge 
of the target being pursued is necessary, as are thoughtfully designed and 
validated assays, to use ECL effectively. 
The textbook by Budowle et al. (2011) has several chapters devoted 
to non–nucleic acid chemical and physical analysis technologies, such as 
mass spectrometry and electron beam–based methods. These technolo-
gies also appear to be useful, particularly for helping to determine the 
manufacturing method for a biothreat agent by analyzing the materials 
associated with the sample, such as agar and silicon in scenarios where 
residual material, a dispersal device, or other materials are discovered. 
Conclusion 8: High priority needs to be placed on continued research 
and development to improve physical science applications to microbial 
forensics.
SAMPLING
Finding: Chapter 5 contains a great deal of detailed information on sam-
pling and preservation of microbial forensic evidence. Ideally, sampling 
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should be conducted according to a plan or design appropriate for the 
context and must include provisions for clear quality assurance and qual-
ity control (QA/QC) measures, documentation, handling, storage, pack-
aging, and transportation. It was stressed that results are more reliable 
if specialists in microbial forensics can advise those who collect samples 
(e.g., first responders) before they begin work on the crime scene. For 
microbial forensics, guidelines are needed that will support the criminal 
justice system and intelligence community and comply with standards 
for crime scene examiners. Type of release influences the type of sampling 
that is appropriate. A covert release may result in a delayed response, 
whereas an overt release allows a more rapid, and possibly more focused, 
response. It also needs to be recognized that evidence collection for micro-
bial forensics is sometimes incompatible with other forensic techniques. 
This concern must be taken into account, and triage strategies are needed 
for sample collection so that critical evidence is not destroyed. Investiga-
tive protocols that optimize the choice and priority of methods are needed 
and should consider sample availability, preservation and conservation 
of evidence, trade-offs between speed and accuracy and/or precision, as 
well as other factors. First and foremost, consideration of the health and 
safety of the people collecting and handling samples is required. Collec-
tion protocols also should be based on analytical capability, preservation 
and integrity of evidence, low cost and high efficiency, documentation, 
training, quality and transparency, and flexibility, because matrices in 
which evidence might be collected could be highly diverse and may be 
difficult to handle or preserve.
Conclusion 9: The development (and validation) of processes (sample 
collection, preservation, handling, storage, packaging, and transporta-
tion) and analytical methods for microbial forensics, including estab-
lishing standards for most components, require a much higher priority. 
Existing processes need to be standardized, compiled, and shared world-
wide, while new, more efficient ones need to be sought.
VALIDATION AND STANDARDS
Finding: All components of a microbial forensics investigation, from 
methods for collection and sampling, preservation and handling, to iden-
tification of the agent, etc., need to be validated.
Although validation is recognized as necessary and essential, it is ill 
defined. There is a challenge in translating the requirements because there 
is no standard way to validate an assay or method. This includes develop-
mental validation of one’s own method as well as internal validation by 
other laboratories implementing the method. Minimum validation criteria 
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include sensitivity, specificity, reproducibility, precision, accuracy, robust-
ness, analyses consistent with the samples and the intended application 
of an assay, for example, reference panels and mock or nonprobative 
materials. Other criteria that tend to apply to many assays but may or 
may not apply in every situation are resolution, purity, critical equipment 
calibration, critical reagents, and databases.
Validation presents many other challenges. For example, validating 
sampling methods is very difficult because there are many types of sur-
faces and environmental matrices. Another variable is the individual who 
performs sample collection. Quality management needs for performing 
microbial forensic work include scientific rigor and validity; methods 
that will support attribution for criminal investigations; and establish-
ing national and international working guidelines for quality assurance 
and quality control as applied to microbial forensics. There is a serious 
need for methods for characterizing uncertainty and resolving conflicting 
results. All analyses are subject to bias and error, so the limits of a method 
need to be understood. Interpretations may need to be made with incom-
plete and mutable data due to the fact that the diversity and variability of 
microorganisms are unknown and organisms undergo genetic change in 
response to environmental and other factors. Consequently, methods to 
accommodate this functional knowledge gap must be devised. Although 
many analysts develop new tests, there is also a need to look at old, 
less-used, or abandoned techniques, since nonstate actors may not have 
access to the latest sophisticated technology. As noted above, although the 
precise identification of an analyte (DNA, etc.) can now be accomplished 
to the level of a distinct strain using, for example, canonical SNPs at the 
few- or even the single-molecule level, the validation of the processes to 
detect rare and low-level signatures is problematic.
The limits of interpretation also need to be clearly understood, and sta-
tistical approaches should be rigorously applied in determining whether 
two microbial samples “match” or are identical, their degree of similarity, 
their association, and/or their most recent common ancestor. Given what 
current science and informatics can provide, what is the best that can be 
expected, accepted, and communicated regarding the probative charac-
teristics of a microorganism and determining its source with acceptable 
confidence? It is important to understand what a negative result means, 
particularly for metagenomic analyses. Finally, analysis is not equal to 
interpretation, and there can be alternative explanations, so there is a 
need to test hypotheses and try to disprove them, not just attempt to 
prove them. Velsko (2011a; see also Conclusion 10) emphasized that we 
must begin an interactive and committed process to address these issues 
now. Scrambling to prepare as an event occurs is an undesirable scenario. 
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Conclusion 10: There is a great need for establishing criteria and require-
ments for validation. In addition, rapid and accurate development of 
additional validated analytical methods for microbial forensics must con-
tinue. These efforts should include establishment of standards for most 
components of microbial forensic analyses. A compilation of all protocols 
in use (e.g., for sampling, DNA extraction and isolation, and sequenc-
ing) and whether and how they have been validated is essential. 
BIOINFORMATICS AND DATA
Bioinformatics is an interdisciplinary field that develops and improves 
on methods for storing, retrieving, organizing, and analyzing biological 
data. A major activity in bioinformatics is to develop software tools to 
generate useful biological knowledge. To do so, bioinformatics uses many 
areas of computer science, mathematics, and engineering to process bio-
logical data. Complex machines are used to generate biological data at 
a much faster rate than before. Databases and information systems are 
used to store and organize biological data. Analyzing biological data may 
involve algorithms in artificial intelligence, soft computing,1 data min-
ing, image processing, and simulation. The algorithms in turn depend on 
theoretical foundations such as control theory, system theory, information 
theory, and statistics. 
The quality of sequence data and the results of bioinformatics analyses 
must be as high as possible. Factors to consider that impact data interpre-
tation and quality include the quality metrics of sequence data; sequence 
errors and uncertainties; reliable standards for genomic data representa-
tion; uncertainty with databases used; inferences based on available data, 
including meta-data; formulation of well-defined hypotheses; and testing 
methods for assessing the weight of microbial forensics evidence.
Data quality and interpretation both require reliable standards for 
genomic data representation. First, there must be an understanding of 
sequence quality, sequence errors, and uncertainties about the output 
data. Second, for interpretation with respect to attribution, criteria are 
needed for comparisons: match, similar, different, inconclusive; rigor of 
reasoning by the expert; and well-defined hypotheses and testing meth-
ods for assessing the weight of microbial forensic evidence. 
Understanding what various bioinformatics results mean may be dif-
ficult because one laboratory cannot precisely replicate all essential details 
of any particular bioinformatics analysis pipeline used by another labo-
ratory. Analyses are complex, different versions of programs exist, and 
1  Use of inexact or approximate solutions for computationally difficult tasks, often when 
the computing power needs exceed the task.
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software and hardware change rapidly. Software libraries are updated 
frequently, and investigators often find that the software they were using 
is obsolete before their project is completed or validated. No bioinformat-
ics software comes as a stand-alone. All programs depend on multiple 
libraries, each of which has its own versions, “bug” fixes, and potential 
parameter settings. It is sometimes uncertain how changes in any of those 
library modules might affect answers coming from any particular pro-
gram. For example, changes in a random number generator seed or in a 
floating-point math library can cause many programs to exhibit different 
behavior if they incorporate Monte Carlo calculations. At an even more 
fundamental level, the version and patch level of the underlying operat-
ing system and the CPU chip architecture and release level could affect 
outputs. Although some differences may be insignificant, others may be 
quite important and these need to be understood. In addition, there are 
important issues regarding how much documentation is required. The 
baseline assumptions that are needed to ensure assessments and effective 
comparisons of technologies need to be defined. Validating bioinformat-
ics pipelines requires data acquisition at all phases of the process, from 
extraction to data analysis to interpretation.
Finding: The new “deep-sequencing” methods generate data in the range 
of tens to hundreds of gigabases. Although the capability to detect poly-
morphisms for attribution at a level that was not possible only a few years 
ago is a great advance, it also presents new challenges. It requires novel 
ways to handle and analyze terabytes of data. Given this new demand, 
bioinformatics is both a necessity and a challenge.
Conclusion 11: Refinement of bioinformatics and statistical methods 
for evaluating evidence in microbial forensics is needed, including new 
algorithms that scale to very large and complex datasets. Bioinformatics 
also needs to be made understandable and user-friendly to laboratory 
users, first responders, the public, and the policy makers. Clear require-
ments are critical in order to attract industry to develop needed hardware 
and software for bioinformatics. 
Data Sharing
Finding: One highly consistent theme heard at the workshop was that 
data sharing is critical and desperately needed, encompassing biological 
information on gene sequences, software, and protocols, and standard 
operating procedures for all microbial forensic methods. Sharing of such 
data has the potential to promote international collaboration and coop-
eration among scientists and, more importantly, to inspire innovation. 
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It might improve security efforts in the sense of promoting more rapid 
responses to infectious disease outbreaks, which could be crucial in this 
age of rapid global transportation. Although most participants agreed on 
the importance of data and information sharing, many expressed con-
cerns about its feasibility and acceptability to governments and policy 
makers. While cloud computing offers solutions to data sharing as well as 
storage issues, these possibilities generate security concerns for microbial 
forensics. In addition, the quality of what is shared is crucial, so standard-
ization of characterization assays was deemed to be key for data sharing. 
Conclusion 12: Discussions are needed under the auspices of an inter-
national body that has the respect of the international political and 
scientific communities about how to share microbial forensic data, and 
for developing and presenting cogent arguments that can be persuasive 
to political leaders and scientists worldwide.
Databases and Reference Collections
Finding: The importance of having a comprehensive archive, or set of 
archives, of reference materials was emphasized by numerous partici-
pants at the workshop, although it was not clear to what extent an archive 
should contain organisms, nucleic acids only, or just sequence informa-
tion, the latter of which is technically not a reference collection but a 
database. An institution could facilitate the development of standardized 
nomenclature, typing techniques, and characterization systems; uniform 
QA/QC requirements; standardization of new techniques and analytical 
evaluations; and reference samples for high-resolution genomic com-
parisons. It is important that any centralized reference entity maintain 
a reasonably comprehensive collection; have sufficient long-term sup-
port; maintain the highest possible QA/QC standards; use accepted and 
standardized methods; strengthen standards for curation and material 
preparation; be responsive to the needs of research and development 
and support R&D that updates our understanding of diversity; be gov-
erned as a community resource; and maintain procedures that balance 
access and security concerns. Ideally, a reference archive would meet 
the needs of both criminal investigators and researchers. However, there 
is skepticism about the feasibility of capturing the full diversity of the 
microbial world and all the permutations necessary for the multitude 
of analytical methods in a single archive. However, if highest priority 
were given to archiving the pathogens and near neighbors that may be 
used in biocrimes or bioterrorism, this would have considerable value 
for microbial forensics. Even if less comprehensive collections are likely 
to be inadequate for most microbial forensic investigations, they would 
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still be suitable for basic research and provide at least a nominal degree of 
centralization, which is required to move forward on an effective system 
for dynamic response and accountability.
Conclusion 13: An international effort to design and establish more 
systematic and comprehensive reference collections and databases for 
pathogens and other microorganisms could take advantage of existing 
models, such as the World Data Centre for Microorganisms and the 
American Type Culture Collection. A model system for a consortium of 
reference collections and data storage centers could be created and later 
scaled up to become more inclusive.
TRAINING AND EDUCATION
Velsko (2011a:522) provides an informative concluding paragraph:
If there is any lesson to be drawn from past experience, it is that micro-
bial forensic collection and analysis are not very effective when they 
are conducted as ad hoc activities, by non-specialists, using improvised 
methods and on-the-fly attempts at validation, without prior review by 
a knowledgeable community. The utility of microbial forensic analysis 
rises in proportion to the extent that it is anticipatory, well planned, 
driven by a cadre of qualified experts, and resourced adequately.
Finding: The committee agrees with this statement. Microbial forensics 
is still a relatively new discipline. Training is needed for a number of 
purposes, including
•	 Increasing the availability of trained microbial forensics practi-
tioners. Given that microbial forensics encompasses a number 
of complex technical areas, any such training would necessarily 
require multidisciplinary, or even transdisciplinary, approaches. A 
core microbial forensics training program that is available world-
wide is needed, and a determination of who would be responsible 
for developing and implementing such a program is required as 
soon as possible. Training, and perhaps even certifications, in 
microbial forensics disciplines would help make microbial foren-
sics a more widely accepted basis for law enforcement actions for 
use in both domestic and international settings.
•	 Increasing the awareness and preparedness of first responders, 
which is essential for both safety purposes (to prevent accidental 
exposures of responder personnel to hazardous pathogens) and 
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for law enforcement needs to ensure that evidence samples are 
not compromised, crime scenes are not contaminated, etc. 
•	 Improving policy-maker and public understanding of what 
microbial forensics is and what it can accomplish. Currently, 
there is scant literature available for either the general public or 
policy makers that explains either the nature or significance of 
microbial forensics or the fact that moving microbial forensics to 
a fully mature and accepted set of law enforcement tools requires 
substantial long-term scientific effort as well as new policies to 
facilitate that effort and its implementation. 
Conclusion 14: An expansion of technically based training is needed to 
“professionalize” microbial forensics and increase the number of quali-
fied practitioners worldwide by engaging international professional 
organizations or other entities that have experience providing training 
in related fields.
SUMMING UP
In its efforts to identify what is required to develop microbial forensics 
further, the committee used a generous definition of “science,” including 
research to improve fundamental scientific understanding of microbes, 
specialized research intended for particular applications in public health, 
law enforcement, or elsewhere, and an array of technologies and meth-
ods that support both basic and applied research. The committee chose 
breadth over depth and gave particular attention to those science and 
technology areas that would benefit from international cooperation and 
collaboration. The result was an extensive list of needs, as outlined in the 
preceding section. The committee also identified a variety of procedural 
and policy needs, such as common understandings and protocols for 
taking and managing samples within and between nations. These addi-
tional needs must be addressed if the scientific and technical advances 
the committee calls for are to make microbial forensics a more effective 
tool for responding to natural, accidental, or deliberate disease outbreaks. 
This report is not meant to, nor can it, provide a detailed roadmap for the 
international development of microbial forensics, but rather elucidates 
the major issues that the committee believes need to be addressed for the 
global development of the science of microbial forensics.
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SETTING PRIORITIES
The list of needs identified by the committee is long, but the suc-
cessful development of microbial forensics will require addressing all of 
them. The committee emphasizes, however, that there are considerable 
differences in how difficult it will be to address the needs and in whether 
there are already existing national or international efforts, for example, in 
basic research, public health, or industry, that can be drawn upon to help 
achieve the desired results. There are also a number of high-priority needs 
that are particularly challenging tasks with long lead times to achieving 
real progress so that efforts should begin or expand soon. The latter needs 
will also require substantial and sustained support from governments as 
major funders of the research, development, and implementation that will 
be essential for achieving success.
Table 8-1 presents the needs identified in this chapter organized 
according to the key features discussed above:
•	 One set of needs represents tasks, for example, the need to iden-
tify and characterize a significantly increased number of micro-
bial species that are particularly challenging and/or require a 
long lead time to achieve the desired results. Such efforts will 
require the involvement of governments to provide the research 
resources to carry them out over many years and should be given 
priority by participating institutions.
•	 The second set represents needs that could take advantage of 
ongoing efforts to advance the development of microbial foren-
sics, but will require deliberate communication efforts and in 
some cases funding to ensure that microbial forensics applications 
are actually included and implemented.
•	 The third set of needs has the advantage of either a relatively 
short lead time to make substantial progress or the existence 
of significant markets that will provide incentives for industry 
to produce what is required. For example, the production of 
faster and cheaper instruments for diagnostics for medicine and 
genomic analyses for microbial forensics will probably be con-
ducted by industry, which is always seeking to put improved 
devices on the market.
The committee recognizes that there is overlap among the categories 
and that some of the needs would fit within more than one of them. It 
nevertheless believes that exercises like this can be helpful in thinking 
about implementation issues and for the eventual development of a more 
detailed roadmap to guide future efforts.
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TABLE 8-1 Priority Categories for Microbial Forensics Needs
Challenging Tasks and/or Long Lead Times
•	 	An international collaboration engaging the worldwide scientific 
community in a systematic effort to identify, monitor, and 
characterize a far higher proportion of global microbial species to 
increase knowledge about endemism and background. The effort 
should begin with known pathogens and then expand to their 
close relatives as well as emerging pathogens. (Conclusion 1, 
Basic Science)
•	 	Development of high-confidence methods to distinguish among 
natural, accidental, and deliberate outbreaks of infectious disease. 
(Conclusion 2, Basic Science)
•	 	Increased emphasis on development and validation of processes 
(sample collection, preservation, handling, storage, packaging, 
and transportation) and analytical methods for microbial 
forensics, including establishing standards for most components. 
(Conclusion 9, Validation and Standards)
•	 	Discussions under the auspices of an international body that has 
the respect of the international political and scientific communities 
about how to share microbial forensic data, and for developing 
and presenting cogent arguments that can be persuasive to 
political leaders and scientists worldwide. (Conclusion 12, 
Bioinformatics and Data/Data Sharing)
•	 	An international effort to design and establish more systematic 
and comprehensive reference collections and databases for 
pathogens and other microorganisms. This effort could take 
advantage of existing models, such as the World Data Centre for 
Microorganisms and the American Type Culture Collection. A 
model system for a consortium of reference collections and data 
storage centers could be created and later scaled up to become 
more inclusive. (Conclusion 13, Bioinformatics and Data/
databases and Reference Collections)
Ongoing Efforts on Which to Build
•	 	Increased emphasis on research to determine mechanisms of 
pathogenicity, including virulence factors and host immune 
responses. (Conclusion 5, Needs Common to Medicine, Public 
Health, and Microbial Forensics)
•	 	Priority research is needed to realize the promise of metagenomics 
and its application to microbial forensics and the development of 
the forensic value of the other “omics”: proteomics, metabolomics, 
transcriptomics, glycomics, immunogenomics, etc. (Conclusion 3, 
Basic Science)
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Microbial forensics has specialized needs because of the demand for 
“evidence” and “proof” in the context of law enforcement or international 
policy. Many of these relate as much to the quality of the process by 
which material is collected and analyzed as to the science and technol-
ogy employed. The strong presence of public health needs in this report 
reflects the global reality that in most countries the only capabilities and 
activities relevant to microbial forensics occur in the context of public 
health. The United States is largely the exception in having a microbial 
TABLE 8-1 Continued
•	 	Greatly improved global disease monitoring and surveillance in 
humans, animals, and plants to facilitate rapid response and better 
disease control. (Conclusion 6, Needs Common to Medicine, 
Public Health, and Microbial Forensics)
•	 	Improved worldwide access to molecular diagnostics (PCR, 
WGS, etc.), including refinement and distribution of benchtop 
NGS instruments that are fast and affordable and have simple 
workflow procedures. (Conclusion 4, Needs Common to 
Medicine, Public Health, and Microbial Forensics)
•	 	High priority placed on continued research and development 
to improve physical science applications to microbial forensics. 
(Conclusion 8, Methods and Technologies)
•	 	Refinement of bioinformatics and statistical methods for 
evaluating evidence in microbial forensics, including new 
algorithms that scale to very large or complex datasets. 
(Conclusion 11, Bioinformatics and Data)
Shorter Lead Times or Industry Incentives
•	 	Development of more advanced, faster, and cheaper assay and 
sequencing technologies that can be standardized and made more 
accessible to benefit both microbial forensics and public health. 
(Conclusion 7, Methods and Technologies)
•	 	A compilation of all protocols in use (e.g., for sampling, DNA 
extraction and isolation, and sequencing) and whether and 
how they have been validated. (Conclusion 10, Validation and 
Standards)
•	 	Expansion of technically based training to “professionalize” 
microbial forensics and increase the number of qualified 
practitioners worldwide by engaging international professional 
organizations or other entities that have experience providing 
training in related fields. (Conclusion 14, Training and Education)
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forensics science community that is differentiated from public health, 
reflecting its experiences in the early 2000s with the anthrax letters. Some 
militaries in developed countries are creating microbial forensic capabili-
ties, and nations such as the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, China, 
and France have basic microbial forensics infrastructures. But for most of 
the rest of the world, microbial forensics is a side activity of public health 
officials. Since most disease outbreaks will first be recognized through 
the public health infrastructure, strengthening detection and diagnostic 
capacities there serves both public health and microbial forensics. In this 
regard, the new Global Health Security Agenda as an alliance among 
over 25 countries, the European Union, and three international organiza-
tions (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organization for Animal 
Health (OIE), and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) illustrates 
the potential for initiatives to address global disease threats of any ori-
gin to contribute to building fundamental microbial forensic capabilities. 
As one of the documents announcing the new collaboration framed the 
challenge:
An interconnected world is increasing the opportunities for human, 
animal and zoonotic diseases to emerge and spread globally. Today’s 
health security threats arise from at least 5 sources: the emergence and 
spread of new microbes; the globalization of travel and food supply; the 
rise of drug-resistant pathogens; the acceleration of biological science 
capabilities and the risk that these capabilities may cause the inadvertent 
or intentional release of pathogens; and continued concerns about ter-
rorist acquisition, development, and use of biological agents. The recent 
emergence of the H7N9 influenza virus and Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome Coronavirus underscore infectious disease as a serious global 
threat. Since the emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in 
2003, the world has made great progress in strengthening local, regional, 
and international capacity to prevent, detect and respond to emerg-
ing infectious disease threats. Yet, despite important accomplishments, 
much remains to be done to achieve our shared global health security 
vision. Only 16% of countries reported reaching full compliance with 
the core IHR [International Health Regulations] competencies by the 
June 2012 deadline set by the WHO. Vulnerabilities include geographic 
areas with limited disease surveillance systems, reluctance to share out-
break information or biological samples, emergence of new pathogens 
and development of drug-resistance, and the specter of intentional or 
accidental release of biological agents. Multi-sectoral collaboration and 
the combined resources and expertise of the health and security sectors 
will be required to efficiently match resources to needs, avoid redundant 
efforts, and identify gaps. In 2013, for the first time, the G20 called upon 
countries to strengthen compliance with the WHO IHR—the standard by 
which the world measures its preparedness for emerging disease threats, 
as well as bioterrorist events. (White House, 2014) 
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The committee commends the Global Health Security Agenda and 
hopes that its implementation will include a conscious effort to develop 
new capacities and connections among institutions, including those in 
the scientific community, that have a role in responding to this range of 
threats. Although the new agenda promotes a welcome multisectoral col-
laboration between the health and security sectors, it will be important 
to consider how the needs of law enforcement and legal standards for 
“evidence” and “proof” can be related to the new Agenda. It is hoped 
that the Agenda will eventually accommodate clear considerations of the 
needs of microbial forensics.
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Committee Biographies
John D. Clements (Chair) is professor and chair of microbiology and 
immunology, Tulane University School of Medicine. After receiving his 
doctorate in 1979 from the University of Texas Health Science Center at 
Dallas, Dr. Clements completed a National Research Council Associate-
ship at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research in Washington, DC. In 
1980, Dr. Clements was appointed as assistant professor in the Depart-
ments of Microbiology and Medicine at the University of Rochester 
School of Medicine in Rochester, New York. In 1982, Dr. Clements joined 
the faculty at Tulane University, where he has served as professor and 
chair of the Department of Microbiology and Immunology since 1999. 
Dr. Clements served as Vice Dean for Research from 2006 to 2009, and 
in 2009 was appointed as Director of the Tulane Center for Infectious 
Diseases. Dr. Clements is currently Director of the Tulane/Xavier Vac-
cine Development/Engineering Project supported by the Department of 
Defense, co-director of the South Louisiana Institute for Infectious Disease 
Research, and co-director of the Louisiana Vaccine Center, both collabora-
tive projects between Tulane University and Louisiana State University 
Health Sciences Center in New Orleans. 
Research in Dr. Clements’s laboratory has resulted in more than 100 
peer-reviewed publications and book chapters and 13 issued patents. Dr. 
Clements currently serves on the Defense Health Board and the Scientific 
Advisory Boards of the Western Regional Center for Excellence in Bio-
defense Research and the PATH Enteric Vaccine initiative. In 2002, Dr. 
Clements chaired the committee to review all military infectious disease 
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research programs for the Department of Defense. In 2003, and again 
in 2004, Dr. Clements served as a member of the Iraq Survey Group in 
Baghdad as a subject-matter expert in weapons of mass destruction and 
dual-use equipment and programs. Dr. Clements is a veteran of the U.S. 
Marine Corps and served on active duty from 1966 to 1972. He was hon-
orably discharged at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel from the U.S. Marine 
Corps Reserves in 1991.
Munirul Alam is senior scientist, International Center for Diarrhoeal Dis-
eases Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B). Dr. Alam joined the ICDDR,B in 
late 2003 as a consultant scientist and was appointed to be a staff scientist 
in 2007 and senior scientist in 2010. Dr. Alam is the principal investigator 
(PI) of the National Institutes of Health–funded multiyear cholera study, 
Epidemiology and Ecology of V. cholerae in Bangladesh, which is running 
on its third consecutive term at ICDDR,B under collaborative agreements 
with the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Dr. Alam has 
been the coordinator of the Diarrheal Disease Epidemiology and Ecology 
research group and actively involved in molecular epidemiological and 
ecological surveillance of cholera in Bangladesh, including monitoring of 
the plankton community dynamics and climate variables in relation to 
the seasonal epidemics with the aim of developing a predictive model for 
cholera and other infectious diseases. Dr. Alam also conducts a hospital-
based cholera intervention study, and his research interests include safe 
drinking water, bacterial community dynamics in human gut and envi-
ronment, microbial forensics, drug resistance of enteric pathogens, and 
metagenomics.
Dr. Alam holds bachelor of science and master of science degrees 
from the University of Dhaka. He started his career as a pharmaceutical 
microbiologist in 1989 and was appointed lecturer of the Department 
of Microbiology at the University of Dhaka in 1991. Dr. Alam won the 
Monbukagusho scholarship and obtained a Ph.D. in microbiology from 
Okayama University, Japan, in 1996. He was an assistant professor and 
later an associate professor of Dhaka University. He was on postdoctoral 
fellowships for different terms in institutions in the United States, Japan, 
and Germany. He has actively attended more than 50 national and inter-
national scientific conferences and served as the oral, invited, and keynote 
speaker. Dr. Alam also served as chair and cochair of scientific sessions. 
Dr. Alam has supervised more than 80 research students including M.S., 
M.Phil., and Ph.D. candidates, and has authored 88 research articles pub-
lished in peer-reviewed journals including Proceedings of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences and The Lancet. He has been a member of many national 
and international professional societies including the American Society 
for Microbiology. For his outstanding contributions in the field of micro-
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biology, Dr. Alam has been elected a Fellow of the American Academy of 
Microbiology (2013). He has been a faculty member of the Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health since 2011, and a visiting fellow of the 
University of Technology Sydney, Australia (2011-2014). He has been a 
member of international scientific committees and on the editorial boards 
of many national and international peer-reviewed journals. Dr. Alam 
is the former President of the Graduate Microbiologists Association of 
Bangladesh. 
Bruce Budowle is director, Institute of Applied Genetics, and profes-
sor, Department of Molecular and Medical Genetics, University of North 
Texas Health Science Center. Dr. Budowle received a Ph.D. in genetics 
in 1979 from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. From 
1979 to 1982, Dr. Budowle was a postdoctoral fellow at the University 
of Alabama at Birmingham. Working under a National Cancer Institute 
fellowship, he carried out research predominately on genetic risk factors 
for such diseases as insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, melanoma, and 
acute lymphocytic leukemia.
In 1983, Dr. Budowle joined the research unit at the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) to carry out research, development, and validation 
of methods for forensic biological analyses. The positions he has held at 
the FBI include research chemist, program manager for DNA research, 
chief of the Forensic Science Research Unit, and the senior scientist for the 
Laboratory Division of the FBI. Dr. Budowle has contributed to the fun-
damental sciences as they apply to forensics in analytical development, 
population genetics, statistical interpretation of evidence, and quality 
assurance. Some of the methods he developed are (1) analytical assays 
for typing a myriad of protein genetic marker systems; (2) designing 
electrophoretic instrumentation; (3) developing molecular biology ana-
lytical systems to include restriction fragment length polymorphism typ-
ing of variable number tandem repeat (VNTR) loci and polymerase chain 
reaction–based single-nucleotide polymorphism assays, VNTR and short 
tandem repeat assays, and direct sequencing methods for mitochondrial 
DNA; (4) new technologies; and (5) designing image analysis systems. 
Dr. Budowle has worked on laying some of the foundations for the cur-
rent statistical analyses in forensic biology and defining the parameters 
of relevant population groups. Dr. Budowle has been directly involved in 
developing quality assurance (QA) standards for the forensic DNA field. 
He has been a member of the Scientific Working Group on DNA Methods, 
chair of the DNA Commission of the International Society of Forensic 
Genetics, and a member of the DNA Advisory Board. He was one of the 
architects of the CODIS National DNA database, which maintains DNA 
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profiles from convicted felons, from evidence in unsolved cases, and from 
missing persons.
Some of Dr. Budowle’s efforts over the last decade are in counter-
terrorism, primarily in efforts involving microbial forensics and bioter-
rorism. Dr. Budowle is heavily involved in the forensic applications on 
bioterrorism and has been involved in developing the field known as 
microbial forensics. In the area of microbial forensics, Dr. Budowle has 
been the chair of the FBI’s Scientific Working Group on Microbial Genetics 
and Forensics, whose mission was to set QA guidelines, develop criteria 
for biologic and user databases, set criteria for a national repository, and 
develop forensic genomic applications. He also has served on the Steering 
Committee for the Colloquium on Microbial Forensics sponsored by the 
American Society of Microbiology and was the organizer of three Micro-
bial Forensics Meetings held at The Banbury Center in the Cold Spring 
Harbor Laboratory. 
In 2009, Dr. Budowle became executive director of the Institute of 
Applied Genetics and professor in the Department of Forensic and Inves-
tigative Genetics at the University of North Texas Health Science Center 
at Fort Worth. His current efforts focus on the areas of human forensic 
identification, microbial forensics, and emerging infectious diseases. He is 
working on microbial forensics topics such as attribution, QA, population 
genetics, next-generation sequencing technology, and sample collection. 
Dr. Budowle’s commitment to helping families resolve missing persons 
cases led him to Fort Worth after a lifetime in the Virginia/Washington, 
DC area in order to collaborate with Health Science Center researchers 
and advance the knowledge and use of forensics and DNA to improve 
health and safety of the world’s population. Dr. Budowle has also been 
instrumental in establishing the DNA-ProKids initiative to identify miss-
ing children on an international scale.
Jongsik Chun is associate professor of biology, Seoul National University. 
Dr. Chun serves on Seoul National University’s Interdisciplinary Program 
in Bioinformatics Steering Committee. Dr. Chun is associated with a num-
ber of institutes at Seoul National University, including the Institute of 
Microbiology Research, the Genetic Engineering Combustion Institute, 
and the International Vaccine Institute. He also assists the Rural Develop-
ment Administration and the Institute of Agriculture and Life Sciences. 
He has previously served as a research associate at the Center of Marine 
Biotechnology at the University of Maryland and as senior researcher at 
the Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and Biotechnology.
Dr. Chun received his B.Sc. from Seoul National University and com-
pleted his Ph.D. at Newcastle University School of Medicine. Dr. Chun 
completed his postdoctoral work at the Research Center for Molecular 
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Microbiology at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun is the Associate 
Editor of the International Journal of Systematic and Evolutionary Microbiol-
ogy. He serves as an editorial board member for Antonie van Leeuwenhoek 
(Dutch Kluwer four issues) and Microbes and Environments.
Rita R. Colwell is distinguished university professor, University of 
Maryland at College Park, and distinguished university professor, Johns 
Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health. Dr. Colwell’s 
interests are focused on global infectious diseases, water, and health, and 
she is currently developing an international network to address emerging 
infectious diseases and water issues, including safe drinking water for 
both the developed and developing world. Dr. Colwell has shown how 
changes in climate, adverse weather events, shifts in ocean circulation, 
and other ecological processes can create conditions that allow infectious 
diseases to spread. In addition to her academic roles, Dr. Colwell is senior 
adviser and chairperson of Canon U.S. Life Sciences, and chairman and 
president of CosmosID, which is exploring the potential applications of 
molecular diagnostic technologies to the field of life sciences. 
Dr. Colwell served as the 11th director of the National Science Foun-
dation from 1998 to 2004. She has previously served as chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the American Academy of Microbiology and also 
as president of the American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence, the Washington Academy of Sciences, the American Society for 
Microbiology, the Sigma Xi National Science Honorary Society, and the 
International Union of Microbiological Societies. Dr. Colwell has also 
been awarded 54 honorary degrees from institutions of higher education, 
including her alma mater, Purdue University. Dr. Colwell holds a B.S. in 
bacteriology and an M.S. in genetics from Purdue University, and a Ph.D. 
in oceanography from the University of Washington. She is a member of 
the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, and the American Philosophical Society. She is the recipi-
ent of the Order of the Rising Sun bestowed by the emperor of Japan and 
the National Medal of Science bestowed by the president of the United 
States. She is a U.S. science envoy and a member of the National Academy 
of Sciences.
Nancy D. Connell is professor of medicine, Rutgers New Jersey Medical 
School, Rutgers University, and director, Rutgers New Jersey Medical 
School Center for Biodefense. Dr. Connell is professor in the Division of 
Infectious Disease in the Department of Medicine at Rutgers New Jersey 
Medical School (RNJMS) and the Rutgers Biomedical Health Sciences. A 
Harvard University Ph.D. in microbiology, Dr. Connell’s major research 
focus is antibacterial drug discovery in respiratory pathogens such as 
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Mycobacterium tuberculosis and Bacillus anthracis. She is director of the 
Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) Facility of RNJMS’s Center for the Study of 
Emerging and Re-emerging Pathogens and chairs the university’s Insti-
tutional Biosafety Committee. Dr. Connell has been continuously funded 
by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and other agencies since 1993 
and serves on numerous NIH study sections and review panels. She has 
served on a number of committees of the National Academy of Sciences, 
for example, the Committee on Advances in Technology and the Preven-
tion of Their Application to Next Generation Biowarfare Agents (2004), 
Trends in Science and Technology Relevant to the Biological Weapons 
Convention; an International Workshop (2010); the Committee to Review 
the Scientific Approaches Used in the FBI’s Investigation of the 2001 Bacil-
lus anthracis Mailings (2011) and the Educational Institute for Responsible 
Science (Malaysia) (2013).
Paul Keim is Cowden endowed chair in microbiology and Arizona 
regents professor, Northern Arizona University. Dr. Keim is the director 
of Northern Arizona University’s Microbial Genetics and Genomics Cen-
ter. He also directs the Pathogen Genomics Division at the Translational 
Genomics Research Institute (TGen), a nonprofit research institute. He 
maintains his Laboratory Affiliate at Los Alamos National Laboratory in 
the Division of Biosciences. Dr. Keim’s current research interests include 
genomic analysis of bacterial pathogens and the application of genomic 
technology to clinical diagnostic problems. 
Dr. Keim’s laboratory has developed high-resolution strain typing 
analysis methods for the forensic analysis of Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pes-
tis, and Francisella tularensis. He has participated in collaborative projects 
with scientists from the former Soviet Union to understand the ecology 
and epidemiology of these pathogens. 
Dr. Keim has served on grant review panels for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture and the National Institutes of Health; on advisory 
groups for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services; and on three previous National Research Council committees. 
He received a B.S. in biology and chemistry from Northern Arizona Uni-
versity and a Ph.D. in botany from the University of Kansas. He has 
done postdoctoral work in genetics, genomics, and biotechnology. He 
is currently a member of the FBI’s Scientific Working Group on Forensic 
Analysis of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism, the 
National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense, and the Executive Advi-
sory Committee for the Pacific Southwest Regional Center for Biodefense. 
He is a fellow of the American Academy of Microbiology.
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Juncai Ma is assistant director of the Institute of Microbiology at the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), and deputy chairman of the Expert 
Committee on CAS Databases. Dr. Ma is the director of the Committee on 
Type Culture Collection CAS and commissioner of the CODATA Chinese 
National Committee, and executive of the World Federation for Culture 
Collections. Currently he is mainly engaged in the research work on bio-
grid, parallel indexing, super-large-scaled full-text retrieval technology, a 
search engine of remote heterogeneous databases, Linux Cluster System, 
and comprehensive utilization of information technology in the field of 
biology. Meanwhile, he is in charge of the implementation of a variety of 
projects, including the China Microbial Resource Database, the Informa-
tion Network System of CAS Biology Specimen Museum, the Microbial 
Information Gateway of National Scientific Digital Library, the E-Science 
Bio-Grid, the National Scientific Data Sharing Platform, as well as the 
Information Network of Chinese Biotechnology and Industry. In 2006, 
he received a Ph.D. from the Biological Resource Department of Mie 
University, Japan.
Alemka Markotić is professor at the Medical School of the University 
of Rijeka, associate member of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts, and lecturer on bioterrorism and biodefense at the Forensic Sci-
ences Study at the University of Split, Croatia. Dr. Markotić is head of the 
Research Department and head of the Department for Clinical Immu-
nology, University Hospital for Infectious Diseases (UHID) in Zagreb, 
Croatia. She received her M.D. at the University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1989), an M.S. in medical microbiology and parasitology 
(1996), and a Ph.D. in infectious diseases (1999) from the University of 
Zagreb Medical School. 
Dr. Markotić began her biomedical research career at the University 
of Sarajevo Medical School in Bosnia and Herzegovina studying ribavirin 
treatment of hantaviruses during which time she collaborated with the 
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Medical Diseases (USAMRIID) 
in Frederick, Maryland. She later received a National Academy of Sci-
ences, National Research Council Postdoctoral Fellowship at USAMRIID 
to conduct research on the immunopathenogenesis of hantaviruses. On 
the basis of this work, she received the Joel Dalymple Memorial Award 
(American Society of Virology) and the USAMRIID Coin. 
Dr. Markotić’s research on hantaviruses has earned her seven national 
and nine international awards. She has published more than 80 peer-
reviewed papers, 14 book chapters and delivered over 90 presentations 
at national and international conferences. She has been the principal 
investigator on research projects studying immune responses to intracel-
lular pathogens, zoonoses, and apoptosis in hantavirus-infected 293HEK 
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
198 APPENDIX A
cells. At the UHID, Dr. Markotić established the Center for Emerging and 
Re-emerging Diseases with nine international and six national partners, 
and she is responsible for managing the first Croatian BSL-3 laboratory 
at the UHID. At the request of the European Union (EU) Commission, 
Dr. Markotić designed, organized, and presented a biosafety/biosecurity 
training workshop in Beijing, China, in May 2009. She worked for several 
years at the Institute of Immunology in Zagreb as a head of the Viral Vac-
cines and Interferon Quality Control Unit. 
She is a member of the Council of the International Society for Hanta-
viruses and the Board for Allergy and Clinical Immunology at the Croatian 
Academy of Sciences and Arts, was a member of the Committee of the 
Croatian Science Foundation and the National Council for Science, and 
was vice president of the Scientific Council in the Scope of Biomedicine 
and Health. In 2004, 2005, and 2009, she was an expert evaluator for FP6 
projects (EU Commission, Brussels) in immunology and emerging infec-
tious diseases. In the 1990s, during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
she helped organize the Caritas Pharmacy and Health Care Unit that 
addressed the health needs of those affected by the conflict.
Geoffrey Smith is professor of pathology and Wellcome Trust Principal 
Research Fellow, Emmanuel College, Cambridge University. Dr. Smith is 
a British virologist and medical research authority in the area of Vaccinia 
virus and the family of Poxviruses. Dr. Smith completed his bachelor’s 
degree at the University of Leeds in 1977, and in 1981 gained a Ph.D. in 
virology while in London. Between 1981 and 1984, while he was work-
ing in the United States at the National Institutes of Health, Dr. Smith 
developed and pioneered the use of genetically engineered live vaccines. 
Between 1985 and 1989, he lectured at the University of Cambridge. 
Prior to 2002, he was based at the Sir William Dunn School of Pathol-
ogy at the University of Oxford. Between 1988 and 1992, his work was 
funded by the Jenner Fellowship from the Lister Institute; he became a 
governor of the institute in 2003. In 1992 the Society for General Microbi-
ology awarded Dr. Smith its Fleming Award for outstanding work by a 
young microbiologist. In 2002, he was elected as a fellow of the Academy 
of Medical Sciences. In 2003, he was invited to become a fellow of the 
Royal Society and in 2005 was awarded the Feldburg Foundation Prize for 
his work on poxviruses. Smith was editor-in-chief of the Journal of General 
Virology until 2008 and chairs the World Health Organization’s Advisory 
Committee on Variola Virus Research. As of 2009, he remains head of the 
Department of Virology at Imperial College London and is president of 
the International Union of Microbiological Societies.
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Convening Organizations
THE CROATIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS
Founded in 1861, the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts is the 
highest scientific and artistic institution in the Republic of Croatia. 
The founder of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts was Josip 
Juraj Strossmayer, bishop of Đakovo and Srijem, whose proposal to found 
the Academy of Sciences was unanimously approved by the Croatian 
Parliament in April 1861. Bishop Strossmayer was elected the patron of 
the Academy and the historian Canon Franjo Rački the first president. 
This national academy of sciences and arts took the name Accademia 
Slavorum Meridionalium (of the South Slavs).
The Academy promotes and organizes scientific research and encour-
ages the application of the findings of this research, develops artistic and 
cultural activities, and is concerned with Croatian cultural heritage and its 
affirmation throughout the world. It also publishes the results of scientific 
research and artistic creation and makes proposals and gives its opinion 
on the promotion of sciences and arts in the fields that are of special 
importance to the Republic of Croatia.
The Croatian Academy’s scientific and artistic activities are carried 
out through its nine departments (I—Department of Social Sciences, 
II—Department of Mathematical, Physical and Chemical Sciences, III—
Department of Natural Sciences, IV—Department of Medical Sciences, 
V—Department of Philological Sciences, VI—Department of Literature, 
VII—Department of Fine Arts, VIII—Department of Music and Musicol-
ogy, and IX—Department of Technical Sciences), as well as through its 
199
Copyright © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Science Needs for Microbial Forensics:  Initial International Research Priorities
200 APPENDIX B
scientific councils and committees. The research is performed through 
the scientific and research units (institutes) of the Croatian Academy in 
Zagreb and other Croatian towns. The Croatian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts collaborates with other academies of sciences and arts, international 
scientific organizations, universities, scientific institutions, state bodies, 
cultural and other institutions, as well as with individual scholars and 
artists from Croatia and abroad.
The main bodies of the Academy are the Assembly, which includes all 
full members of the Academy, the Presidency, the executive body of the 
Assembly, which consists of the Management Board members, secretaries 
of the departments, and five full members of the Academy.
The Academy consists of honorary, full, corresponding, and associate 
members. Full members reserve the right to bear the title of Fellow of the 
Croatian Academy (F.C.A.), and they are part of the permanent working 
structure of the Academy.
The Croatian Academy may elect as honorary members, persons who 
are exceptionally meritorious for the development and progress of sci-
ences and arts. Among its deceased members, we should mention the 
Nobel Laureates Lavoslav Ružička, Vladimir Prelog, Ivo Andrić, and 
Linus Pauling; Nikola Tesla, world famous scientist and inventor; Vlaho 
Bukovac, famous Croatian painter; Ivan Meštrović, world famous sculp-
tor; and Andrija Štampar, founder of the World Health Organization; 
Dmitrij Ivanovič Mendeljejev; and numerous other world-renowned sci-
entists and artists.
The managment board of the Academy for the period from 2011 to 
2014 consists of the President, Professor Zvonko Kusić; two vice-presi-
dents, Professor Velimir Neidhardt and Professor Jakša Barbić; Secretary-
General, Professor Pavao Rudan; and Secretary, Marina Štancl.
More information is available at http://info.hazu.hr/. 
THE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF 
MICROBIOLOGICAL SOCIETIES (IUMS)
The Union is one of the 31 Scientific Unions of the International Coun-
cil of Science (ICSU). It was founded in 1927 as the International Society of 
Microbiology, and became the International Association of Microbiologi-
cal Societies affiliated with the International Union of Biological Sciences 
(IUBS) as a Division in 1967. It acquired independence in 1980 and became 
a Union Member of ICSU in 1982.
The objectives of the Union are to promote the study of microbiologi-
cal sciences internationally: initiate, facilitate, and coordinate research and 
other scientific activities that involve international cooperation; ensure the 
discussion and dissemination of the results of international conferences, 
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symposia, and meetings and assist in the publication of their reports; 
represent microbiological sciences in ICSU; and maintain contact with 
other international organizations. The major goal of IUMS is to promote 
research and the open exchange of scientific information for advance-
ment of the health and welfare of humankind and the environment and it 
strongly discourages any uses of knowledge and resources to the contrary. 
In particular, the IUMS strives to promote ethical conduct of research and 
training in the areas of biosecurity and biosafety so as to prevent use of 
microorganisms as biological weapons and therefore to protect the pub-
lic’s health and to promote world peace. IUMS seeks that all its member 
societies adopt or develop a Code of Ethics to prevent misuse of scientific 
knowledge and resources. The scientific activities of the Union are con-
ducted by the three Divisions of Bacteriology & Applied Microbiology 
(BAM), Mycology, and Virology and by six specialist international com-
mittees, eight international commissions, and two international federa-
tions. Their major activities include the classification and nomenclature of 
bacteria, fungi, and viruses; food microbiology; medical microbiology and 
diagnostics; culture collections; education; and biological standardization. 
The Divisions are responsible for the organization of their International 
Congresses (International Congress of Bacteriology and Applied Micro-
biology, International Congress of Mycology, and International Congress 
of Virology), and the committees, commissions, and federations organize 
their own meetings.
More information is available at http://www.iums.org/. 
THE ROYAL SOCIETY
The Royal Society is a self-governing fellowship of many of the 
world’s most distinguished scientists drawn from all areas of science, 
engineering, and medicine. 
The Society’s fundamental purpose, reflected in its founding charters 
of the 1660s, is to recognize, promote, and support excellence in science 
and to encourage the development and use of science for the benefit of 
humanity.
The Society has played a part in some of the most fundamental, 
significant, and life-changing discoveries in scientific history, and Royal 
Society scientists continue to make outstanding contributions to science 
in many research areas.
The Royal Society is the national academy of science in the United 
Kingdom, and its core is its Fellowship and Foreign Membership, sup-
ported by a dedicated staff in London and elsewhere. The Fellowship 
comprises the most eminent scientists of the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
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and the Commonwealth. Its current president is Sir Paul Nurse, a geneti-
cist who was awarded the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine in 2001.
A major activity of the Society is identifying and supporting the work 
of outstanding scientists. The Society supports researchers through its 
early and senior career schemes, innovation and industry schemes, and 
other schemes.
The Society facilitates interaction and communication among scien-
tists via its discussion meetings, and disseminates scientific advances 
through its journals. The Society also engages beyond the research com-
munity, through independent policy work, the promotion of high-quality 
science education and communication with the public.
The Royal Society’s Science Policy Centre provides independent, 
timely, and authoritative scientific advice to U.K., European, and inter-
national decision makers. It champions the contribution that science and 
innovation can make to economic prosperity, quality of life, and environ-
mental sustainability and is a hub for debate about science, society, and 
public policy.
More information is available at www.royalsociety.org.
THE U.S. NATIONAL ACADEMIES
The National Academies of the United States comprise four organiza-
tions: the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engi-
neering, the Institute of Medicine, and the National Research Council.
The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpet-
uating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engi-
neering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology 
and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter 
granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that 
requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical 
matters. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone is president of the National Academy of 
Sciences.
The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under 
the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organiza-
tion of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration 
and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy 
of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The 
National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs 
aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and 
recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. C. D. Mote, Jr. is 
president of the National Academy of Engineering.
The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National 
Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appro-
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priate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the 
health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to 
the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an 
adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to iden-
tify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Victor J. Dzau is 
president of the Institute of Medicine.
The National Research Council was organized by the National Acad-
emy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and 
technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and 
advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general 
policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the princi-
pal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the 
National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the govern-
ment, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The 
Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of 
Medicine. Dr. Cicerone and Dr. Mote are chair and vice chair, respectively, 
of the National Research Council.
More information is available at http://www.national-academies.org.
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Appendix C
Agenda
13-16 October 2013 
Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts
SUNDAY, 13 OCTOBER
17:30 Registration
18:00–19:30 Welcome Reception (Palace Hotel)
Welcome from sponsoring organizations 
	 •	 Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts—
  o Zvonko Kusić, FCA, President
  o  Dragan Dekaris, FCA, member, Department of 
Medical Sciences
	 •	 	U. K. Royal Society and International Union of 
Microbiological Societies—Elinor Buxton for Geoffrey 
Smith
	 •	 U.S. National Academy of Sciences—John Clements
MONDAY, 14 OCTOBER
8:15 Registration, Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts 
   **All plenary sessions at Croatian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts
205
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9:00 Opening Plenary
 Chair: John Clements
 Welcome/Meeting Goals: John Clements
  Introduction: “The Emerging Field of Microbial Forensics”: 
Randall Murch
	 •	 	Why is there a need for microbial forensics and why 
is it important? What is the current state of the art and 
today’s cutting-edge techniques and infrastructure? 
How do the forensics used for criminal investigations 
differ from epidemiological investigations for public 
health? 
	 •	 	What are the major research challenges for the field? 
How can basic science be used to solve the current 
challenges for microbial forensics and how might this 
help in other areas, such as public health?
 Comments:
	 •	 	Piers Millet
	 •	 	Mats Forsman
 Q&A 
10:30 Break
11:00  Plenary: Microbial Ecology and Diversity—Microbial 
Forensics in the Context of Population Genetics
 Chair: Paul Keim
	 •	 	What is known, in general, about the ecology of 
pathogens globally—Ruifu Yang 
	 •	 	Microbial ecology and diversity in the context of 
microbial forensics—Aaron Darling
 Q&A
12:00 Lunch (Palace Hotel)
 Lunch Speaker
 Chair: Geoffrey Smith
  Talk: “Croatian Accomplishments in Forensics Genetics”—
Dragan Primorac 
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13:30  Plenary: Clinical and Forensic Approaches to Microbial 
Identification 
 Chair: Dragan Primorac
	 •	 	Technologies and techniques for forensics—Dana 
Kadavy
	 •	 	Clinical diagnostic practices—Alemka Markotić
 Q&A
14:45  Plenary: Technologies and Approaches for Identifying 
Microbes for Law Enforcement—The 2001 Anthrax 
Letters 
  After a talk about the anthrax letters case, a panel of 
experts will make short comments to amplify specific 
aspects or perspectives, offer lessons from other cases.
 Chair: Gilles Vergnaud
 Speaker: Paul Keim
 Comments: 
	 •	 	Anthrax-contaminated heroin in Scotland and 
Germany—Richard Vipond
	 •	 	Hepatitis C case in Spain—Fernando 
González-Candelas
	 •	 	An international perspective: Inspections for biological 
weapons capabilities—Rocco Casagrande
	 •	 	An international perspective: UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540—Dana Perkins
 Q&A
16:15  Poster Session and Reception, Croatian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts
  This session is intended to allow participants to discuss 
their research in an informal setting.
	 •	 	Welcome from Pavao Rudan, FCA, Secretary General of 
the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts
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TUESDAY, 15 OCTOBER
9:00  Plenary: Technologies and Approaches for Identifying 
Microbes in Public Health—The E. coli O104 Case
  After a talk about the E. coli O104 case, a panel of experts 
will make short comments to offer lessons from other 
cases and amplify specific aspects or other perspectives.
 Chair: Munirul Alam
 Speaker: Dag Harmsen
 Comments:
	 •	 	Haruo Watanabe
	 •	 	Stephen Morse
	 •	 	Raymond Lin
 Q&A
10:30 Break
11:00 Plenary: Sampling and Preservation Methods 
  A talk will address key issues, such as public health 
versus criminal investigation, transportation and storage, 
accepted protocols and practices, and the more general 
question of whether there is a need for standardized 
methods that are shared internationally. A panel of experts 
will make comments at points during the talk.
 Chair: Bruce Budowle
 Speaker: Adam Hamilton
 Comments: 
	 •	 	Stephen Morse
	 •	 	Cerys Rees
 Q&A
12:15 Lunch (Palace Hotel) 
 Lunch Speaker
 Chair: Herawati Sudoyo
  Talk: “The Importance of Reference Collections and the 
Role of the World Data Center for Microorganisms”—
Juncai Ma
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13:45  Plenary: Validation and Reference Materials for 
Microbial Forensics 
  A talk will address key issues, such as guidelines and 
components for validation, transportation and storage, test 
materials, and whether there is a need for internationally 
accepted standards for validation.
 Chair: Cindi Corbett
 Speaker: Bruce Budowle
 Q&A
14:45 Plenary: Bioinformatics and Data 
 Chair: Habib Bukhari
	 •	 	Role and importance of bioinformatics and 
computational genomics in microbial forensics— 
 Jongsik Chun
	 •	 	Managing large datasets—Aaron Darling 
Q&A
16:00 Break 
16:30 Breakout sessions 
  These sessions will address questions intended to set the 
stage for the concluding sessions on the final day, such as:
	 •	 	If resources were not an issue, in what kinds of science 
should we invest? 
	 •	 	Given that there are resource constraints, what critical 
investments should receive immediate priority? 
17:30 Adjourn
17:35  Visit to the Strossmayer Gallery of Old Masters of the 
Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts 
19:30 Conference Dinner
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WEDNESDAY, 16 OCTOBER
9:00 Plenary: Reporting Back from the Breakout Sessions
  Brief summaries of key points from the previous day
 Chair: John Clements
 Q&A
9:45 Breakout Sessions
  These sessions will refine and develop further the ideas 




 Chair: John Clements
 Brief summaries of key points from the morning sessions
 General discussion 
 Consideration of other issues, such as
	 •	 	Starting the dialogue toward development of 
international standards
	 •	 Creating opportunities for education and training 
	 •	 	Assessing viability of an international body (e.g., 
UN Secretary General’s Investigation Mechanism) to 
provide first response and investigative assistance
12:30 Adjourn
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List of Presentations 
Bruce Budowle, Director, Institute of Applied Genetics and Professor, 
Department of Molecular and Medical Genetics, University of North 
Texas Health Science Center
•	 Sampling and Preservation: Commentary Using Food and Agri-
culture as Examples of Targets for an Attack with a Bioweapon
•	 Validation and Reference Materials for Microbial Forensics
Rocco Casagrande, Founder and Managing Director, Gryphon Scientific
•	 Technologies and Approaches for Identifying Microbes for Law 
Enforcement: Tools Needed to Support Biological Disarmament
Jongsik Chun, Associate Professor of Biology, Seoul National University
•	 Bioinformatics Challenges for Microbial Forensics
Aaron Darling, Associate Professor in Computational Genomics and Bio-
informatics, University of Technology Sydney Faculty of Science’s ithree 
institute
•	 Big Data and Computing Challenges in Microbial Forensics
•	 Microbial Ecology and Diversity in the Context of Forensics 
Mats Forsman, Research Director for Biological Analyses, Swedish 
Defense Research Agency (FOI)
•	 Commentary: Microbial Forensics—A Swedish Perspective
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Fernando González-Candelas, Full Professor of Genetics, Department of 
Genetics, University of Valencia
•	 Molecular Evolution in Court: Analysis of a Large Hepatitis C 
Virus Outbreak from an Evolving Source
Adam Hamilton, President and CEO, Signature Science
•	 Sampling and Handling for Microbial Forensics Applications
Dag Harmsen, Head of Research, Periodontology Department, University 
Hospital Münster
•	 The E. coli O104 Case 
Dana R. Kadavy, Senior Microbiologist, Signature Science
•	 Forensic Approaches to Microbial Identification
Paul Keim, Cowden Endowed Chair in Microbiology and Arizona 
Regents Professor, Northern Arizona University
•	 The FBI Amerithrax Investigation 
Raymond Lin Tzer Pin, Head and Senior Consultant, Division of Micro-
biology; Clinical Director, Molecular Diagnostic Centre
•	 Commentary: Technologies and Approaches for Identifying 
Microbes in Public Health 
Juncai Ma, Assistant Director of Institute of Microbiology at the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS); Deputy Chairman of the Expert Committee 
on CAS Databases
•	 The Importance of Reference Collections and the Role of the 
World Data Center for Microorganisms
Alemka Markotić, Head, Department for Research, University Hospital 
for Infectious Diseases, Zagreb, Croatia; Professor at the Medical School of 
the University of Rijeka and Associate Member of the Croatian Academy 
of Sciences and Arts
•	 Clinical and Forensic Approaches to Microbial Identification: 
Clinical Diagnostic Practices
Piers Millet, Deputy Head of the Implementation Support Unit, Biologi-
cal Weapons Convention, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
•	 Commentary: The Emerging Field of Microbial Forensics
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Stephen A. Morse, Associate Director for Environmental Microbiology, 
National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
•	 Sampling and Preservation Methods: Public Health Aspects
•	 Technologies and Approaches for Identifying Microbes in Public 
Health
Randall Murch, Professor in Practice, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University, Visiting Professor, Department of War Studies, King’s 
College London, UK
•	 The Trajectory of Microbial Forensics: From Origins to “Grand 
Challenges” 
Dana Perkins, Expert, Group of Experts, Committee established pursuant 
to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
•	 Using Microbial Forensics to Strengthen Biosecurity and the 
Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540
Dragan Primorac, Adjunct Professor, Eberly College of Science, The Penn-
sylvania State University, and Henry C. Lee College of Criminal Jus-
tice and Forensic Sciences, University of New Haven; Professor, Medical 
Schools, Split and Osijek, Croatia
•	 Croatian Accomplishments in Forensics Genetics
Cerys Rees, Capability Lead, CB Analysis & Attribution, Detection 
Department, Dstl Porton Down
•	 Commentary: Sampling and Preservation Methods
Richard Vipond, Operations Manager for the Rare and Imported Patho-
gens Laboratory (RIPL), Public Health England, Porton Down
•	 Heroin-Associated Anthrax Cases 2009/10, 2012 and . . .
Haruo Watanabe, Director General, National Institute of Infectious Dis-
eases, Tokyo, Japan
•	 Commentary: Technologies and Approaches for Identifying 
Microbes in Public Health
Ruifu Yang, Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology
•	 What Is Known, in General, About the Ecology of Pathogens 
Globally
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Appendix F
Speaker Biographies
Bruce Budowle (see Appendix A)
Rocco Casagrande is founder and managing director, Gryphon Scientific. 
Dr. Casagrande holds a B.A. in chemistry and biology from Cornell Uni-
versity and a Ph.D. in experimental biology from the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology. From December 2002 to March 2003, Dr. Casagrande 
worked as a United Nations biological weapons inspector in Iraq, where 
he participated in more than 50 inspections and acted as the chief of the 
U.N. biological analysis laboratory. In a prior post, Dr. Casagrande led a 
team of biologists and engineers at Surface Logix, a Boston-based biotech-
nology firm, to develop and test real-time detectors for biological agents. 
In his most recent position, he led the homeland security practice at Abt 
Associates, one of the nation’s largest public policy research and consult-
ing firms. He has published numerous articles on biological defense and 
has consulted on chemical and biological warfare and defense for several 
congressional offices and government agencies.
Jongsik Chun (see Appendix A)
Aaron Darling is associate professor in computational genomics and 
bioinformatics, University of Technology Sydney Faculty of Science’s 
ithree institute. Dr. Darling has over a decade of experience develop-
ing computational methods for comparative genomics and evolutionary 
modeling, and in 2013, moved from the University of California, Davis 
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(UC Davis) to start a computational genomics group at the University of 
Technology Sydney.
Dr. Darling embarked on his research career at the University of 
Wisconsin–Madison (UW-Madison). Following a bachelor’s degree in 
computer science, he worked with members of the UW-Madison Genome 
Center to sequence and analyze the first genomes of pathogenic Esch-
erichia coli. During this time, Dr. Darling led the development of some 
widely used computational methods for analyzing genomic data, includ-
ing the mpiBLAST open-source parallel BLAST software and the Mauve 
software for comparing multiple genome sequences. Following the award 
of a Ph.D. at UW-Madison, Dr. Darling received a fellowship from the U.S. 
National Science Foundation to pursue postdoctoral studies at the Univer-
sity of Queensland (UQ). After 2 years at UQ, he returned to UC Davis to 
develop a research program in computational metagenomics—the study 
of uncultivated microorganisms from the environment using computa-
tional methods. Dr. Darling now brings his experience to understand the 
relationship between humans and microorganisms in collaboration with 
microbiologists at the ithree institute.
Mats Forsman is research director for biological analyses, Swedish 
Defense Research Agency (FOI).  After finishing his Ph.D. in microbiol-
ogy, he joined the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Division for 
CBRN Defence and Security. In 2002, he was appointed associate profes-
sor, Department of Cell and Molecular Biology, Umeå University. Dr. Fors-
man has represented Sweden for more than 10 years in various Economic 
Development Administration and NATO research projects and working 
groups concerning various biodefense issues. He is currently research 
director and group leader at FOI for biological analyses, a group involved 
in both research and applied activities in the field of molecular diagnos-
tics, bioinformatics, ecology, and epidemiology of pathogenic bacteria.
Fernando González-Candelas is full professor of genetics, Department of 
Genetics, University of Valencia. Dr. González-Candelas’ main research 
interests are in population and evolutionary genetics, molecular and 
evolutionary epidemiology, molecular systematics and genomics, bioin-
formatics, and conservation biology. Dr. González-Candelas is currently 
working on the molecular evolutionary epidemiology of different patho-
gens, mainly RNA viruses, such as hepatitis C virus (HCV) and human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and bacteria, such as Legionella pneumoph-
ila. The basic approach is the analysis of nucleotide sequence variability 
at different levels, from intrapatient to worldwide samples, depending on 
the specific goals of the different projects.
He has previously studied the population and evolutionary biol-
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ogy of Mediterranean endemic Limonium (Plumbaginaceae) species, by 
using an array of genetic markers (random amplified polymorphic DNAs, 
amplified fragment length polymorphisms, microsatellites, isozymes) and 
including the analysis of quantitative traits. In addition, he has been very 
involved in the establishment of the Bioinformatics Service at the Uni-
versity of Valencia, of which he served as head from 1994 to 2000. He has 
also helped in the development of the Automated Sequencing Service. 
Dr. González-Candelas also served as scientific expert on the Spanish 
National Biosafety Council from 1998 until 2010.
Adam Hamilton is president and CEO, Signature Science. Mr. Hamilton’s 
background includes experience in engineering (B.S., M.S.), science (chem-
istry and microbiology), training, statistics, and quality assurance. He is 
a registered professional engineer (1993-present) and has been heavily 
involved in applications of science and engineering for public safety and 
homeland security for more than 25 years. Mr. Hamilton has attained 
the highest level of certification in homeland security from the American 
College of Forensic Examiners and is Federal Emergency Management 
Agency–certified in the National Response Plan and the National Incident 
Management System. Mr. Hamilton is on the Training Advisory Board for 
the Texas Attorney General and is a board member of the Greater Austin 
Crime Commission. He is also a graduate of the FBI Citizen’s Academy 
and has previously served as the HAZMAT Committee Chairman of the 
Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education. 
He also serves as the Future Plans Officer (N5) for the Texas State Guard 
Maritime Regiment and is a certified concealed handgun instructor, wild-
land firefighter, diver, and armorer. 
Mr. Hamilton graduated with honors from the University of Texas at 
Austin with a bachelor of science in engineering and received his master 
of science in engineering from the University of Texas.
Dag Harmsen is head of research, Periodontology Department, Univer-
sity Hospital Münster. He is an M.D. specializing in microbiology and the 
epidemiology of infectious diseases. He commenced his training in 1991 
at the Institute of Hygiene and Microbiology, University of Würzburg 
(Germany). From September 2000 to January 2002 he headed the Research 
and Development Diagnostics division of CREATOGEN AG (Augsburg, 
Germany). From February 2002 to September 2004 was senior research 
scientist at the Institute of Hygiene, University of Münster (Germany). 
From June 2005 until July 2008, he was temporary head of the Department 
of Periodontology, University of Münster. He is now head of research of 
this department. His scientific interests focus on molecular diagnostics, 
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epidemiology, and the phylogeny of microorganisms. Furthermore, he is 
specialized in applied bioinformatics in microbiology.
Dana R. Kadavy is senior microbiologist, Signature Science. Dr. Kadavy 
joined Signature Science in 2003, serving as a microbiologist and principal 
investigator to multiple microbiological and molecular research projects. 
She has developed unique field deployment and sampling, development, 
and validation assays for molecular detection of microorganisms and 
alternative collection TTP to support national security and law enforce-
ment scientific applications. Leveraging her academic teaching experience, 
Dr. Kadavy has developed very popular and effective training programs 
in Hazardous Materials Response and Applied Foundational Biology (for 
response units). Prior to joining Signature Science, Dr. Kadavy served as 
Chief of Bacteriology with the Armed Forces Institute of Technology. 
Dr. Kadavy earned a doctorate in microbiology from the University 
of Nebraska–Lincoln in 2001. She has published multiple professional 
papers and presents regularly at professional conferences.
Paul Keim (see Appendix A)
Raymond Lin Tzer Pin is head and senior consultant, Division of Micro-
biology; Clinical Director, Molecular Diagnostic Centre. Dr. Lin is a senior 
consultant at the Department of Laboratory Medicine, head of the Micro-
biology Division, and clinical director of the Molecular Diagnosis Centre. 
He is adjunct associate professor with the Department of Microbiology, 
Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore. He 
studied medicine at the National University of Singapore and obtained 
his M.Sc. with distinction in medical microbiology at the London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (University of London). He is a Fellow 
of the Royal College of Pathologists of Australia and of the Academy of 
Medicine, Singapore. Professor Lin has wide-ranging interests related 
to medical microbiology, including antibiotic resistance, strain typing, 
molecular diagnostics, and emerging infections. 
Dr. Lin is actively engaged in infection control issues and has had 
experience in several hospitals in this respect. He also believes strongly 
in promoting quality systems in the laboratory and the use of informatics 
in microbiology practice. He has published in many refereed journals and 
has coauthored a monograph on enteroviruses. He sits on committees on 
the hospital and national level, and is involved in two committees of the 
Royal College of Pathologists of Australasia.
Juncai Ma (see Appendix A)
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Alemka Markotić (see Appendix A)
Piers Millet is deputy head of the Implementation Support Unit, Bio-
logical Weapons Convention (CBWC), United Nations Office for Disar-
mament Affairs, in Geneva, Switzerland. His duties there include acting 
as deputy secretary to meetings of the BWC, liaising with international, 
regional, and expert bodies as well as developments in science and tech-
nology relevant to the treaty regime. Dr. Millett has served as a member 
of the Secretariat for all meetings of the BWC since 2001. 
He trained originally as a microbiologist and is a chartered biologist 
in the United Kingdom. He has a doctorate from the University of Brad-
ford on the past, present, and future of anti-animal biological warfare 
which focused heavily on the impact of developments in the life sciences 
on biological weapons.
Dr. Millet also holds postgraduate degrees in international politics 
and security studies as well as research methodology. He is widely pub-
lished on issues related to preventing the acquisition and use of biological 
weapons and is a regular speaker at conferences around the world. His 
efforts have seen him collaborate with a range of other intergovernmen-
tal organizations, including the World Health Organization, the World 
Organisation for Animal Health, the Food and Agriculture Organization, 
the International Committee for the Red Cross, INTERPOL, the Organi-
zation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the U.N. Institute for 
Disarmament Research and the U.N. Interregional Crime and Justice 
Research Institute. He is also a member of the Advisory Board of the Vir-
tual Biosecurity Center and a founding member of the Safety Committee 
of the International Genetically Engineered Machines Competition. 
Stephen A. Morse is associate director for environmental microbiology, 
National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia. Dr. Morse’s previ-
ous post at the CDC was associate director for science. He is the coauthor 
of the Atlas of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS, 4th Edition. Before he 
joined the CDC, Dr. Morse was a professor of microbiology and infectious 
diseases at the Harvard School of Public Health and at Oregon Health 
Sciences University. In 1984, the CDC recruited him to direct their sexu-
ally transmitted disease research program. He was subsequently named 
deputy director of the bioterrorism program. In 2008, he became associ-
ate director for environmental microbiology at the National Center for 
Preparedness, Detection and Control of Infectious Diseases at the CDC, a 
post that also encompassed bioterrorism issues.
Dr. Morse earned his M.S.P.H. and Ph.D. degrees in microbiology and 
public health at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is cur-
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rently a member of the Public Health Foundation Board at the University 
of North Carolina’s Gillings School of Global Public Health. In 2000, he 
received the school’s Harriet Hylton Barr Distinguished Alumni Award, 
which recognizes the achievements of alumni and their outstanding con-
tributions to public health.
Randall Murch is associate director, Research Program Development, 
National Capital Region, Virginia Tech, adjunct professor, School of Pub-
lic and International Affairs, and adjunct professor, Department of Plant 
Pathology, Virginia Tech, and visiting professor, Department of War Stud-
ies, King’s College London, United Kingdom. Following graduate school 
and brief service in the U.S. Army Reserve, Dr. Murch’s first career was 
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), where he was a special 
agent. In his early years with the FBI, he was assigned to the Indianapo-
lis and Los Angeles Field Offices where he performed counterterrorism, 
counterintelligence, and other investigations. During his career, he was 
assigned to the FBI Laboratory as a forensic biologist, research scientist, 
department head, and deputy director at various times. Interspersed with 
his laboratory assignments were four assignments in the bureau’s techni-
cal investigative program: as a program manager for complex operations 
planning, Intelligence Division; unit chief for a technology development 
and deployment group, Technical Services Division; squad supervisor, 
New York Field Office; and deputy director, Investigative Technology 
Division. Between his last two FBI assignments, he was detailed to the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Department of Defense, where 
he was the director of the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, where 
he led advanced studies on complex current and future challenges dealing 
with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). While in the FBI, he created 
the FBI’s WMD forensic investigative program, served as the FBI’s science 
advisor to the 1996 Olympic Games, led forensic investigative aspects of 
a number of major terrorism cases, and initiated a number of new pro-
grams for both the FBI Laboratory and technical investigative program. 
In 1996, Dr. Murch created the FBI’s Hazardous Materials Response Unit, 
the nation’s focal point for the forensic investigation of WMD threats, 
events, and hoaxes; this laid the foundation for the creation of new fields 
in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons forensics. Throughout his 
FBI career, he also was involved with extensive liaison at the national and 
international levels in furthering science and technology for law enforce-
ment, counterterrorism, and national security purposes. He retired from 
the FBI in November 2002 after nearly 23 years of service, and as a mem-
ber of the Senior Executive Service for the last 7 of those years.
From December 2002 to December 2004, Dr. Murch was employed 
as a research staff member, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a lead-
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ing federally funded research and development center, where he led 
and participated in studies for the defense, intelligence, and homeland 
security communities. He is still an adjunct staff member at IDA. He 
joined Virginia Tech in December 2004, where he now works in the areas 
of life science research program development, microbial systems biology, 
microbial forensics, biosecurity, and university strategic planning. He 
has served or still serves on the Board of Life Sciences, National Research 
Council; DTRA’s Threat Reduction Advisory Committee; the Defense 
Intelligence Agency’s BioChem 2020, the FBI’s Scientific Working Group 
on Microbial Genomics and Forensics, and a new standing committee 
of the National Academy of Sciences for the Department of Homeland 
Security’s National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center. 
He has also been or is a member of, or has advised study committees 
of, the National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Insti-
tute of Medicine, Defense Science Board, and Threat Reduction Advisory 
Committee.
Dr. Murch received his bachelor of science in biology from the Uni-
versity of Puget Sound, Tacoma, Washington, in 1974; his master of sci-
ence degree in botanical sciences from the University of Hawaii in 1976, 
and his Ph.D. in plant pathology from the University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign in 1979.
Dana Perkins is a member of the Group of Experts established pursuant 
to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. Dr. Perkins earned a 
master’s degree in biochemistry from the University of Bucharest, Roma-
nia. She also earned a Ph.D. in pharmacology and experimental thera-
peutics in 2002 from the University of Maryland, Baltimore, where she 
specialized in microbiology/neurovirology. In her prior position, she led 
the Biological Weapons Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Branch 
in the Office of Policy and Planning, Office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS). At DHHS/ASPR, some of her responsibilities 
and duties included providing subject-matter expertise, interagency coor-
dination, and senior-level policy advice on the scientific (biodefense and 
biosecurity) and public health aspects of national and international emer-
gency preparedness and response; directing and coordinating national 
and international progress on issues related to biodefense and biosecurity; 
developing and reviewing policies on biosecurity, biological weapons 
nonproliferation, and health security; and performing expert analysis and 
preparing implementation plans to support the U.S. government biode-
fense and biosecurity policy.
Currently, Dr. Perkins serves in a U.S. government-seconded posi-
tion as a member of the Group of Experts supporting a subsidiary body 
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of the U.N. Security Council, the 1540 Committee. The 1540 Committee 
was established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) to monitor the imple-
mentation of this resolution worldwide. U.N. Security Council Resolution 
1540 imposes binding obligations on all states to prevent the proliferation 
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, related materials, and their 
means of delivery to terrorists and other non-State actors. It also encour-
ages enhanced international cooperation on such efforts.
Dragan Primorac is a pediatrician, forensic expert, and geneticist, adjunct 
professor, Eberly College of Science, The Pennsylvania State University, 
and Henry C. Lee College of Criminal Justice and Forensic Sciences, Uni-
versity of New Haven, Professor at Medical Schools in Split and Osijek, 
Croatia; founder of the Special Hospital for Orthopaedics, Neurology 
and Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation “St. Catherine,” Croatia; and 
cofounder of Department of Forensic Sciences, University of Split, Croatia.
Professor Primorac is a pioneer in the application of DNA analysis for 
identification of bodies in mass graves and one of the founders of forensic 
DNA analysis in the region. He authored more than 100 scientific papers 
and abstracts in clinical medicine, molecular genetics, forensic science, 
population genetics, genetic legacy of Homo sapiens sapiens, and educa-
tion, science, and technology policy. His papers have been cited more than 
1,500 times and currently he is the most cited clinician in Croatia in his age 
group in the field of biomedicine. Currently, he is involved in two FP-7 
projects (diagnostic and prognostic biomarkers for inflammatory bowel 
disease IBD-BIOM and multidimensional omics approach to stratification 
of patients with low back pain), altogether worth over 12 million euros. 
Professor Primorac has been an invited speaker at 60 conferences 
around the world and he is the cofounder of International Society of 
Applied Biological Sciences (ISABS) in which the Scientific Committee for 
Nobel Prize Laureates is involved. Several renowned media outlets, both 
electronic and print, have reported on the results of his work, such as the 
New York Times, USA Today, Chicago Tribune, Hartford Courant, JAMA, The 
Lancet, Science, NBC, and Channel 8 (Connecticut TV station). 
Professor Primorac has received 21 domestic and international awards 
including the Young Investigator Award of the American Society for Bone 
and Mineral Research in 1992, the Michael Geisman Fellowship Award of 
the Osteogenesis Imperfecta Foundation in 1993, the Life Time Achieve-
ment Award from the Henry C. Lee’s Institute of Forensic Science in 
2002, the Award of the Italian Region Veneto for Special Achievements 
in Promoting Science in the EU in 2007, the University of New Haven’s 
International Award for Excellence in 2010, and the Presidential Award 
by the president of the International Association of Forensic Sciences for 
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his contribution to forensic sciences in 2011. He is an honorary citizen of 
five cities in and outside of Croatia. 
From 2003 to 2009 he served as minister of science, education and 
sports, Republic of Croatia. According to the International Republican 
Institute survey of October 1, 2007, he was rated as the most successful 
minister in the Croatian government with 31 percent approval rate. As 
the minister of science, education and sports, Dr. Primorac launched a 
series of successful reforms in primary, secondary, and tertiary education 
as well as in science, technology, and sports that significantly improved 
the system. The award for numerous efforts made in the Croatian educa-
tional system is the survey of Newsweek (2010) which rated Croatia 22nd 
in education, ahead of 12 countries from the G20 group. 
Cerys Rees is capability lead, CB Analysis and Attribution, Detection 
Department, Dstl Porton Down, and is responsible for both the opera-
tional and research aspects in this area. She is a microbiologist with 15 
years of experience handling dangerous pathogens, and for the last nine 
years has been the technical leader for the development of the CB analy-
sis capability for defense and security (law enforcement) purposes in the 
United Kingdom.
Richard Vipond is operations manager, Rare and Imported Pathogens 
Laboratory (RIPL), Public Health England, Porton Down, and project 
manager for groups providing diagnostic support for RIPL and research 
into related pathogens. He is responsible for assessment and application 
of new diagnostics, genotyping, and genomic methods to study high-
containment pathogens. His interests include bacterial pathogenicity, 
genomics, proteomics, diagnostics, epidemiology, and high-containment 
bacterial pathogens. Dr. Vipond has published on bacterial pathogenic-
ity, vaccine evaluation, vaccine characterization, genome analysis, and 
epidemiology.
Haruo Watanabe is director general, National Institute of Infectious Dis-
eases, Tokyo, Japan, and professor, Faculty of Medicine, Tokyo University, 
Japan. Dr. Watanabe’s research interest areas are in understanding the 
molecular pathogenesis of enteric bacteria including enterohemorrhagic 
Escherichia coli, Salmonella, and Shigella, and development and applica-
tion of molecular epidemiological methods for outbreak investigations. 
Dr Watanabe holds M.D. and Ph.D. degrees from Gunma University in 
microbiology.
Ruifu Yang is a professor at the Beijing Institute of Microbiology and 
Epidemiology, China. His research is focused on bacterial genomics, evo-
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lution, and pathogenesis. He has published more than 150 papers in peer-
reviewed journals, including the New England Journal of Medicine, Nature, 
Nature Genetics, PNAS, PLOS Genetics, and Clinical Infectious Diseases. He 
is vice director of the Chinese Society of Microbiology and a member of 
the National Evaluation Committee for Food Safety Risk Assessment. He 
is also associate editor for PLOS NTD, Microbiologica Sinica, Chinese Journal 
of Preventive Medicine, Journal of Zoonosis, and editor for Pathogens and Dis-
eases, New Microbes and New Infections, and Chinese Journal of Microbiology 
and Immunology.
